Earlier quoted context omitted.
Secure hashes need to be fast. If you look at the ongoing SHA-3 competition, you will see an enormous focus on speed, on both software and hardware. Why do they need to be fast? They're used everywhere . Opening up notepad.exe, you'll verify a handful of digital signatures, each of which will compute a hash of the binary as first order of business. HMAC is used in virtually every secure network protocol worth using -…
I guess what I don't fully understand is just how computationally intensive (slow) a hash needs to be to produce a reliable fingerprint, that is, one that is as collision free as possible and extremely sensitive to any tiny change in the source data. I do understand that password related hashes may have arbitrary computational delays added just to make them tougher to brute force, which would be bad in many other (al…
They go the other way round and set a "security parameter" that should hold for a particular instance (all the parameters fixed) of their algorithm. That "security parameter" determines how hard it should be for an arbitrary adversary to break the scheme by brute force, and in addition the scheme is only thought to be secure if there is no polynomial time algorithm that can break it in time significantly less than the brute force algorithm would take.
Given such a security parameter, the art is then typically to design the fastest primitive that upholds this same security margin. For example, if two (unbroken) algorithms would take O(2^80) for a brute force Birthday Attack, then you'd conceive the faster of the two as the "better" algorithm. ("Fast" of course can be subjective, e.g. fast in HW or fast in SW etc.)
For one thing, that's simply just because making an algorithm slower is always possible (PBKDF2), but in practice there are a lot of applications (probably more) where a hash should be as fast as possible rather than as slow as possible, as in digital signatures for example.