Earlier quoted context omitted.
Tor itself does not support UDP, even if SOCKS might
Good point. Makes it a better fit for SOCKS I suppose. Tor does dns over tcp - or no dns?
Arti – An implementation of Tor in Rust
131–140 of 143 posts
Re: Arti – An implementation of Tor in Rust
#132Earlier quoted context omitted.
To many on the internet which was financed by DARPA? The irony is strong on this thread.
Perhaps you're forgetting that although the NSA have at times historically been regarded as good guys, they've since been found to quietly backdoor crypto products (etc) to others detriment. That's a bit different from DARPA.
Tor was initially funded by the Naval Research Lab (which is broadly similar to DARPA), and from a quick google, has received funding grants from the NSF and Department of State.
Re: Arti – An implementation of Tor in Rust
#133Earlier quoted context omitted.
I've been wondering about this. Afaik Ross Ulbricht was caught due to shitty opsec. Was that a case of the NSA having that capability and not sharing it with the FBI?
Ulbricht was first connected to "Dread Pirate Roberts" by Gary Alford, an Internal Revenue Service investigator working with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration on the Silk Road case, in mid-2013.The connection was made by linking the username "altoid", used during Silk Road's early days to announce the website, and a forum post in which Ulbricht, posting under the nickname "altoid", asked for programming help a…
Re: Arti – An implementation of Tor in Rust
#134Couldn't find any introduction to the project on the blog but the official repo has more info on the background for the project: >Rust is more secure than C. Despite our efforts, it's all too simple to mess up when using a language that does not enforce memory safety. We estimate that at least half of our tracked security vulnerabilities would have been impossible in Rust, and many of the others would have been very…
Re: Arti – An implementation of Tor in Rust
#135Earlier quoted context omitted.
You are linking to those as if I haven’t read them – I have! I find the grift in the space just as gross. You didn’t answer my second question about whether you (yes, you, not Stephen Diehl) think that having a private way to transact online is important. Do you? The next question for you is a little more philosophical – say cryptocurrency is bad, evil and should be “gotten rid of”. What do you propose we do about th…
Tight regulations is the solution and is needed on the crypto space. The privacy tokens will be first, Monero, ZCash, etc, they will be completely banned and made illegal due to this, (why does Coinbase still not allow these tokens?) Next, we need to crackdown tighter on the exchange ramps, we only have to look at the Tether fraud [0] that is happening, then the crackdown will begin on the whole space. Then the crash…
Re: Arti – An implementation of Tor in Rust
#136Earlier quoted context omitted.
How so?
Because it is just a library for rust programs. Not even close to reimplementation of Tor for general use. edit: yea, downvoters, show your own inability to process truth. I love this grown up behavior here on HN.
Re: Arti – An implementation of Tor in Rust
#137This would allow global access to services in case of DNS outages, superfluous takedown requests, or anything in between.
Onion service support seems to be TBD, unfortunately.
Re: Arti – An implementation of Tor in Rust
#138Earlier quoted context omitted.
Towards the flagged sibling comment about the tor network providing a hiding place for illegal activities and terrorism: While it's non-trivial to inspect many aspects of tor traffic, an often used study metric has been the (determinable) percentage of connections to hidden services, which are usually assumed to be disproportionately malicious. This ranges around ~5% across most studies, the most recent one I can fin…
It's easier to account for the quantity of malicious use of Tor towards non-hidden internet websites > Based on data across the CloudFlare network, 94% of requests that we see across the Tor network are per se malicious. https://blog.cloudflare.com/the-trouble-with-tor/
I'm skeptical about their metrics. If I try to access a cloudfare protected site and never manage to finish the infinite captcha look or just change my mind after seeing the captcha, do they consider it a successful block? Even if we think they have some magic way of actually knowing whether all requests are malicious or not:
> That doesn’t mean they are visiting controversial content, but instead that they are automated requests designed to harm our customers. A large percentage of the comment spam, vulnerability scanning, ad click fraud, content scraping, and login scanning comes via the Tor network.
Personally I don't think content scraping and vulnerability scanning are "malicious per se", by that metric even Google (and every other search engine) would be malicious.
Re: Arti – An implementation of Tor in Rust
#139So at this point it is ready for passing traffic through a SOCKS proxy. Meaning we can `cargo run --release -- proxy` and redirect applications to use port `9150` for their network connections. Couple of related questions: - Does anyone know, in a Linux distro, how to pass all system traffic through a SOCKS proxy port? I'm not looking for intermediary proxy handlers but an official method to force all user and system…
Re: Arti – An implementation of Tor in Rust
#140Well done and thank you to all involved. You are making a real difference on the side of democracy, human rights and the values of the free world at an uncertain time when so much is under threat.
Towards the flagged sibling comment about the tor network providing a hiding place for illegal activities and terrorism: While it's non-trivial to inspect many aspects of tor traffic, an often used study metric has been the (determinable) percentage of connections to hidden services, which are usually assumed to be disproportionately malicious. This ranges around ~5% across most studies, the most recent one I can fin…
"I could not find any reference to the toolset used to identify the websites being visited by the scanned users. I think this is important for external verification of the validity of the data. If the software is public and known, could the authors reference it? If the code is new, could the authors deposit it along the rest of the code in the OSF repository? This should not be a problem, since the authors do not have any conflict of interest."
[0] https://pubpeer.com/publications/3CE766FE19680525B332FA0004A...