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Netgear Signed TLS Cert Private Key Disclosure

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Re: Netgear Signed TLS Cert Private Key Disclosure

#141

Post by ryanlol »

tracker1 wrote: post #135
ryanlol wrote: post #79

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I have zero sympathy for end users who aren’t willing to hold the vendors accountable. And besides, there’s nothing stopping the millions of end users from offering their own bribes in order to get shit fixed. $10 from each would go very far.

They already gave their "bribes" to get it fixed, by buying a product and expecting a reasonable level of support. Personally, I haven't liked most Netgear hardware I've tried... but since the FCC cracked down on open firmware for consumer gear, options are really limited with most vendors.

> They already gave their "bribes" to get it fixed, by buying a product and expecting a reasonable level of support

Ah yes, that certainly sufficiently compensates independent security research.

Your complaints aren’t worth shit unless you’re willing to pay up.

Re: Netgear Signed TLS Cert Private Key Disclosure

#142

Post by actionowl »

xg15 wrote: post #132
actionowl wrote: post #120

HTTP(S) might just be the wrong protocol for initial setup of a router! Maybe instead generate a password for each router and print it on the box along with the device's unique SSH Key fingerprint. Technical users can then SSH in and bootstrap the system (also generate/upload their own TLS certs if they want to use a browser and connect over HTTPS, etc). Non-technical users get an app and they can scan a QR code on t…

> Non-technical users get an app ... So now I need an already-working smartphone to set up my internet connection.

That's a good point actually. You'd need the internet to install the app too.

Re: Netgear Signed TLS Cert Private Key Disclosure

#144

Post by eldakka »

actionowl wrote: post #120

HTTP(S) might just be the wrong protocol for initial setup of a router! Maybe instead generate a password for each router and print it on the box along with the device's unique SSH Key fingerprint. Technical users can then SSH in and bootstrap the system (also generate/upload their own TLS certs if they want to use a browser and connect over HTTPS, etc). Non-technical users get an app and they can scan a QR code on t…

This could be extended to something like:

Ship a USB stick with the device with installer software on it.

The installer software sets up an SSH tunnel to the device, so it includes an SSH client and a script (batch) file that effectively does: SSH -Llocalhost::localhost: setup@

It has the known SSH signature of the device in its known_hosts, and of course the user has to type the password from the sticker on the device.

Then it fires up the browser with the url http://localhost: port used in previous step> which has access to the full setup of the device via the browser. It is HTTP, therefore there are no initial setup TLS issues with the browser, as you are going via an encrypted tunnel set up via SSH using HTTP encapsulated within that encrypted tunnel (effectively a temporary VPN) rather than using TLS.

As part of the setup process, the device generates a self-signed cert, which you can put in your computers/browsers trusted cert store for future use. Also as part of the setup, once the self-signed keys and certs are generated, it disables this local HTTP webserver that is being forwarded to via SSH, so in future the user can use a standard TLS connection to the device using the generated certificates. If a factory reset of the device is done, it blats its config and re-enables the 'setup' webserver (that is only running on localhost therefore can only be access locally,i.e. via SSH tunneling).

Re: Netgear Signed TLS Cert Private Key Disclosure

#145

Post by gdm85 »

gdm85 wrote: post #108
JshWright wrote: post #63

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That's an awfully big (and awfully optimistic) "might" in your first paragraph there...

It's not optimistic, it's what a responsible vendor is supposed to do. By not following responsible disclosure the researcher has lifted the vendor from the possibility of organizing a proper response.

By the way, I meant coordinated disclosure and I am not aware of Netgear not doing any at all, never.

Re: Netgear Signed TLS Cert Private Key Disclosure

#146

Post by oarsinsync »

lima wrote: post #84
oarsinsync wrote: post #66

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This was answered on the Gist in a comment[0] linking to a tweet[1]: Things to do instead of shipping TLS certs and static private keys to consumer-grade routers you sell by the thousand: Generate a unique keypair per device. Use this keypair to communicate upstream, in a similar fashion to CloudFlare's Keyless SSL. This keypair you generate on the device would need to be preloaded at the factory, unique per device,…

An attacker can just dump the unique key, impersonate the device and use that for a MitM attack. There's just no way to do this securely without completely locking down the devices using hardware key management (which would be unreasonably expensive for a cheap router, plus bad for people who want to flash their own firmware). Same level of security, and a lot of extra complexity and cost.

Yep, and that compromises that one device in the field. Not every device globally, today and tomorrow.

Re: Netgear Signed TLS Cert Private Key Disclosure

#147

Post by cjbprime »

dlgeek wrote: post #112
tgsovlerkhgsel wrote: post #91

The cert for www.routerlogin.net (Serial c1:a1:00:64:07:61:2c:07:00:00:00:00:50:f1:09:6a) isn't revoked yet: https://crt.sh/?id=1955992027&opt=ocsp The reporters should have asked the CAs to revoke the certificate. If the CA doesn't do that within 24 hours, it's considered a violation of the rules that the CA needs to follow to stay in browsers.

Anyone with access to the private key can submit a problem report to the CA, they're obligated to revoke if the key is exposed to a non-subscriber. I have submitted a report - they are obligated to revoke within 24 hours.

Looks like they've failed to perform the revocation in time -- other users reported to Entrust >24h ago.

Re: Netgear Signed TLS Cert Private Key Disclosure

#148

Post by lima »

oarsinsync wrote: post #146
lima wrote: post #84

Earlier quoted context omitted.

An attacker can just dump the unique key, impersonate the device and use that for a MitM attack. There's just no way to do this securely without completely locking down the devices using hardware key management (which would be unreasonably expensive for a cheap router, plus bad for people who want to flash their own firmware). Same level of security, and a lot of extra complexity and cost.

Yep, and that compromises that one device in the field. Not every device globally, today and tomorrow.

Only if each device has a unique subdomain.

Re: Netgear Signed TLS Cert Private Key Disclosure

#149

Post by ryanlol »

zelon88 wrote: post #126
ryanlol wrote: post #48

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It should be noted that it’s essentially never the people who find bugs arguing for “responsible disclosure”. It sure is easy to tell others what to do with their work product when you have zero stake in the game. There exists a really easy solution to the purported problem of full disclosure, vendors could just offer significant enough financial compensation for non-disclosure.

Let's take that avenue as a thought experiment... 1. Netgear buys the bug. 2. They keep shipping firmware with a private key. 3. Someone with malicious intent finds it. 4. Someone with malicious intent MITMs a Netgear network and does something bad. 5. Bad actor sells bug online. 6. Millions of Netgear devices continue operating with compromised certs. Instead, here's what happened/happens now... 1. Researcher tries…

Ah yes, it seems totally reasonable for netgear to not patch bugs they paid for.

Re: Netgear Signed TLS Cert Private Key Disclosure

#150

Post by borumpilot »

dlgeek wrote: post #136
cipherboy wrote: post #94

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yeah, but remember how they found it? On Netgear's website! In their firmware images! It wasn't like they had to hack a router, get root, and exfil the keys. All of this data was already made public, by Netgear! They just put together a document with prettier forms for everyone else to see. Hell, they probably could've given you a shell one liner to grab it from Netgear and extract the keys yourself. :-) Edit: and th…

It's still not, as of the time of this comment: https://crt.sh/?id=1955992027&opt=ocsp

It's still not, as of the time of this comment.
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