This story reminds me Hit-Girl and Big Daddy from Kick-Ass movie.
I heard there is excessive camp in this movie, but I'll check it out.
Is This The Girl That Hacked HBGary?
131–135 of 135 posts
Re: Is This The Girl That Hacked HBGary?
#132Earlier quoted context omitted.
correct. opcodes are unique to a processor architecture, not an operating system.
FWIW, it could be referring to the opcodes in the .NET virtual machine.
still don't think that is what the article was referring to since it was 'windows opcodes'
Re: Is This The Girl That Hacked HBGary?
#133Earlier quoted context omitted.
Couldn't they just attempt to fill the "outside" partition up? I mean, let's say you have a 1TB partition with a 100GB hidden volume inside. What happens if somebody tries to write more than 900GB into the outside partition?
It will overwrite the hidden partition. The 'outside' partition doesn't know about the hidden one. When you are mounting the outside partition you do have an option to protect the hidden one by providing the password for the hidden one, but if you don't, you can end up overwriting it by filling up the outer partition.
That said -- I would think that a random blob of data sitting around on the hard drive is still highly suspect. Aren't hard drives zeroed from the factory? And wouldn't any true "garbage" data be decidedly not random? (Even if it's compressed... you would still expect to find headers etc. somewhere.)
Re: Is This The Girl That Hacked HBGary?
#134http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/mar/17/us-spy-oper...
Re: Is This The Girl That Hacked HBGary?
#135Earlier quoted context omitted.
I've never understood this. Wouldn't a competent security professional know of the existence of TrueCrypt, who would then ask a competent psychologist to determine if you were withholding information (I sure as hell wouldn't be able to keep a straight face), who would then ask a competent interrogator to get the real password from you? I don't even think plausible deniability would hold in court -- claiming that a la…
A large part of the design of Truecrypt is that nobody CAN prove there's an alternate partition. Or, you can decrypt your secondary alternate partition under duress to reveal your real hidden one. Maybe put some token warez on it or something. To make sure that you can't distinguish free space from encrypted noise, you have to write random noise everywhere as part of the filesystem creation process. The one thing Tru…
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/10/evil_maid_atta...