141–150 of 158 posts
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Regulatory capture. After their careers at the FAA they will go work at Boeing.
Do you think regulatory capture actually exists? If so, why is the pharmaceutical industry immune?
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Most software engineers aren’t qualified to have an opinion about the quality of proprietary safety critical software systems that also happen to run against proprietary hardware. So unless you’ve found an economical way to develop an open source jetliner... honestly, what would be the point of open sourcing safety critical systems to the general public? I’m not at all saying it should be closed off from external saf…
You'd be surprised what fraction of a safety critical codebase is just mundane code that anybody can understand with the same amount of effort it takes for "normal" software. The real problem is that most outsiders don't understand the requirements very well (unless you make them public too!), so they can likely only find "simple" code quality issues.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Most software engineers aren’t qualified to have an opinion about the quality of proprietary safety critical software systems that also happen to run against proprietary hardware. So unless you’ve found an economical way to develop an open source jetliner... honestly, what would be the point of open sourcing safety critical systems to the general public? I’m not at all saying it should be closed off from external saf…
Does being qualified grant you access to the code right now? Who decides if you're qualified and if permission is granted? I assume that currently there's several gatekeepers involved who can shut most independent investigators out.
Simply reading the code isn’t going to help you find critical safety flaws.
If they are doing 96% of the safety validation work — then they should bear 96% of the responsibility for safety process failures ... in this case, given the break down of safety validation capacity and what I’m increasingly viewing as essentially a coverup after the first and second crashes — 96% of the responsibility is and probably should be - enough to bring Boeing down ...
I’m beginning to think that might be the only way to ensure responsibility for this failure gets allocated in a sufficiently accurate way to ensure this scenario isn’t likely to happen again ... allowing the faa to have the responsibility to bear the weight of this process breakdown would basically just allow Boeing to shift responsibility for this outcome off themselves and onto an organization which it seems has been deliberately engineered (by Boeing) to not have the capacity to perform effective oversight ...
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That's surreal - avionics should run on hard real time. (Whether it's offline scheduled and thus "impossible" to miss a deadline, or if it's "soft" realtime and merely testing ensures this, is not the important part. The important part is that it should never miss a deadline.)
I can understand it looks weird but it isn't. A faster processor has no more real time guarantees than a slower processor from the 80s Of course, the faster one can do more stuff in less time, but for flying an airplane (or going to the moon) the amount of computing power needed is much less than people imagine. The issue here is adding more computing into an aging platform. But there's nothing inherently wrong into…
Can anyone in the know explain why, if ground clearance due to the new engines is the issue, why Boeing cannot just add a few inches to the wheel stems? This would raise the whole aircraft off the ground. Surely that wouldn't effect aerodynamics too much as the wheels are up most of the time.
They actually cleverly modified the landing gear to gain a bit of heigth, but it was not enough: https://youtu.be/F4IGl4OizM4
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Most software engineers aren’t qualified to have an opinion about the quality of proprietary safety critical software systems that also happen to run against proprietary hardware. So unless you’ve found an economical way to develop an open source jetliner... honestly, what would be the point of open sourcing safety critical systems to the general public? I’m not at all saying it should be closed off from external saf…
You'd be surprised what fraction of a safety critical codebase is just mundane code that anybody can understand with the same amount of effort it takes for "normal" software. The real problem is that most outsiders don't understand the requirements very well (unless you make them public too!), so they can likely only find "simple" code quality issues.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
You'd be surprised what fraction of a safety critical codebase is just mundane code that anybody can understand with the same amount of effort it takes for "normal" software. The real problem is that most outsiders don't understand the requirements very well (unless you make them public too!), so they can likely only find "simple" code quality issues.
That’s essentially my point. Just finding simple code quality issues isn’t going to cut it, especially when you need hundreds of thousands of dollars of hardware to even test the code against.
Move fast break things kind of doesn't work well with planes. Also too big to fail (fall) doesn't apply here.