Earlier quoted context omitted.
Feels like reinventing the past, looking at what people have done with just x509/PKI in multiple European countries. Though that's not to say there aren't a few fun ideas in there, it just seems much less mature with many mistakes repeated.
Federation and acceptance are key. My country of citizenship has been issuing PIV(?)-based smartcards for more than a decade now, yet almost nobody could (and still can) verify them within the country, let alone abroad. On the other hand, the EU digital Covid certificate project managed to get pretty widespread adoption in a short timeframe – with a vastly simpler technology stack backing it. I'm really hoping the eI…
That is most likely specific to your country and it's approach to deployment, your politics. Estonia mandated the availability of smartcard/PIV/mTLS authentication and it's now very widespread. Also really easy and free to implement.
> let alone abroad.
That is unwillingness to follow the EU standard from some EU countries and wish to reinvent the wheel (e.g. BankID and similar). I know that eIDAS-compliant PIV/smartcard implementations are cross-compliant e.g. Finland-Estonia-Latvia-Lithuania. But code-stealing Polish implementation for example isn't.
> On the other hand, the EU digital Covid certificate project managed to get pretty widespread adoption in a short timeframe – with a vastly simpler technology stack backing it.
Each country were given most of the stack required, they bypassed a lot of bullshit many countries have with software development.
> I'm really hoping the eIDAS project or a similar private initiative manages to use that momentum and bring (hopefully private) ID verification to the web.
When PSD2 required 2FA for banking, we had had it for more than five years at that point. So there is hope some EU legislation smooths these things out at some point, but it's going to be quite late.