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Deno Sandbox

deno.com

131–140 of 185 posts

Re: Deno Sandbox

#131
What's with the pricing of these sandbox offerings recently? I assume just trying to milk the AI trend.

It's about 10x what a normal VM would cost at a more affordable hoster. So you better have it run only 10% of the time or you're just paying more for something more constrained.

A full month of runtime would be about $50 bucks for a 2vCPU 1GB RAM 10GB SSD mini-VM that you can get easily for $5 elsewhere.

Re: Deno Sandbox

#132
post #12

> In Deno Sandbox, secrets never enter the environment. Code sees only a placeholder > The real key materializes only when the sandbox makes an outbound request to an approved host. If prompt-injected code tries to exfiltrate that placeholder to evil.com? Useless. That seems clever.

Reminds me a little of Fly's Tokenizer - https://github.com/superfly/tokenizer It's a little HTTP proxy that your application can route requests through, and the proxy is what handles adding the API keys or whatnot to the request to the service, rather than your application, something like this for example: Application -> tokenizer -> Stripe The secrets for the third party service should in theory then be safe should…

I've been working on something similar (with claude code).

It's a sandbox that uses envoy as a transparent proxy locally, and then an external authz server that can swap the creds.

The idea is extended further in that the goal is to allow an org to basically create their own authz system for arbitrary upstreams, and then for users to leverage macaroons to attentuate the tokens at runtime.

It isn't finished but I'm trying to make it work with ssh/yubikeys as an identity layer. The authz macaroon can have a "hole" that is filled by the user/device attestation.

The sandbox has some nice features like browser forwarding for Claude oauth and a CDP proxy for working with Chrome/Electron (I'm building an Obsidian plugin).

I'm inspired by a lot of the fly.io stuff in tokenizer and sprites. Exciting times.

https://github.com/dtkav/agent-creds

Re: Deno Sandbox

#133

Secret placeholders seems like a good design decision. So many sandbox products these days though. What are people using in production and what should one know about this space? There's Modal, Daytona, Fly, Cloudflare, Deno, etc

These are all wrappers around VMs. You could DIY these easily by using EC2/serverless/GCP SDKs.

Modal engineer here. This isn’t correct. You can DIY this but certainly not by wrapping EC2 which is using the Nitro hypervisor and is not optimized for startup time.

Nearly all players in this space use Gvisor or Firecracker.

Re: Deno Sandbox

#134

Secret placeholders seems like a good design decision. So many sandbox products these days though. What are people using in production and what should one know about this space? There's Modal, Daytona, Fly, Cloudflare, Deno, etc

These are all wrappers around VMs. You could DIY these easily by using EC2/serverless/GCP SDKs.

To the commenters here: thanks for correcting me! So AWS is losing AI sandboxing market to GCP due to high cold start times of EC2...very interesting!

Re: Deno Sandbox

#135

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm not saying sandboxes are not needed, I'm saying VMs/containers already provide the core tech and it's easy to DIY a sandbox. Would love to understand what value E2B offers over VMs?

making a local sandbox using docker is easy, but making them work at high volume and low latency is hard

That's right. But they (E2B) rely on the underneath Cloud infra to achieve high scalability. Personally, I'm still not sure about the value they add on top of Cloud hosted VMs. GCP/AWS already offer huge discounts to startups, which should be enough for VM-based sandboxing of agents in the MVP phase.

Re: Deno Sandbox

#136
post #17

See also Sprites ( https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46557825 ) which I've been using and really enjoying. There are some key architecture differences between the two, but very similar surface area. It'll be interesting to see if ephemeral + snapshots can be as convenient as stateful with cloning/forking (which hasn't actually dropped yet, although the fly team say it's coming). Will give these a try. These are ex…

what are the key architectural differences?

Sprites aren't ephemeral. They're like deli cups: "semi-disposable". You keep them around as long as you feel like, and you don't feel bad about throwing them away.

Re: Deno Sandbox

#137
It's always the exorbitant price with such offerings.

A 2 vCPU, 4GB Ram and 40GB Disk instance on Hetzner cost 4.13 USD.

The same here is:

$127.72 without pro plan, and $108.72 with pro plan.

This means to break even, I can only use this for 4.13/127.72*730 = 23.6 hours every month, or, less than an hour daily.

Re: Deno Sandbox

#138
post #131

What's with the pricing of these sandbox offerings recently? I assume just trying to milk the AI trend. It's about 10x what a normal VM would cost at a more affordable hoster. So you better have it run only 10% of the time or you're just paying more for something more constrained. A full month of runtime would be about $50 bucks for a 2vCPU 1GB RAM 10GB SSD mini-VM that you can get easily for $5 elsewhere.

Ditto... but it's more like 30x.

Mentioned the same in this comment as well: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46881920

Re: Deno Sandbox

#139

Earlier quoted context omitted.

These are all wrappers around VMs. You could DIY these easily by using EC2/serverless/GCP SDKs.

Modal engineer here. This isn’t correct. You can DIY this but certainly not by wrapping EC2 which is using the Nitro hypervisor and is not optimized for startup time. Nearly all players in this space use Gvisor or Firecracker.

Do you know Eric Zhang by chance? I went to school with him and saw that he was at Modal sometime back. Potentially the smartest person I’ve ever met… and a very impressive technical mind.

Super impressed with what you’ve all done at Modal!

Re: Deno Sandbox

#140
post #12

> In Deno Sandbox, secrets never enter the environment. Code sees only a placeholder > The real key materializes only when the sandbox makes an outbound request to an approved host. If prompt-injected code tries to exfiltrate that placeholder to evil.com? Useless. That seems clever.

Reminds me a little of Fly's Tokenizer - https://github.com/superfly/tokenizer It's a little HTTP proxy that your application can route requests through, and the proxy is what handles adding the API keys or whatnot to the request to the service, rather than your application, something like this for example: Application -> tokenizer -> Stripe The secrets for the third party service should in theory then be safe should…

This reminds me of a SaaS that existed 15+ years ago for PCI-DSS compliance. It did exactly that: you had it tokenize and store the sensitive data, and then you proxied your requests via it, and it inserted them into the request. It was a very neat way to get around storing data yourself.

I cannot remember what the platform was called, let me know if you do.

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