Is this happening in part due to the sheer volume of pull-requests with AI generated code.. things are slipping through?
The telnyx SDKs aren’t AI generated code. The issue here was a pypi account compromise
Telnyx package compromised on PyPI
131–140 of 153 posts
Re: Telnyx package compromised on PyPI
#132I think it's only a matter of time at this point before a devastating supply chain attack occurs. Supply-chain security is such a dumpster fire, and threat actors are realising that they can use LLMs to organize such attacks.
Not sure what you mean by devastating, but supply chain attacks occur pretty much daily worldwide and LLMs have been used by attackers since multiple years at that point. Defending against supply chain threats is a pretty hard area to iterate and things are slow to change. For example pypi only supports trusted publishers since 2023 IIRC, and lots of large companies are still not consistently using that option
Re: Telnyx package compromised on PyPI
#133Telnyx provides voice capabilities for OpenClaw for those wondering.
They should add voip.ms. it's better all around I think
I had an horrible experience with VoIP.ms.
Every time I wanted to call a number in Europe I had to contact their support and go through "can you try now and see if works?" several time.
After 3 months I had enough of it and asked to have my provisioned credit reimbursed but they just refused.
Re: Telnyx package compromised on PyPI
#134Earlier quoted context omitted.
No. I was one of the "lucky" ones forced to use 2FA from the beginning. I also wrote the twine manpage (in debian) because at the time there was even no way of knowing how to publish at all. Basically you enable 2FA on your account, go on the website, generate a token, store it in a .txt file and use that for the rest of your life without having to use 2FA ever again. I had originally thought you'd need your 2FA ever…
I’ll bypass the technical inaccuracies in this comment to focus on the main important thing. > Then they have the trusted publisher thing (which doesn't and won't work with codeberg) where they just upload whatever comes from github's runners. There’s no particular reason it wouldn’t work; it’s just OIDC and Codeberg could easily stand up an IdP. If you’re willing to put the effort into making this happen, I’d be hap…
Did I misunderstand this conversation? https://discuss.python.org/t/new-oidc-providers-for-trusted-...
It didn't look to me like codeberg was being seriously considered for inclusion.
Re: Telnyx package compromised on PyPI
#135Has anyone here used Telnyx? I tried to build a product against their API last year and 3 weeks after signing up they banned my account and made it impossible to get an answer as to why or re-enable it.
I believe Telnyx and Twilio nuked every small or personal accounts at some point because they couldn't risk those being used for spam or scams.
There might have been some real risks for them, IDK.
But it is ironic that now Telnyx brand itself as an AI company but they couldn't detect that I am just calling some family once in a while and not involved in massive spam campaign.
The only one who kept me around was voip.ms but it literally doesn't work.
I am still looking for a decent VoIP provider to simply make calls.
Re: Telnyx package compromised on PyPI
#136Earlier quoted context omitted.
If they have compromised the token wouldn't that mean the developer is compromised and such access can be used to just put "curl whatever" into the build and publish that payload on pypi?
I don’t understand the question, sorry.
I'll try to reformulate in a simpler way.
On debian, all builds happen without internet access. So whatever ends up on the .deb file is either contained on the dependencies or in the orig tarball.
Is anything similar done for builds that create artifacts for pypi, so that a certain correspondence between binary file and sources exists? Or is there unrestricted internet access so that what actually ends up on pypi can come from anywhere and vetting the sources is of little help?
Re: Telnyx package compromised on PyPI
#137Earlier quoted context omitted.
Rather than being hopeful why not start running 'uv' inside sandbox? Why does your python package (cli/Web server/library) need full access to your full disk at the time of execution?
You're doing all of your software development inside containers, all the time? That is very inconvenient.
I'd argue it's not only not inconvenient, but also a great way of keeping your system clean of all the random system-wide dependencies you'll end up accumulating over the years.
Re: Telnyx package compromised on PyPI
#138Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don’t understand the question, sorry.
I'll try to reformulate in a simpler way. On debian, all builds happen without internet access. So whatever ends up on the .deb file is either contained on the dependencies or in the orig tarball. Is anything similar done for builds that create artifacts for pypi, so that a certain correspondence between binary file and sources exists? Or is there unrestricted internet access so that what actually ends up on pypi can…
That’s a nice property of centralized package management systems; I don’t think anything exactly like that exists for PyPI. The closest thing would be a cryptographic attestation.
(If I wanted to taxonomize these things, I say that the Debian model is effectively a pinky promise that the source artifacts correspond to the built product, except that it’s a better pinky promise because it’s one-to-many instead of many-to-many like language package managers generally are. You can then formalize that pinky promise with keys and signatures, but at the end of the day you’re still essentially binding a promise.)
Re: Telnyx package compromised on PyPI
#139Earlier quoted context omitted.
I’ll bypass the technical inaccuracies in this comment to focus on the main important thing. > Then they have the trusted publisher thing (which doesn't and won't work with codeberg) where they just upload whatever comes from github's runners. There’s no particular reason it wouldn’t work; it’s just OIDC and Codeberg could easily stand up an IdP. If you’re willing to put the effort into making this happen, I’d be hap…
Did I misunderstand this conversation? https://discuss.python.org/t/new-oidc-providers-for-trusted-... It didn't look to me like codeberg was being seriously considered for inclusion.
I wrote in that thread that I think Forejo (or more precisely Codeberg) probably clears the bar for inclusion[1].
[1]: https://discuss.python.org/t/new-oidc-providers-for-trusted-...
Re: Telnyx package compromised on PyPI
#140Earlier quoted context omitted.
Or Forth with scientific library, bound to the constraints. Put some HTTP library on top and some easy HTML interface from a browser with no JS/CSS3 support at all. It will look rusty but unexploitable. Enterprise computing with custom software will make a comeback to avoid these pitfalls. I depise OpenJDK/Mono because of patents but at least they come with complete defaults and a 'normal' install it's more than enou…
> Or Forth with scientific library, bound to the constraints. Put some HTTP library on top and some easy HTML interface from a browser with no JS/CSS3 support at all. It will look rusty but unexploitable. Let this be a lesson to you youngsters that nothing in unexploitable. Forth has no standard library for interfacing with SQLite or any other database. You're either using 8th or the C ABI. Therefore, you'll most lik…
GForth might have then for sure (Sqlite it's small and supported by even jimtcl) . Also, there's Factor, a Forth inspired language.