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Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability

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Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability

#131
post #85

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Quoting you here: "I'd also like to point out that the scope of the risk isn't trivial. For example, URL-based password resets are only as secure as the mailbox they are sent to. i.e. a significant number of domains are stolen and threatened to be stolen through email account exploits (re-registering previously used addresses, forwarding attacks, etc.) This is made even more complex when a domain expires and email on…

"why would your team not opt for things that ARE vetted as being secure, trusted, open, and have widespread adoption?" It was a classic case of letting product management opinion over-ride engineering implications. Namely, on behalf of customer service, I went to bat - hard - with the engineers, to give our CSRs a completely effective way to handle inbound password requests in cases where customers no longer had acce…

What's to stop me (possible hover CSR, co-worker, whatever) from simply reading a high-profile customer's password and transferring all their million dollar domain names to me later that night when I get home from work?

I have a pretty good memory. I bet I could remember 5-10 simple passwords and email addresses without writing anything down. Chances are the idiots use the same password for their email anyways.

Muahahaha, I'm rich, and your company is going down the tubes in a lawsuit. See you later!

Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability

#132

In the past few weeks, we’ve discussed a new approach that we think will strike a better balance by giving our customers greater control over password management and at the same time ensuring the basic security of those passwords. I’m personally very pleased that our approach will have appeal to customers that are concerned about password security and customers that appreciate the benefits of great usability (and for…

Second all of that about Gandi. They also seem to offer more TLD's than most of the mainstream US-based registrars.

Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability

#133

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Isn't this basically the same thing as e-mailing yourself your password?

Not if the link can time-out or expire after X [days, minutes, seconds, ect]. When I think of emailing my self the password, I think of storing it in plain text in my email account. When I think of authentication via email I think of a one time use link that allows me to log into a session.

Email is sent in plaintext. It'd be easy enough for an attacker to request an email authentication (which it then sniffs in transit). Expiry time doesn't help much.

Email auth really should be done as Joakal says - your public key stored on their server when you sign up, email auth is encrypted. Trouble is, it's "too hard" for "normal people". If gmail/outlook etc supported it, though, it could catch on.

Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability

#134

tl;dr: guy from hover, mea culpa, new code on the way. I thought it might help to provide some further deets on that blog post. I don't think we're making a case there, or providing an excuse - it certainly wasn't my intent to try and convince anyone of anything when I wrote that, but rather, it was an exercise to explain where we were (with that and other development projects) and where we were going. We've gone bac…

Fwiw, let me share some of the less predictable consequences of what could happen if your pwd database is hacked, and why it's important to use bcrypt, PBKDF2, or scrypt to secure your users passwords. (http://codahale.com/how-to-safely-store-a-password/)

I was one of the folks whose email and password were compromised in the recent MtGox.com bitcoin exchange attack. Until then I had been using a three-tier password system, consisting of three passwords of increasing difficulty, used for sites of increasing levels of importance.

My bank/card accounts, email accounts, and any account that stored bank/card info (Paypal, Square) got the strongest password. Sites that were part of my online identity or similarly important, but did not store financial data, got the next strongest password (Twitter, Facebook). Finally, spam sites I didn't care about but needed a login for some reason got the third password.

Well, the MtGox hackers got my middle-tier password and the associated email address. Shortly afterward they also got my Twitter account, which used the same for login. Fortunately they didn't take the time to change my email address, and I was able to get it back with a password reset email.

And a few days later I tried to login to Amazon and found they had changed the password there too. I got it back the same way, pwd reset, logged into AWS and found my EC2 test instances had all been terminated and all the work I had been doing there gone.

Now I'm sitting here wondering what's next, as I can't remember all the sites I used that email/pwd combo on. But I'll never make that mistake again, and am now evaluating password managers like Lastpass, Keepass, Passpack, and Clipperz for storing unique, strong passwords for every site I use.

I'll also never use MtGox again, and have discovered a newfound wariness of all websites' security practices. One report like this is enough to make me not only file away the name of the site, but also the people who built it, as unreliable.

My point here is that, if your database gets pwned and distributed out to the black market, there's a realistic chance your users will be harmed in ways you haven't foreseen, on other sites not related to yours, and will remember and blame you for it indefinitely.

Given that most people have lots of sites they log into, and that most can't or won't remember separate passwords for them all, you can assume a good portion of your users reuses passwords.

The potential downside of those reused pwd's getting hacked via your site and put into the underground identity-theft rings and whatnot, far outweighs whatever user-experience upside you may perceive.

Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability

#137
post #33

Please correct me if I'm wrong, but... storing password hashes (actually key derived from password) is only meant to secure up password re-use. If there is any other reason, please disregard the text below and just correct me ;-) Isn't password re-use a social problem rather than technical one? Perhaps we ought to use a different -- social -- measure to prevent password reuse. Throwing technical solutions onto social…

If someone gets read-access to this database he can log into my account independently of me reusing passwords (which I don't) or not. The problem is not on my side.

Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability

#138
post #90

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Companies like Hover have a user/password scenario unlike e.g. an email provider: users only visit their site one/two times a year (to renew a domain or whatever). So I wonder if they should instead allow "authentication-by-email". Basically, make it work just like current reset emails (with an embedded randomized link that allows access), but prevent the link from expiring. Obviously that suggestion has a lot of hol…

I love this idea. 90% of the time when I use a forgot password link, I'm really trying to auth-by-email. I'm not sure how it would work for reusable links, since that becomes auth-by-URL, which seems significantly less secure— maybe putting HTTP auth in the url would be less likely to be logged at any point?

wouldn't oauth (by gmail perhaps?) be a better solution to this?

Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability

#139
post #20

This isn't a microblogging service or pet social network. A domain registrar is storing your password in plaintext? Really? Didn't we go over this a thousand times? If I was on Hover (which I considered), I'd transfer my domains immediately. Moving to a plaintext password system to get fewer support requests is like removing the door from your house so you don't have to keep fumbling for the key.

It's not just domain registrars, I reset the password of my basecamphq.com account (which stores very confidential project information) last week, and received this email:

  Hi -name-,
  
  Can't remember your password? Don't worry about it — it happens. We can help.
  
  Username: -username-
  Password: -password in plain text-
  
  Please keep your password safe to prevent unauthorized access.
It blows my mind that even 37signals falls for this trap. There should be a website showing a blacklist of services that store passwords plaintext.

Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability

#140
post #20

This isn't a microblogging service or pet social network. A domain registrar is storing your password in plaintext? Really? Didn't we go over this a thousand times? If I was on Hover (which I considered), I'd transfer my domains immediately. Moving to a plaintext password system to get fewer support requests is like removing the door from your house so you don't have to keep fumbling for the key.

It's not just domain registrars, I reset the password of my basecamphq.com account (which stores very confidential project information) last week, and received this email: Hi -name-, Can't remember your password? Don't worry about it — it happens. We can help. Username: -username- Password: -password in plain text- Please keep your password safe to prevent unauthorized access. It blows my mind that even 37signals fal…

Not exactly a list, but: http://plaintextoffenders.com/
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