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Shai-Hulud Themed Malware Found in the PyTorch Lightning AI Training Library

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Re: Shai-Hulud Themed Malware Found in the PyTorch Lightning AI Training Library

#131

Post by bbor »

auraham wrote: post #47

This week I was wondering whether using uv for managing Python versions is a good idea. From their website [1] > Python does not publish official distributable binaries. As such, uv uses distributions from the Astral python-build-standalone project. See the Python distributions documentation for more details. It points to this GitHub repo https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standalone which mentions this other…

I'm really not worried about `uv` and `cpython` -- their processes are robust, their response times fast, and (now) their funding significant

I'm worried about, say, `mdformat` (a widely used formatter mostly maintained by one person in their spare time), not to mention some super-specific dependency that hasn't been updated in years and is 3 levels deep in your dep tree. I really don't want to pin & manually approve every single update for an app that's under active development, but it's beginning to look like that's mandatory for any serious app.

In the meantime, I've gotta go get my API keys out of my unencrypted `.env` files! Getting burned on a large, consumer-facing webapp would be embarrasing but logical, but losing hundreds to thousands of dollars because of some indirect dependency of some silly one-off demo repo that just happens to be on the same host & system as my `.env`s... oof.

Anyone know if OAI or Anthropic will refund you if you get your keys stolen like this? Or is it user error?

Re: Shai-Hulud Themed Malware Found in the PyTorch Lightning AI Training Library

#132

Post by nullsanity »

godelski wrote: post #127
jefftk wrote: post #113

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>This might just be the frequency illusion at play, but there seem to have been a number of high-profile supply chain attacks of late in major packages. It's real. As of the beginning of April we'd had 7 in the past 12 months vs 9 in the two decades before that: https://www.jefftk.com/p/more-and-more-extensive-supply-chai...

I think the real question is "are we just hearing about it more now or has the actual rate of attack increased?"

[dead]

Re: Shai-Hulud Themed Malware Found in the PyTorch Lightning AI Training Library

#133

Post by gib444 »

stronglikedan wrote: post #56
gib444 wrote: post #40

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Your LLM isn't a dependency?

It's a tool for building things. I can build those things equally well with or without it, maybe saving some time with it (arguable)), but I'm not dependent on it.

No, I'd posit the average developer who pulls in hundreds of deps but now uses LLMs to effectively replace them can not build things equally well without either.

Of course most devs lie to ourselves because of our ego that pulling in deps is /just/ a time-saving measure, but of course we know there are some incredibly high quality libraries and frameworks that we don't have the skills or experience to replicate to the same level

Re: Shai-Hulud Themed Malware Found in the PyTorch Lightning AI Training Library

#134

Post by ifwinterco »

pxc wrote: post #110
crabbone wrote: post #64

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Looking back ten years to `left-pad`, are there more successful attacks now than ever? I can't vouch for the number of attacks, but, and since we are talking about Python, nothing substantially changed since the time of `left-pad`. The same bad things that enabled supply chain attacks in Python ten years ago are in place today. However, it looks like there are more projects and they are more interconnected than bef…

> It's not just common, it's almost universal to run `pip install` on production machines as a means of deploying a Python program. Maybe a Python culture problem; maybe a hallmark of Python's status as an "easy to hire for", manager-friendly, least common denominator blub language; maybe a risk that stems from the conveniences of interpreter languages... but this is such a shame in this day and age. It's seriously n…

"Almost universal" is a bit of a stretch, most of the time these days Python apps are deployed as Docker containers, and if you're using k8s this becomes effectively mandatory.

However a lot of the time especially for older codebases the docker build will just run pip install from public pypi without a proper lockfile.

So at least install code isn't being executed on your production machine, but still significant surface area for supply chain attacks

Re: Shai-Hulud Themed Malware Found in the PyTorch Lightning AI Training Library

#136

Post by LtWorf »

mschuster91 wrote: post #60
wlkr wrote: post #32

This might just be the frequency illusion at play, but there seem to have been a number of high-profile supply chain attacks of late in major packages. There are several articles on the first few pages of HN right now with different cases. Looking back ten years to `left-pad`, are there more successful attacks now than ever? I would suspect so, and surely the value of a successful attack has also increased, so are we…

> Looking back ten years to `left-pad`, are there more successful attacks now than ever? I would suspect so, and surely the value of a successful attack has also increased, so are we actually getting better as a broad community at detecting them before package release? The value has increased, and that is what drives all these attacks. Cryptocurrencies are to blame in particular because they not just provided a way f…

> All too often it's North Korea or Iran running these campaigns.

I'm sure the NSA does similar things to them but we aren't really informed about that detail.

Re: Shai-Hulud Themed Malware Found in the PyTorch Lightning AI Training Library

#137

Post by fastball »

solid_fuel wrote: post #49
jackdoe wrote: post #22

I cant wait to have no dependencies. An extreme example is now when I make interactive educational apps for my daughter, I just make Opus use plain js and html; from double pendulums to fluid simulations, works one shot. Before I had hundreds of dependencies. Luckily with MIT licensed code I can just tell Opus to extract exactly the pieces I need and embed them, and tweaked for my usecase. So far works great for hobb…

And of course, you will go over every line of code that Opus produces with the same scrutiny we expect of open source maintainers, right? Right? I'm going to go publish some MIT-licensed remote access code and get that into Opus's training data.

Correct (and secure) code is possible and readily doable. It is unclear if supply chain attacks can ever be fully mitigated.

Re: Shai-Hulud Themed Malware Found in the PyTorch Lightning AI Training Library

#138

Post by saltyoldman »

wlkr wrote: post #32

This might just be the frequency illusion at play, but there seem to have been a number of high-profile supply chain attacks of late in major packages. There are several articles on the first few pages of HN right now with different cases. Looking back ten years to `left-pad`, are there more successful attacks now than ever? I would suspect so, and surely the value of a successful attack has also increased, so are we…

The attacks from TeamPCP were successful at stealing credentials recursively. So it is very likely that someone working on this pytorch related package may have recently pulled the bad litellm or trivy (or what was there like 8 others?)

And the reason it jumps from npm to pip to whatever is that it's trying to find all the user's keys in well known locations for any of these repos.

So teampcp is sitting on tens of thousands of passwords or keys and they just need time to run tests on them to figure out what packages they can release to get even more attacks out there.

Why all the major repo vendors haven't done a full cred wipe? No idea (unless they have and I just wasn't on the email list)

Re: Shai-Hulud Themed Malware Found in the PyTorch Lightning AI Training Library

#139

Post by kakacik »

CoastalCoder wrote: post #96
eddythompson80 wrote: post #39

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yeah, and ultimately no body cares. Everyone assumes it’s just some process miss, and we need to add another step to the process and move on. Fuck ups that would have killed the credibility of projects 10 years ago are now treated as “eeh what are you gonna do. Sometimes you ship malware. Will look into it”

> Yeah, and ultimately no body cares. I assume you're using hyperbole. Some of us are very aware and concerned about the risk. But like Cassandra from Greek mythology, we see the coming disaster and feel powerless to stop it.

Well yeah but if you don't have some critical mass which is very vocal/influential, at the end 'nobody cares enough'.
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