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The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI can simulate but not instantiate consciousness

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Re: The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI can simulate but not instantiate consciousness

#131

Post by dwb »

tsimionescu wrote: post #110
dwb wrote: post #101

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The computer and the program wouldn't exist without us, though. They only exist to be interpreted by us. The physical properties of the circuits outside of what we cajole them into doing are irrelevant, meaningless. The circuits only do their work regardless of particular interpretations; they wouldn't exist at all without people building them to be interpreted.

The physical computer could exist regardless of us. The program, if by that we mean "a human model of the computation happening in a physical computer" is just a description, yes. It would be extraordinarily unlikely, but physically conceivable, that a physical system that is organized exactly like a microcontroller running an automatic door program, together with a solar panel, a basic engine, and a light sensor, co…

I disagree that it’s conceivable that a computer could somehow exist without a conscious maker. It’s so unlikely that it may as well be impossible. If something non-human that was capable of consciousness did form in the universe, through known biology or not, it would “just” be another form of life, and not what the paper is talking about.

What you say about buildings is sort of true as far as it goes, but irrelevant for the argument because buildings aren’t symbolic manipulation machines that only mean something via conscious interpretation, that some people are claiming could gain consciousness themselves.

Re: The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI can simulate but not instantiate consciousness

#132

Post by tsimionescu »

dwb wrote: post #131
tsimionescu wrote: post #110

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The physical computer could exist regardless of us. The program, if by that we mean "a human model of the computation happening in a physical computer" is just a description, yes. It would be extraordinarily unlikely, but physically conceivable, that a physical system that is organized exactly like a microcontroller running an automatic door program, together with a solar panel, a basic engine, and a light sensor, co…

I disagree that it’s conceivable that a computer could somehow exist without a conscious maker. It’s so unlikely that it may as well be impossible. If something non-human that was capable of consciousness did form in the universe, through known biology or not, it would “just” be another form of life, and not what the paper is talking about. What you say about buildings is sort of true as far as it goes, but irrelevan…

Probability of such a structure forming is completely irrelevant. The argument makes sense if there was a mathematical/physical impossibility, but as long as the laws of physics allow such an object to exist and form by random chance, and predict it would operate exactly the same as the consciousness-designed one, I don't see any reason to discount it.

I also think the arguments against this are contradictory. On the one hand, we have an argument that says that computers only work because a consciousness built them to implement a particular computation. On the other hand, we're saying that the same physical computer doing the same physical thing can be interpreted to be implementing an infinite number of different computations. These two seem to point in different directions to me.

Re: The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI can simulate but not instantiate consciousness

#133

Post by tsimionescu »

tsimionescu wrote: post #111
TimTheTinker wrote: post #102

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think a better counter is the question "Is there a meaningful difference between binary discretization and Planck units? Aren't those discrete/indivisible as well?"

That's not really a good counter - Planck units are not a discretization. Space-time is continuous in all quantum models, two objects can very well be 6.75 Planck lengths away from each other. The math of QM or QFT actually doesn't work on a discretized spacetime, people have tried.

I should add one thing here: no theory that is consistent with special relativity can work on a discretized spacetime, because of the structure of the Lorrentz transform. If a distance appears to be 5 Planck units to you, it will appear to be 2.5 Planck units to someone moving at half the speed of light relative to you in the direction of that distance.

Re: The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI can simulate but not instantiate consciousness

#134

Post by 0xBA5ED »

colordrops wrote: post #130
0xBA5ED wrote: post #121

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'd argue we must go with these assumptions out of necessity rather than convenience. I don't have any broad strokes to offer on western thought, however.

Necessity for what condition? To find truth? Making assumptions are the opposite of finding truth.

To function. You must assume many things on a daily basis to function and survive because we are limited.

Re: The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI can simulate but not instantiate consciousness

#135

Post by gwd »

GMoromisato wrote: post #35
metalcrow wrote: post #13

I've attempted desperately to understand this paper after thoroughly reading it and have made 0 progress. Can anyone who does understand it attempt to explain? Currently my understanding is that this paper is claiming that "concepts" are a fundamental building block of experience (which relates to consciousness), and can only be built by a mapmaker which is something that directly converts continuous physical phenome…

It starts by saying that a simulation of something is not the real thing. A simulation of a hurricane is not a hurricane. That's certainly true and even obvious. Then they say that current AI is just a simulation of consciousness and therefore is not real consciousness. Moreover, it can never be real consciousness because it is just a simulation. But that's a circular argument: they are defining AI as a simulation. B…

> A simulation of a hurricane is not a hurricane. That's certainly true and even obvious.

I mean, if I simulated a small section of a hurricane by generating 120 mph winds and water pointed at your house, your house could still be flooded and destroyed.

Re: The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI can simulate but not instantiate consciousness

#136

Post by Tryk »

tsimionescu wrote: post #25

I've never understood why certain philosophers view computation as some kind of abstract symbolic manipulation, while they easily accept that consciousness is a physical process. Computation is something that a computer provably does. We build physical hardware, at great effort, to do computation. The hardware works and does the computation regardless of whether there is anyone to understand or interpret it. If it di…

>Computation is something that a computer provably does.

