Live data from Hacker News

An in-depth security review of the Intel Management Engine

security-center.intel.com

141–150 of 192 posts

Re: An in-depth security review of the Intel Management Engine

#141
post #65

Does anyone have an idea to what extent macbooks are affected? Intel ME is baked in every CPU but according to The Register [0] the AMT part is not running on Apple hardware. [0]: https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/05/01/intel_amt_me_vulner...

These most recent vulnerabilities don't require AMT. I don't see any reports of me_cleaner being used on a Mac yet, but I'd assume they are running the same ME firmware as everything else unless there is evidence otherwise.

Re: An in-depth security review of the Intel Management Engine

#142
post #8

Wow all 6th, 7th and 8th gen are all vulnerable along with a bunch of Xeon processors. Even the laptop I am typing this on is vulnerable, this is going to be messy. Plus all the fun vulnerabilities like arbitrary code execution, unauthorized access to privileged content. These must be related to the blackhat talk coming up in December about hacking a turned-off computer and running unsigned code on ME [0]. Yep and th…

> Wow all 6th, 7th and 8th gen are all vulnerable along with a bunch of Xeon processors.

Do we really think older systems are magically not vulnerable to any of these? It seems more likely that they're vulnerable but old enough that they're getting ignored... and so they'll never get fixes.

Intel sales slump solved? :-/

Re: An in-depth security review of the Intel Management Engine

#143
post #84
post #74

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I guess I'm "Normal-for-HN". IPMI is so useful that I wouldn't buy a server without it, even one I'm going to use in the same building.

IPMI is fantastic, so long that the understanding is in place that access to your IPMI vlan may as well be considered root access to the node. BMCs tend to be pretty miserable when it comes to security. It's generally a good idea to have ACLs in place to ensure BMCs can only communicate with a secured management node, and importantly that BMCs cannot communicate with each other .

Back when boards kept the IPMI on a separate interface it was easy to isolate them, including shutting down all port to port traffic on a switch.

Now, on many motherboards the BMC stuff will aggressively talk in-band even if you think you've disabled that.

Re: An in-depth security review of the Intel Management Engine

#144
post #117

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I think many discussions miss the nuance here. The problem is that the functionality is hidden, not necessarily that the function is there. > If they were more transparent, then they could be used by normal users for remote administration as well. The fundamental objection with ME isn't that it's "proprietary" or "non-libre" or whatever other ideological objections, it's that it's an opaque embuggerance that makes…

> The fundamental objection with ME isn't that it's "proprietary" or "non-libre" or whatever other ideological objections, it's that it's an opaque embuggerance that makes any analysis or reasoning about the system's security/trustworthiness/reliability completely impossible and specious. Erm, your fundamental objection is exactly the same objection as it being non-libre. You presented the same argument while trying…

Having source code is but a tool towards having the freedom to do what you want with your hardware. I can't see another tool that would also work and give the verifiability that you want.

Access to the firmware binary running on the ME processor and documentation for the latter would be even better than having source, since the latter assumes you trust the toolchain too.

Re: An in-depth security review of the Intel Management Engine

#145
post #117

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I wonder if this will at all dissuade either Intel or AMD into continuing to make these super privileged processors whose functions are completely hidden. I think many discussions miss the nuance here. The problem is that the functionality is hidden, not necessarily that the function is there. In corporate use, these tools can be incredibly useful. If they were more transparent, then they could be used by normal us…

> I think many discussions miss the nuance here. The problem is that the functionality is hidden, not necessarily that the function is there. > If they were more transparent, then they could be used by normal users for remote administration as well. The fundamental objection with ME isn't that it's "proprietary" or "non-libre" or whatever other ideological objections, it's that it's an opaque embuggerance that makes…

If you live in a city apartment, it’s likely locked (at least in part) with a key that the fire department holds. In Seattle in the mid 2000s we had a spate of hundreds of breakins due to ill secured fire dept master keys (in cheap lock boxes).

Re: An in-depth security review of the Intel Management Engine

#147
post #117

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I think many discussions miss the nuance here. The problem is that the functionality is hidden, not necessarily that the function is there. > If they were more transparent, then they could be used by normal users for remote administration as well. The fundamental objection with ME isn't that it's "proprietary" or "non-libre" or whatever other ideological objections, it's that it's an opaque embuggerance that makes…

> The fundamental objection with ME isn't that it's "proprietary" or "non-libre" or whatever other ideological objections, it's that it's an opaque embuggerance that makes any analysis or reasoning about the system's security/trustworthiness/reliability completely impossible and specious. Erm, your fundamental objection is exactly the same objection as it being non-libre. You presented the same argument while trying…

Auditability and modifyability are different.

Re: An in-depth security review of the Intel Management Engine

#149

Could someone explain what Management Engine is actually used for? It’s still not really clear to me why it needs to exist at all. Serious question.

Remote administration. Installing a new OS remotely, for example. There is legit demand for that. Imagine manually re-imaging 1000 workstations or servers.

yes, very useful for an enterprise and completely useless/potentially dangerous for consumers.
Post reply on HN