I use Privacy.com, which basically turns every card I use with them into a canary. The first time you charge on one of their virtual cards, they become merchant-locked. No other merchant can charge to that number, and if someone tries, I get an alert. I have uncovered flaws in online merchants this way, and notified them. They were usually grateful, especially so since the fraudulent charges failed.
Worth mentioning that several banks offer virtual credit card numbers as a built-in feature so you don't need a separate service: https://www.doctorofcredit.com/list-of-banks-which-offer-vir... I've only used this for the sketchiest of vendors though. Chargebacks are pretty easy for the once-a-decade event where I get billed for something incorrectly.
Detect breaches with Canary credit cards
131–140 of 158 posts
Re: Detect breaches with Canary credit cards
#132Does anyone have a good alternative to Privacy.com where your virtual credit card transaction data isn't sold to Wall Street? If you're unfamiliar with what a "virtual [credit] card" is here's the page from Privacy.com's website: https://privacy.com/virtual-card I use the Privacy app on my mobile phone to create virtual cards (primarily for work subscriptions). Pro-tip: since each Privacy card can have its own name p…
> (1) Does anyone have a privacy-respecting alternative to Privacy.com's virtual credit cards? Capital One offers virtual cards through Eno ( https://www.capitalone.com/digital/eno/virtual-card-numbers/ ) that are merchant locked. They make it somewhat cumbersome to use, but I've really enjoyed using them. It doesn't block wall street knowing about what you're buying, but at least it's likely got one (or more) fewer…
Re: Detect breaches with Canary credit cards
#133I use Privacy.com, which basically turns every card I use with them into a canary. The first time you charge on one of their virtual cards, they become merchant-locked. No other merchant can charge to that number, and if someone tries, I get an alert. I have uncovered flaws in online merchants this way, and notified them. They were usually grateful, especially so since the fraudulent charges failed.
Not just ACH information from a check for the linked account, which is all they should require.
No, despite supposedly being privacy-concerned, they require credentials (or auth token, hopefully) that gain access to everything the login has visibility into. I have multiple accounts at these places, the checking account is a tiny fraction of what's available with creds in hand.
That tab was promptly closed and effort abandoned.
Re: Detect breaches with Canary credit cards
#134Earlier quoted context omitted.
> (1) Does anyone have a privacy-respecting alternative to Privacy.com's virtual credit cards? Capital One offers virtual cards through Eno ( https://www.capitalone.com/digital/eno/virtual-card-numbers/ ) that are merchant locked. They make it somewhat cumbersome to use, but I've really enjoyed using them. It doesn't block wall street knowing about what you're buying, but at least it's likely got one (or more) fewer…
Citi also offers unlimited virtual card numbers for credit cards, and it is a bit easier than Eno since you can manage directly from the website without needing to install anything.
Re: Detect breaches with Canary credit cards
#135xPay (Apple/Google/etc Pay) Isn’t a major value prop of Apple Pay and the likes is your creditial can’t be stolen.
Apple also seems to have no interest in letting other browsers on macOS use it, and I do most of my shopping on my mac, so I end up using my plain card number in almost all cases.
If the merchant seems particularly sketchy about security or not charging the card for more than what was agreed on (or makes it very hard to cancel their service), I need a one-time use card number anyway, since Apple and Google Pay don't yet protect against the latter.
Re: Detect breaches with Canary credit cards
#136Earlier quoted context omitted.
Credit card shouldn’t need to be shared with all and sundry. The concept is very old fashioned. We wouldn’t share out side project github keys like this!
Quite the opposite: It should, in an ideal world, be perfectly safe to share your credit card number with everyone, because all it should be is arguably an account number. Payment initiation or confirmation can be an entirely separate layer (such as chip + PIN or 3D Secure). This is actually the goal of European regulators right now (with some carve-outs for low value and low-risk transactions).
At the moment you need to provide a complete "private key" to each processor, who up the ante to: CC Number + Expiry + Security Code + Name + Address. They all ask for it, so any of them could leak it, or it could be phished.
Re: Detect breaches with Canary credit cards
#137> Some places we recommend putting these include: Databases where you store customer payment information alarm klaxon sounds Why do you have a database containing customer payment information?
Yes, in many cases you can have your payment service provider store that data for you, but sometimes that's impracticable.
Re: Detect breaches with Canary credit cards
#138This is a very shortsighted and short-lived idea - cyber criminals will find out the first digits of all these canary credit cards and never bother to test them. Even if multiple prefixes come into existence, unless they are mixed with normal credit cards, this won't ever make practical sense.
From the article: "Savvy attackers may start looking for patterns in the bank identification numbers (BINs) that we issue, and proactively deleting or excluding them from their dumps. For this reason we are in discussions with a number of banks to onboard their BINs to the system too, further mixing in legitimate cards with tokens."
Re: Detect breaches with Canary credit cards
#139> Some places we recommend putting these include: Databases where you store customer payment information alarm klaxon sounds Why do you have a database containing customer payment information?
To seed with canary credit card numbers! But seriously, for widely implemented (i.e. not-proprietary) databases of CC numbers it would be great if there were more automated ways of seeding them with CC canaries. Sort of a "LetsEncrypt for CC databases." E.g. for CCs saved by your browser, I'd like to see a plugin that lets you use one click to seed that DB with a few random CCs.
The whole idea would be to reduce the burden on the end user, who we all know will probably not take the time to do this manually.
Re: Detect breaches with Canary credit cards
#140> Some places we recommend putting these include: Databases where you store customer payment information alarm klaxon sounds Why do you have a database containing customer payment information?
To charge payments to customers? Yes, in many cases you can have your payment service provider store that data for you, but sometimes that's impracticable.
Honestly shocked by how much pushback I've had on this on this thread. I feel like I made a fairly innocuous comment that, essentially, was just suggesting that it's probably best practice to avoid storing customer card details in your own database. That seems to me about as uncontroversial as saying 'you should not be storing plaintext passwords', but apparently, judging from the replies I've seen, it's hopelessly naive, and you can't actually handle payments without storing CC numbers.
Which comes as a bit of a surprise to me, as in my day job I work on an e-commerce system that handles a billion dollars of credit card transactions a year, including stored payment methods and processing recurring billing - and we haven't got a single credit card number in any of our databases. So I kind of suspect it can be done.