> It’s also worth noting that end-to-end encryption is necessarily broken as messages to (and from) WhatsApp, Signal and Telegram pass across the bridge(s). The bridge(s) operates in Element’s trusted EMS environment, with no content scanning or datamining, but currently bridged conversations are not stored end-to-end encrypted in Matrix (they will be in the future). As a Signal user, I kind of don't want this to tak…
(Element CEO here). Honestly, it depends on your threat profile. Any kind of bridge has to inevitably MITM your conversations in order to work, and we’ve tried to spell that out in all the product info about Element One. If you want to avoid your E2EE conversations on Signal or WhatsApp being relayed via a service like Element One (because you’re an activist or whatever), then your options are to not bridge at all, o…
Sure, I can go around and tell everyone I know that they shouldn't bridge Signal to Element One because , but there's no way for me to tell that my advice has been followed. Previously, the chances that someone had set up such a bridge were small, but by nature of making these things accessible, Element One also increases the risk of my conversations being (benevolently?) MITM'd.
I think it's a great offering, but I share GP's reticence about a system that puts what used to be zero-knowledge conversations in plaintext on a third-party server...all without me realizing.