Earlier quoted context omitted.
Limiting a bit the impacts if Let's Encrypt is compromised in any way. If Let's encrypt is compromised, either by being able to issue certificate for arbitrary domains or if the CA itself is compromised, the impact would be huge given the current number of certificates signed by it and this number is likely to grow in the futur. With several CAs in different organizations, you have a far lower risk of seeing all the…
What exactly happens if a CA is compromised (private keys stolen etc)? Wouldn't existing certificates before the compromise date still be valid?
With multiple signatures, at least, your certificate is still valid as it has at least another valid CA signature.
Also, right now, if one CA is compromised and if this goes unnoticed, the effect is a bit catastrophic as it's possible to create valid certificates for any domain. With multiple CA signatures in conjunction with a security policy mechanism stating how many of these signatures must be valid, you mitigate this issue as it would require several CAs to be compromised and controlled by the same actor to issue valid certificates.