People seem to have a really hard time with the idea that, in the SVB debacle, the system worked effectively and pretty much the way it was planned to. It's not even clear what people are upset about. There's an article on the front page of The Atlantic today about how angry we should be about SVB, and if you read it, it's hard to figure out who those angry people should be. Equity is getting zeroed out. Management w…
This kind of assumes that the risk matrix of an executive is singularly indexed on the long term viability of their institution. But the short term gain of bad behavior is still in full effect. Bonuses for the years up to this crisis have already been paid and were probably inflated based on the banks over performance due to its riskier posture.
And the consequences have been softened. There's a very good chance that the people responsible here have had their guilt assuaged by the reduction in impact. They are probably less likely to become the kinds of pariah that they probably should because while we should always consider decisions in the context they are made, humans seem to always adjust their assessments to final consequences.
I'm in agreement that the decisions here on the part of the government are probably the wisest in this context. But this crisis does hint that perhaps we need to reconsider the structure of this system a bit.