This is a circular definition. In order to properly define the concept, we must be able to word it without using "computing devices" in the definition.

Finding a satisfactory definition for what constitutes a "Computation" is actually an interesting debate goes back to the 1600s. Currently, the mainstream definition (from wikipedia) gives that: "A computation is any type of arithmetic or non-arithmetic calculation that is well-defined".

One way to understand the author is to learn more about the "The mapping account" theory behind computation: "a physical system can be said to perform a specific computation when there is a mapping between the state of that system and the computation such that the 'microphysical states [of the system] mirror the state transitions between the computational states.'"

Re: The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI can simulate but not instantiate consciousness

#137

Post by colordrops »

brotchie wrote: post #92
colordrops wrote: post #84

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I understand the original framing which is what you are repeating. I'm saying the framing itself is an illusion. It's an arbitrary distinction and also implies fully understanding all the underlying processes that go into pouring a cup of water in a pond (we don't) and that running a fluid dynamics simulation is some trivial thing (it's not).

Are you saying that, in some abstract sense, that actually pouring the cup may be isomorphic to running a perfect simulation of pouring the cup? Genuinely curious about your statement that its an illusion / arbitrary distinction, to figure out if there's a gap in my thinking / reasoning. To me there's a clear distinction between the actual thing happening via physical dynamics vs. us (humans) having creating a discre…

No, because calling them isomorphic would imply that we understand both processes well enough to make that comparison. Sorry I didn't reply sooner, HN blocked me for making three comments in a row.

Re: The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI can simulate but not instantiate consciousness

#138

Post by tsimionescu »

Tryk wrote: post #136
tsimionescu wrote: post #25

I've never understood why certain philosophers view computation as some kind of abstract symbolic manipulation, while they easily accept that consciousness is a physical process. Computation is something that a computer provably does. We build physical hardware, at great effort, to do computation. The hardware works and does the computation regardless of whether there is anyone to understand or interpret it. If it di…

>Computation is something that a computer provably does. This is a circular definition. In order to properly define the concept, we must be able to word it without using "computing devices" in the definition. Finding a satisfactory definition for what constitutes a "Computation" is actually an interesting debate goes back to the 1600s. Currently, the mainstream definition (from wikipedia) gives that: "A computation i…

I wasn't trying to use that as a definition of what computation means. My point is that regardless of how we define it, the fact is that the devices we build to do some form of computation are objectively successful at doing what they were built to do.

For example, you can say that Firefox is a human-centric abstraction, and that my computer isn't running Firefox right now in an objective sense, that this is is just a human-centric interpretation of what the physical device is doing, and that there exist other computations that we could assign to it.

But what you can't say is that the device is not affecting the physical world in ways that are consistent with performing the Firefox computation, such as causing certain specific wavelengths of light to be emitted by the screen based on state that is stored in a server in the YCombinator data center. This is a measurable fact of the physical world that is independent of the model of computation you chose to ascribe to the physical device - any consistent mapping will have to preserve this same physical property.

Re: The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI can simulate but not instantiate consciousness

#139

Post by bch8_ »

tsimionescu wrote: post #138
Tryk wrote: post #136

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>Computation is something that a computer provably does. This is a circular definition. In order to properly define the concept, we must be able to word it without using "computing devices" in the definition. Finding a satisfactory definition for what constitutes a "Computation" is actually an interesting debate goes back to the 1600s. Currently, the mainstream definition (from wikipedia) gives that: "A computation i…

I wasn't trying to use that as a definition of what computation means. My point is that regardless of how we define it, the fact is that the devices we build to do some form of computation are objectively successful at doing what they were built to do. For example, you can say that Firefox is a human-centric abstraction, and that my computer isn't running Firefox right now in an objective sense, that this is is just…

The paper addresses this point in section 3.2. They aren't debating the fact that a physical process is taking place in a computer running a program. They are arguing that the semantic interpretation of the output of that program is indeterminate and dependent on the mapping function:

> A single physical vehicle (bottom) possesses a fixed causal trajectory. However, it does not instantiate a unique computation. Depending on the alphabetization key applied (fA or fB ), the same physical states can be mapped to entirely different abstract computations (Top Left vs. Top Right). Therefore, computation cannot be intrinsic to the physics (p).

So yes there is a physical process generating your Firefox browser, but there is also a mapping function taking that program and interpreting that it should display your Firefox browser. There are any number of mapping functions that could be applied to the physical state in order to display other things on your screen besides the browser. Therefore, the Firefox browser being displayed is not inherent or intrinsic to the physical state of your computer. If we did not have the right mapping function, we would have no way of knowing or inferring or discovering which mapping function is correct.

Re: The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI can simulate but not instantiate consciousness

#140

Post by bch8_ »

Anon84 wrote: post #33

I would argue that, before we can begin to address whether or not AI can instantiate consciousness, we should agree on a practical, unequivocal definition of what consciousness is... and I think we're still pretty far from that milestone... Until then, this kind of argument are nothing more than pipe dreams, solipsism, and idle philosophising

I had the same initial thought but to be fair the paper addresses this explicitly and the author believes their argument can hold without fully understanding consciousness
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