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Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users

krebsonsecurity.com

131–140 of 233 posts

Re: Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users

#131
post #128

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Because they aren’t required to by law. I have filed comments with the FTC that this recovery path should be legally mandated for digital accounts, I encourage others to do the same. It doesn’t have to be an Apple Store (insider risk, see SIM swapping analogy); could be USPS or another government identity proofer they partner with. Login.gov uses USPS for in person identity proofing, for example. Your data and accoun…

Well previously when stock trades involved exchanging physical certificates, I could imagine that ownership could evaporate if you lost that piece of paper. Or just think about cash: you do lose that ownership when you lose that magical piece of paper. It's a simpler world when what you have physically determines what you own.

Physical certificates are not a thing of the past and can be restored upon loss or destruction: https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-ba...

Re: Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users

#132

Earlier quoted context omitted.

But you shouldn't ONLY store it in a box or in your house. That means you're one natural disaster away from losing everything. As much as it can "weaken" security, an electronic backup is still recommended for most

As much as it can "weaken" security, an electronic backup is still recommended for most Maybe I'm being dense (probably), but where would you save it? iCloud? No, that doesn't work - you need the key to access iCloud. Some other cloud storage service? No, that doesn't work - you need your phone to generate a token for access and your phone was destroyed in the same fire as the paper backup. Seems like the safe choice…

Engraved onto something like titanium would be better than a fireproof safe - they're only safe for X amount of time (I want to take a stab in the dark and say about 90 minutes?). This is how I have backed up some (since retired) crypto seed phrases in the past.

Re: Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users

#133
post #66

Earlier quoted context omitted.

As much as it can "weaken" security, an electronic backup is still recommended for most Maybe I'm being dense (probably), but where would you save it? iCloud? No, that doesn't work - you need the key to access iCloud. Some other cloud storage service? No, that doesn't work - you need your phone to generate a token for access and your phone was destroyed in the same fire as the paper backup. Seems like the safe choice…

Get it tattooed on a (normally not seen) part of your body. Like under your hair! ;) Of course, a code like that can be in multiple places, possibly where it won’t be recognized as such.

And pray you never need to update the passcode!

I'm imagining this spiraled around somebody's upper thigh... "fakePassw0rdo̶n̶e̶t̶w̶o̶t̶h̶r̶e̶e̶four"

Re: Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users

#134

Earlier quoted context omitted.

But you shouldn't ONLY store it in a box or in your house. That means you're one natural disaster away from losing everything. As much as it can "weaken" security, an electronic backup is still recommended for most

As much as it can "weaken" security, an electronic backup is still recommended for most Maybe I'm being dense (probably), but where would you save it? iCloud? No, that doesn't work - you need the key to access iCloud. Some other cloud storage service? No, that doesn't work - you need your phone to generate a token for access and your phone was destroyed in the same fire as the paper backup. Seems like the safe choice…

> Some other cloud storage service? No, that doesn't work - you need your phone to generate a token for access

You definitely don't need your phone for access. I use Yubico security keys for everything like this. I have several of them that are on all my accounts and I don't keep them in the same place.

Re: Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users

#136
post #104

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Have you seen how easy it is to get fake government ID? It’s damn near a rite of passage for teenagers so they can buy alcohol. $20-$50 if you know the right person or can wander the dark web right. I’m not sure you want that to be the absolute best digital security you can get.

Okay, then also require a photo when opting in to this, and make sure the person who shows up looks like said photo too.

[deleted]

Re: Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users

#137
post #68

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I was unsure what this Recovery Key was: https://support.apple.com/en-us/109345 It is kind of scary too — lose the key and no one can get you back in to your account.

You can setup a recovery contact incase you do loose the key. I just set that up with my partner and the chance of loosing the key and both of us losing all of our apple devices I think is fairly slim. I also stuck that key in 1Password (sure it's less safe, but if my 1Password was breached I have far bigger problems than this key being retrieved). Then keep a hard copy in a safe. Been contemplating sending my parent…

Hard copy? edge the string in a hard surface. My favorite is a rock in my garden. The characters are facing the ground to shield from erosion. The visible surface of the rocks (all of them) is painted white for aesthetic.

Survives a fire, earthquake. No tornadoes or tsunamis here. Nobody has stolen any such rocks from here.

Re: Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users

#138
post #4

Yet another reason why phone number verification is the most insecure way to verify users and it doesn't matter if a company like Apple is using it or your bank using so called 'Military grade encryption'. The point still stands [4] with countless examples [0] [1] [2] [3]. Unless you want your users to be SIM swapped, there is no reason to use phone numbers for logins, verification and 2FA. [0] https://news.ycombinat…

I think we should start doing product liability lawsuits to any organization capable of having user financial data affected from their account, that is using SMS one time codes as either default, enabled by default, and the heaviest legal remedies to financial organizations where that's the only option we should also update PCI DSS compliance or whatever relevant security standard to call SMS one time codes totally i…

Never will happen on the consumer side. Consumer lose their device way to often to make TOTP or pass codes viable.

