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Brute-forcing a macOS user’s real name from a browser using mDNS

fingerprint.com

131–140 of 168 posts

Re: Brute-forcing a macOS user’s real name from a browser using mDNS

#131

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Better cloudflare than your ISP that's already explicitly intercepting your dns queries to sell your data/profile.

False dichotomy. Not only am I pretty sure Sonic isn't selling my DNS queries, I've already opted out of DNS over HTTPS. Refusing to respect the choices I've made is worse than not. Besides, unencrypted SNI means that if my ISP wanted to get the hosts I was looking at, they could.

Unencrypted SNI is fairly rare now.

Re: Brute-forcing a macOS user’s real name from a browser using mDNS

#132
post #59

The more time passes, the more comfortable I feel about mostly interacting with the internet from a Qubes box, in a disposable Whonix/Tor VM, with Javascript disabled... This is just gross. I mean, not surprising. But appalling in so many ways that it's even possible. If you're not familiar with fingerprint.com, they do "deep user profiling" - think "maintaining a constant user ID across computers, browsers, OSes, et…

Eww this is gross. I'm impressed it manages to do it on a stock iphone in incognito with two different IPs, surely it must look like any other iphone

Edit: ublock origin filter, which breaks the demo:

  ||fpjscdn.net

Re: Brute-forcing a macOS user’s real name from a browser using mDNS

#133

Good thing I always change the name of my devices. Apple's default naming is a privacy error. One time I was on a first date with someone in law enforcement. Being a woman alone and obviously interested in protecting herself, she'd done a background check on me and had informed several fellow community members of our whereabouts. I, on the other hand, didn't know her last name. We joked about that. When we got in her…

>...dashboard display showed that it auto-paired with her iPhone... which was named with her first and last name.

So many times a rental car comes with a dozen of profiles from previously paired phones along with their phone books, saved map locations, history. Not much use, of course, still, it leaks out without much thought to it.

Guess what, the hardest thing is to remind myself to clear my profile before returning the car...

Re: Brute-forcing a macOS user’s real name from a browser using mDNS

#135
post #121

This is a well-written, interesting article. I especially like the non-alarmist tone to it ("Considering the inherent weaknesses and numerous limitations, this attack isn't practical.")

I’m not sure.

This allows to test wether hostnames exists on your network.

It’s maybe not an issue for a unique hostname but what about fixed hostnames or default hostnames that are common in the IoT world.

This allows a website to secretly guess if you own a given device. It’s even worse used in a targeted attack : if you know some devices of the network, you can guess that the connected user is on the targeted network.

Re: Brute-forcing a macOS user’s real name from a browser using mDNS

#136
post #33
post #25

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Is that true? There’s a preflight request that checks with the server as to what’s allowed and then the browser issues the original request if it’s ok, right?

"Simple requests" are not preflighted, such as those that do not set any headers (among other qualifications). https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/CORS#simpl... (Aside, is MDN's href linking broken for everyone or just me?)

link works for me

Re: Brute-forcing a macOS user’s real name from a browser using mDNS

#137
post #57

On my macOS box, I run Little Snitch, a nice UI that can be set to ask local user for explicit permission before allowing a network request. https://www.obdev.at/products/littlesnitch/index.html I’ve occasionally stumbled on it during remote logins, usually when an SSH session wants to download something new, like NPM requesting NodeJS bits. The text terminal SSH download will block; if I figure out it’s the Little S…

I've heard of little snitch a ton, but is it just a really smart firewall essentially? On Windows, every darn thing connects to something, its ridiculous.

Re: Brute-forcing a macOS user’s real name from a browser using mDNS

#138
post #110

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Using Firefox (on a Linux laptop) with resistfingerpriting=true or Mull (on an Android) with its default settings, I'm able to get assigned a new fingerprint whenever I clear cookies or use a new Incognito session. I haven't tested it, but presumably they also wouldn't be able to track me between domains, even without clearing cookies.

So it gets me on MacOS with safari, lynx, and firefox with strict anti-tracking on. Tor works for blocking it. All in all they have created a creepy wee tool.

On MacOS, on Firefox, resistFingerprint=1 and clearing out recent history, or going in incognito mode, (cookies, cache, etc.) defeats the fingerprint.

A little disappointed that Privacy Badger didn't seem to make any difference. Was active the whole time.

Re: Brute-forcing a macOS user’s real name from a browser using mDNS

#139
post #57

On my macOS box, I run Little Snitch, a nice UI that can be set to ask local user for explicit permission before allowing a network request. https://www.obdev.at/products/littlesnitch/index.html I’ve occasionally stumbled on it during remote logins, usually when an SSH session wants to download something new, like NPM requesting NodeJS bits. The text terminal SSH download will block; if I figure out it’s the Little S…

I've heard of little snitch a ton, but is it just a really smart firewall essentially? On Windows, every darn thing connects to something, its ridiculous.

Same with macOS. Install LittleSnitch in strict mode, and you won't go 5s without a pop up blocking something. You can either trust all of the lists that are available to keep LS somewhat out of your way, or you can go full tilt and approve everything. Personally, I've never found that middle ground.

Re: Brute-forcing a macOS user’s real name from a browser using mDNS

#140

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Better cloudflare than your ISP that's already explicitly intercepting your dns queries to sell your data/profile.

False dichotomy. Not only am I pretty sure Sonic isn't selling my DNS queries, I've already opted out of DNS over HTTPS. Refusing to respect the choices I've made is worse than not. Besides, unencrypted SNI means that if my ISP wanted to get the hosts I was looking at, they could.

Can you elaborate on why you'd want to opt-out of DNS over HTTPS? I was under the impression that it was useful and good for privacy, but I may be misinformed.
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