Is there any reason to use these cloud based solutions when open source alternatives like KeepassXC is available?
Same problem with many other open source alternatives. Lousy user experience, in this case across devices.
The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on
131–140 of 436 posts
Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on
#132I feel like this is an excellent time to, once again, give out two reminders to anyone who needs reminding: "The cloud" is just someone else's computer. Sharing your password with anyone always makes you less secure.
And so does sending your passwords to a phone or a home/work pc via chats or email, or using a single password everywhere, or maybe a couple of them with trivial variations. Cloud password managers wouldn’t even exist if people didn’t do much more stupid things to enter their passwords on a different device than the cloud could ever think of.
Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on
#133For anybody else left wondering, Bitwarden does encrypt (nearly) everything in your vault: > At Bitwarden we take this trusted relationship with our users seriously. We also built our solution to be safe and secure with end-to-end encryption for all Vault data, including website URLs, so that your sensitive data is “zero trust” secure [1] I haven't used LastPass in years, but the recent news made me wonder how Bitwar…
I run BW with Yubikey 2FA and a local hosted sync server.
KeePassX/C perhaps. Vault for secrets management.
Never touched LastPass, 1Password or any of these other mickey-mouse commercial apps that invariably claim "military-grade encryption" or "unhackable" when their fundamental constructions are crap.
Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on
#134Earlier quoted context omitted.
you're thinking too much about the specific example and not the general point, but I edited the parent comment with an actual example edit: oh, I did say append so I see why you'd think that. that's my bad. what I meant was include
By your example, your passwords are a set of fixed or knowable data, plus a unique identifier that in your examples is three characters long. Therefore knowing one of your passwords gives all except three characters of every other password, thus making your effective password length three characters (substitute the actual length of your unique identifier if it's more than three).
Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on
#135Earlier quoted context omitted.
The database is encrypted when at rest; i.e., no plaintext is stored on Dropbox. Assuming your master password is decent, you could plaster the database on a billboard and it would be safe. LastPass, on the other hand, encrypts some information (the actual passwords). The URLs and other sensitive information is stored in plaintext in the cloud. [Final edit. I swear.] As you note, as long as the entire blob is encrypt…
But that is the same claim that Bitwarden and 1Password make. Both insist that they don't ever see your master password, which means that your vault security depends entirely on it being good enough. And both encrypt everything. Assuming that I trust Bitwarden not to lie about their security model, what do I gain by piecing together multiple tools to accomplish the same thing?
Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on
#136Earlier quoted context omitted.
But that is the same claim that Bitwarden and 1Password make. Both insist that they don't ever see your master password, which means that your vault security depends entirely on it being good enough. And both encrypt everything. Assuming that I trust Bitwarden not to lie about their security model, what do I gain by piecing together multiple tools to accomplish the same thing?
(Sorry, I turned around and made an edit, but not before you replied.) KeePass encrypts the entire database, all fields, as one giant blob. LastPass stores URLs and other fields as plaintext; these too can contain critically sensitive information. [Edit: (See I flagged it)] As far as know it wasn't LastPass's client that was compromised--it was their servers/data store.
Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on
#137And when I say that I will stop using 1password when the local vault no longer works, people look at me like I'm paranoid and crazy. I've looked at the white paper https://1passwordstatic.com/files/security/1password-white-p... , I think 1password has a decent security posture for their cloud offering but then there's always the risk of a breach where the attacker controls the site and can intercept your master passw…
Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on
#138Having all your keys/passwords on a 3rd party server is something that I've never been willing to accept from a security standpoint. That's what always kept me from using a `hosted` solution. I do get the allure from a multi-user management aspect though.
Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on
#139Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on
#140If this is true there really is such low hope for cryptocurrency. If you can’t store your keys in a service like LP hardened via physical 2FAA. What’s left? Air gapped setups?