Let's start with a secure implementation for remote access:
1. SSH:
Port - 22
Protocol - 2
PermitRootLogin - no
StrictModes - yes
MaxAuthTries - 1
PasswordAuthentication - no
PermitEmptyPasswords - no
ChallengeResponseAuthentication - no
UsePAM - yes
2. PAM_ABL (auto-ban by account after three retires)
3. IPTables (auto-ban by IP after three retries)
So in the above implementation an attacker has three attempts, max. This means the logs are quiet, yet accurately depict intrusion attempts. This also stops brute force attempts in their tracks and requires no exemptions to normal workflow.
If, under the above circumstances, I were to obscure the port as well, this would serve no purpose than to completely side step script kiddie brute force attempts (as minimized as they would be in this configuration) with the horrific side effect of forcing my users to maintain (at the least) a config entry for the custom port assignment. Which, by the way, would become perpetually worse with the amount of servers and users in play.
This is why obscuring the port is such a bad idea.
And if you still want to obscure the port because the server, or network device, in question should only have occasional access by an extremely limited group of people, then just throw on a white list and possibly restrict access only through another server. Both provide more security than moving the port.
And moreover, this article isn't even about SSH. It's about the semantics surrounding the usage of the term "security through obscurity" in the previous article. Which is hilarious to me, as both articles are full of shit. For one, the security implications of non-privileged ports is moot as the attacker already has access. And two, being less likely of a target is still being a target. Those five people who found the port in the test sample. Those are the ones who win most likely to exploit; not the thousands of script kiddies brute forcing you.
Your time would be much better spent obscuring the actual version information for the service than the access point to it ...
(Reposted here, as the original site went down.)