Financial institutions can detect if your phone number has been ported or forwarded.

Bigger threat is phishing and password sharing between accounts. I ran tech at investment firm/ neo bank and never saw an attack on sms 2FA and we had over a million customers. We had email 2FA for a while there was significant number of people who shared passwords between email and their bank.

Re: Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users

#139

Earlier quoted context omitted.

But you shouldn't ONLY store it in a box or in your house. That means you're one natural disaster away from losing everything. As much as it can "weaken" security, an electronic backup is still recommended for most

As much as it can "weaken" security, an electronic backup is still recommended for most Maybe I'm being dense (probably), but where would you save it? iCloud? No, that doesn't work - you need the key to access iCloud. Some other cloud storage service? No, that doesn't work - you need your phone to generate a token for access and your phone was destroyed in the same fire as the paper backup. Seems like the safe choice…

One possibility is to encrypt a copy with a key that you are pretty sure you can remember, and store that encrypted copy someplace public on the web. Periodically check that you do still remember the key.

The conventional way to do this would be encrypt it with a symmetric cipher keyed from a password or passphrase. I've been using an unconventional approach where the secret you have to memorize is an algorithm rather than a password/phrase. Programmers might find an algorithm easier to memorize than a passphrase.

Here's an example of this general idea. The algorithm is going to be a hash. This one will take a count and a string, and output a hex string. In English the algorithm is:

  hash the input string using sha512 giving a hex string
  while count > 0
    prepend the count and a "." to current hash and apply sha512
The recovery code I want to backup is 3FAEAB4D-BA00-4735-8010-ADF45B33B736.

I'd pick a count (say 1969) and a string (say "one giant leap for mankind"), actually implement that algorithm, run it on that input and string. That would give me a 512 bit number. I'd take "3FAEAB4D-BA00-4735-8010-ADF45B33B736" and turn it into a number too (by treating at as 36 base 256 digits). I'd xor those two numbers, print the result in hex, and split it into 2 smaller strings so it wouldn't be annoyingly wide.

Then I'd save the input count, input string, and the output:

  1969 one giant leap for mankind
  ed428dffa23f4f14ae2a7b7e842019fc11b5726d726b96c11ec266758be67cb0
  f2a78a320a85df809afe83c6c7840e2d175cceadb455260735405cd047459cc9
I'd then delete my code.

I could then do a variety of things with the "1969 one giant leap for mankind" and the two hex strings. Put then in my HN description. Include then in a Reddit comment. Put them on Pastebin. Take a screenshot of them and put it on Imgur.

To recover the code from one of those backups, the procedure is to implement the algorithm from above, run it with the count and string from the backup to get the 512 bit hash, take the 512 bits of hex from the backup, xor them, and then treat the bytes of the result as ASCII.

Then delete the implementation of the algorithm. With this approach the algorithm is the secret, so should never exist outside your head except when you are actually making or restoring from backup.

When picking the algorithm take into account the circumstances you might be in when you need to use it for recovery. Since you'd probably only be needing this if something so bad happened that you most of your devices and things like your fireproof safe, you might want to pick an algorithm that does not require a fancy computer setup or software that would not be in a basic operating system installation.

The algorithm from this example just needs a basic Unix-like system that you have shell access to:

  #!/bin/sh
  COUNT=$1;
  shift;
  KEY=`/bin/echo -n $* | shasum -a 512 | cut -d ' ' -f 1`
  while [ $COUNT -ge 1  ]; do
    KEY=`/bin/echo -n $COUNT.$KEY | shasum -a 512 | cut -d ' ' -f 1`
    COUNT=`expr $COUNT - 1`
  done
  echo $KEY

Re: Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users

#140
post #128

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Because they aren’t required to by law. I have filed comments with the FTC that this recovery path should be legally mandated for digital accounts, I encourage others to do the same. It doesn’t have to be an Apple Store (insider risk, see SIM swapping analogy); could be USPS or another government identity proofer they partner with. Login.gov uses USPS for in person identity proofing, for example. Your data and accoun…

Well previously when stock trades involved exchanging physical certificates, I could imagine that ownership could evaporate if you lost that piece of paper. Or just think about cash: you do lose that ownership when you lose that magical piece of paper. It's a simpler world when what you have physically determines what you own.

People want a just world (imho, n=1, based on all available evidence, etc), recourse, and protections, not a simple world. Interestingly, cash will likely be the last to go in the near future from a “possession of value” as the world goes cashless (although whether this is "good" or "bad" can be argued in another thread).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cashless_society

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