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How we exploited CodeRabbit: From simple PR to RCE and write access on 1M repos

research.kudelskisecurity.com

131–140 of 244 posts

Re: How we exploited CodeRabbit: From simple PR to RCE and write access on 1M repos

#131

Earlier quoted context omitted.

https://www.coderabbit.ai/blog/our-response-to-the-january-2...

For anyone following along in the comments here. Code Rabbit's CEO posted some of the details today, after this post hit HN. The usual "we take full responsibility" platitudes.

I’m sure an “intern” did it.

Re: How we exploited CodeRabbit: From simple PR to RCE and write access on 1M repos

#132

I cancelled my coderabbit paid subscription, because it always worries me when a post has to go viral on HN for a company to even acknowledge an issue occurred. Their blogs are clean of any mention of this vulnerability and they don't have any new posts today either. I understand mistakes happen, but lack of transparency when these happen makes them look bad.

Most security bugs get fixed without any public notice. Unless there was any breach of customer information (and that can be often verified), there are typically no legal requirements. And there's no real benefit to doing it either. Why would you expect it to happen?

The benefit, apparently, is that people like this guy don't cancel their memberships.

Re: How we exploited CodeRabbit: From simple PR to RCE and write access on 1M repos

#133
post #130

From the CEO's response: > On January 24, 2025, security researchers from Kudelski Security disclosed a vulnerability to us through our Vulnerability Disclosure Program (VDP). The researchers identified that Rubocop, one of our tools, was running outside our secure sandbox environment—a configuration that deviated from our standard security protocols. Honestly, that last part sounds like a lie. Why would one task run…

[deleted]

Re: How we exploited CodeRabbit: From simple PR to RCE and write access on 1M repos

#134

hey, this is Howon from CodeRabbit here. we wish to note that this RCE was reported and fixed in January. it was entirely prospective and no customer data was affected. we have extensive sandboxing for basically any execution of anything now, including any and every tool and all generated code of any kind under the CodeRabbit umbrella. if you want to learn how CodeRabbit does the isolation, here's a blog post about h…

The word "now" here is kinda worrying tbh. How was it a good idea to release and sell this product before it has been the case?

Re: How we exploited CodeRabbit: From simple PR to RCE and write access on 1M repos

#135
When I read up to "One can use the Rubocop configuration file to specify the path to an extension Ruby file" my immediate thought was "oh no, they didn't allow a user-extendable tool to run in their prod environment..." - and yes, they did. Not that it'd be properly secure without this glaring hole - I don't think many linters are properly audited and fuzzed against hostile inputs - but this is like opening the front door and hanging a blinking neon sign "Please Hack Us!" over it.

Re: How we exploited CodeRabbit: From simple PR to RCE and write access on 1M repos

#136
post #83

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Code Rabbit is a vibe coder company, what would you expect? Then they try to hide the breach and instead post marketing fluff on google cloud blog not even mentioning they got hacked and can not even give any proof there is no backdoor still running all the time. What a piece of shit company.

I got so much heat for calling out that Tea app for being imbeciles who couldn’t bother finishing reading the firebase docs. People were quick to blame firebase instead of the devs. Vibrators are so fucking annoying, mostly dumb, and super lame.

This post would have a lot more meaning if "vibe coders" were the only ones making security mistakes that involved thousands of customers.

Re: How we exploited CodeRabbit: From simple PR to RCE and write access on 1M repos

#137
post #2

> While running the exploit, CodeRabbit would still review our pull request and post a comment on the GitHub PR saying that it detected a critical security risk, yet the application would happily execute our code because it wouldn’t understand that this was actually running on their production system. What a bizarre world we're living in, where computers can talk about how they're being hacked while it's happening. A…

Another proof that AI is not smart, it’s just really good at guessing.

Re: How we exploited CodeRabbit: From simple PR to RCE and write access on 1M repos

#138

I cancelled my coderabbit paid subscription, because it always worries me when a post has to go viral on HN for a company to even acknowledge an issue occurred. Their blogs are clean of any mention of this vulnerability and they don't have any new posts today either. I understand mistakes happen, but lack of transparency when these happen makes them look bad.

Most security bugs get fixed without any public notice. Unless there was any breach of customer information (and that can be often verified), there are typically no legal requirements. And there's no real benefit to doing it either. Why would you expect it to happen?

> there are typically no legal requirements

Not after EU CRA https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyber_Resilience_Act goes into effect

Re: How we exploited CodeRabbit: From simple PR to RCE and write access on 1M repos

#139
post #130

From the CEO's response: > On January 24, 2025, security researchers from Kudelski Security disclosed a vulnerability to us through our Vulnerability Disclosure Program (VDP). The researchers identified that Rubocop, one of our tools, was running outside our secure sandbox environment—a configuration that deviated from our standard security protocols. Honestly, that last part sounds like a lie. Why would one task run…

Not sure why it seems like a lie. Oversights like this happen all the time.

Re: How we exploited CodeRabbit: From simple PR to RCE and write access on 1M repos

#140

I think that Security fuckups of this disastrous scale should get classified as "breaches" or "incidents" and be required to be publicly disclosed by the news media, in order to protect consumers. Here is a tool with 7,000+ customers and access to 1 million code repositories which was breached with an exploit a clever 11 year old could created. (edit: 1 million repos, not customers) When the exploit is so simple, I f…

> be required to be publicly disclosed

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyber_Resilience_Act

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