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Hardening Firefox with Claude Mythos Preview

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Re: Hardening Firefox with Claude Mythos Preview

#131

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes I was including C in "C++". I dunno how much C Firefox uses. And I presume you can run AddressSanitizer with Rust but given Rust is memory safe by default, it's only going to find issues in `unsafe` code which is a tiny tiny fraction of most code. Google had a blog post a few months ago where they managed to put some actual numbers on this, because they almost shipped one Rust memory safety bug.

The lesson for other projects is very different if the reason these are all C++ bugs is just "We didn't ask Mythos for the bugs in Rust" versus if the difference is that asking Mythos for similar bugs in the Rust is futile because it won't find any. Some of this is tempered if the pattern is that Mythos finds bugs mostly in dusty old C++ but the rates are much, much lower in newer C++, the reverse of Google's earlier…

> The lesson for other projects is very different if the reason these are all C++ bugs is just "We didn't ask Mythos for the bugs in Rust" versus if the difference is that asking Mythos for similar bugs in the Rust is futile because it won't find any.

The answer is both of those. They didn't ask for bugs in the Rust code because it wouldn't have found any. They've explicitly set it up to only look for memory safety bugs. It's not going to find any in a memory safe language.

Re: Hardening Firefox with Claude Mythos Preview

#132

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I work at Mozilla; I fixed a bunch of these bugs. In general, I would say that our use of "vulnerability" lines up with what jerrythegerbil calls "potential vulnerability". (In cases with a POC, we would likely use the word "exploit".) Our goal is to keep Firefox secure. Once it's clear that a particular bug might be exploitable, it's usually not worth a lot of engineering effort to investigate further; we just fix i…

You may not be able to comment, but do you feel like Mythos is accomplishing anything that couldn't have already been done with Opus and the right prompting? I've assumed I could send an agent using a publicly available model bug hunting in a codebase like this and get tons of results, assuming I wanted to burn the tokens, so it's really unclear to me whether the Mythos hype is justified or if it's just an easy butto…

I never got direct access to Mythos, so all I know is what I've seen from the quality of the bugs being produced. I also haven't been involved at the prompting end.

So the best answer I can give is: I dunno, maybe it's possible to find bugs like this using Opus, but if so, where are they? Did nobody think to try "please find the bug in this code" pre-Mythos? I've done enough auditing with Opus to be convinced that it can be a good assistant to somebody who already knows what they're doing, but in practice the big wave of AI-discovered bugs started with Mythos.

I'm sure lots of people have assumed they could send a publicly available model bug hunting and find things. I have not noticed a huge amount of success. We've had some very nice correctness bugs reported, but skimming through the list of security bugs I've fixed recently, the AI-related ones all seem to be Mythos.

My best guess is that Mythos is just enough better along just enough axes that its hit rate on finding potential bugs and filtering out the real ones from the hallucinations is good enough to matter. Like, there's no obvious qualitative difference between 3.6kg of uranium-232 and 3.8 kg of uranium-232, just a small quantitative increase. But if you form both of them into spheres, only one of them has reached critical mass. Can you do something clever to reach critical mass with 3.6kg of uranium? Maybe! But needing to do something clever is a non-trivial barrier in itself.

Re: Hardening Firefox with Claude Mythos Preview

#133

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The lesson for other projects is very different if the reason these are all C++ bugs is just "We didn't ask Mythos for the bugs in Rust" versus if the difference is that asking Mythos for similar bugs in the Rust is futile because it won't find any. Some of this is tempered if the pattern is that Mythos finds bugs mostly in dusty old C++ but the rates are much, much lower in newer C++, the reverse of Google's earlier…

> The lesson for other projects is very different if the reason these are all C++ bugs is just "We didn't ask Mythos for the bugs in Rust" versus if the difference is that asking Mythos for similar bugs in the Rust is futile because it won't find any. The answer is both of those. They didn't ask for bugs in the Rust code because it wouldn't have found any. They've explicitly set it up to only look for memory safety b…

As long as the memory-safe subset of Rust is used exclusively.

