Should a microkernel implement eBPF and WASM, or, for the same reasons that justify a microkernel should eBPF and most other things be confined or relegated or segregated in userspace; in terms of microkernel goals like separation of concerns and least privilege and then performance?
Linux containers have process isolation features that userspace sandboxes like bubblewrap and runtimes don't.
Flatpaks bypass selinux and apparmor policies and run unconfined (on DAC but not MAC systems) because the path to the executable in the flatpaks differs from the system policy for */s?bin/* and so wouldn't be relabeled with the necessary extended filesystem attributes even on `restorecon /` (which runs on reboot if /.autorelabel exists).
Thus, e.g. Firefox from a signed package in a container on the host, and Firefox from a package on the host are more process-isolated than Firefox in a Flatpak or from a curl'ed statically-linked binary because one couldn't figure out the build system.
Container-selinux, Kata containers, and GVisor further secure containers without requiring the RAM necessary for full VM virtualization with Xen or Qemu; and that is possible because of container interface standards.
Linux machines run ELF binaries, which could include WASM instructions
/? ELF binary WASM : https://www.google.com/search?q=elf+binary+wasm :
mewz-project/wasker
https://github.com/mewz-project/wasker :
> What's new with Wasker is, Wasker generates an OS-independent ELF file where WASI calls from Wasm applications remain unresolved.*
> This unresolved feature allows Wasker's output ELF file to be linked with WASI implementations provided by various operating systems, enabling each OS to execute Wasm applications.
> Wasker empowers your favorite OS to serve as a Wasm runtime!
Why shouldn't we container2wasm everything? Because (rootless) Linux containers better isolate the workload than any current WASM runtime in userspace.