Re: Hardening Firefox with Claude Mythos Preview

#134
post #112
post #77

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I've been thinking about this. Static analysis tools can also be much faster and most are fully deterministic, so including them in CI can catch bugs or latent bugs before they have a chance to land. I maintain a static analysis tool using in Firefox's CI. False positives have to be fixed or annotated as non-problems in order for you to land a patch in our tree. That means permitting zero positives (false or true), w…

Which tool?

https://firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org/js/HazardAnalysis/in... though I really ought to update that page.

It's for detecting a specific situation: you grab a pointer to a GC-managed object, call something that might possibly trigger a GC even if it probably won't, and then use the pointer. (The GC might collect that object, or it might move it somewhere else.)

Claude is pretty good at weaponizing these UAFs.

Re: Hardening Firefox with Claude Mythos Preview

#135

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The lesson for other projects is very different if the reason these are all C++ bugs is just "We didn't ask Mythos for the bugs in Rust" versus if the difference is that asking Mythos for similar bugs in the Rust is futile because it won't find any. Some of this is tempered if the pattern is that Mythos finds bugs mostly in dusty old C++ but the rates are much, much lower in newer C++, the reverse of Google's earlier…

> The lesson for other projects is very different if the reason these are all C++ bugs is just "We didn't ask Mythos for the bugs in Rust" versus if the difference is that asking Mythos for similar bugs in the Rust is futile because it won't find any. The answer is both of those. They didn't ask for bugs in the Rust code because it wouldn't have found any. They've explicitly set it up to only look for memory safety b…

> It's not going to find any in a memory safe language.

I mean, it's not supposed to find any in the unsafe language either, but that's why it was used.

Firefox not only uses unstable Rust features (via the exemption mechanism the same way Linux does it, trained professionals, closed course, do not attempt at home) it also presumably has some volume of its own explicitly unsafe Rust and so there's no reason this could not be checked, and what makes the difference here is whether it was or was not.

Re: Hardening Firefox with Claude Mythos Preview

#136
post #2

I hope to see the day when (or if) the LLMs get so good at spotting and fixing bugs that all that’s left for the Firefox engineers to do is to focus on adding new features. This isn’t sarcasm. Firefox deserves to be used more. Most people I know don’t use it because “Chrome does almost everything better”, and Firefox can’t compete with the other browsers’ roadmaps.

> Firefox deserves to be used more Part of the problem is, when they stop working on fixing bugs, they start doing Mr Robot things... We just want a web browser. Nobody asked for pocket, or AI... If they use AI to fix all the bugs, then what else is for them to do, other than maintain syntax compatibility with the various languages they build with? They're just going to go back to making the browser trash again.

when was the last time you made a contribution financially or physically? Those features were economically tied, who's giving the dough?

Re: Hardening Firefox with Claude Mythos Preview

#137
post #73
post #65

Earlier quoted context omitted.

How about this: a "vulnerability" is a "vulnerability", but after it was identified and verified to cause problem, that's when it should be called a "bug", because it could make the software do unwanted things.

At Mozilla, everything is called a bug. It's what other systems call an "issue". So it's too late for your terminology at Mozilla. (Example: I have a bug to improve the HTML output of my static analysis tool. There is nothing incorrect or flawed about the current output.) At Mozilla, but not everywhere: exploits are a subset of vulnerabilities are a subset of bugs.

That's why they created Bugzilla :) (https://www.bugzilla.org/blog/2023/08/26/bugzilla-celebrates...)

Re: Hardening Firefox with Claude Mythos Preview

#138

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It may be worth noting that Claude can and will (if it believes you own the code, at least) produce PoC exploits for exploitable bugs that it finds. My only source for this is personal experience, and no, I can't share any evidence of it.

Are you certified for high risk cyber uses? If so then you're correct. If not, then it does not match my experience

I'm not and I'm doing it right now.

Re: Hardening Firefox with Claude Mythos Preview

#140

I'm having more problems with Firefox 150 than I have had with any other browser update in years. I think I might be the only one though?

On both desktop and Android, I've been getting HTTPS errors that require two Refresh clicks before the actual page loads.
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