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Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

nytimes.com

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Re: Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

#131

Post by rjzzleep »

GoToRO wrote: post #118
kejaed wrote: post #27

I really see this as a failure of the Systems Engineering process. With so many people unaware of the impacts of the changes, it’s up to the systems types to have the big picture view and make sure these sorts of things are taken into account. Especially if as the article says a failure of the AOA sensor on the system would be Hazardous (looks like it was Catastrophic when paired with MCAS in retrospect), that would…

engineers overseeing this work There the thing: nobody wants to pay engineers on par with managers. Maybe one can not manage something he/she can not understand.

Given all the environments I've worked in, including midsize construction projects I'm willing to bet my hand on the fact that some engineers or third party planning bureaus actually did spot these flaws and reported them and then were turned down and ignored, but not before having been told that it's not their decision/problem.

That's always the moment when I'm happy to have documented the decisions.

Re: Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

#132

Post by countbackula »

kejaed wrote: post #43
kejaed wrote: post #27

I really see this as a failure of the Systems Engineering process. With so many people unaware of the impacts of the changes, it’s up to the systems types to have the big picture view and make sure these sorts of things are taken into account. Especially if as the article says a failure of the AOA sensor on the system would be Hazardous (looks like it was Catastrophic when paired with MCAS in retrospect), that would…

Thinking about this a little more, I also see a failure here in terms of naming things, which I have noticed in my career can be scoffed at but is so important. As the article says, the function of MCAS changed and its operational envelope was greatly expanded. What if, internally at least, the new system was referred to as MCAS2? This is somewhere that things can get political, as was exactly the case with the Max,…

Admittedly I have 0 familiarity of the internals of a corporate electrical engineering environment, but this is a logically sound idea that in many other industries is standard. OS 10.02, Apache license v. 2, Archer router xyz Rev 02. What's the limiting factor here in the case of MCAS?

Re: Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

#133

Post by BurningFrog »

kejaed wrote: post #43
kejaed wrote: post #27

I really see this as a failure of the Systems Engineering process. With so many people unaware of the impacts of the changes, it’s up to the systems types to have the big picture view and make sure these sorts of things are taken into account. Especially if as the article says a failure of the AOA sensor on the system would be Hazardous (looks like it was Catastrophic when paired with MCAS in retrospect), that would…

Thinking about this a little more, I also see a failure here in terms of naming things, which I have noticed in my career can be scoffed at but is so important. As the article says, the function of MCAS changed and its operational envelope was greatly expanded. What if, internally at least, the new system was referred to as MCAS2? This is somewhere that things can get political, as was exactly the case with the Max,…

Perhaps something entirely different than what you're talking about, but...

I believe changing the aircraft type would trigger regulatory events carrying rather gargantuan costs.

Avoiding those seem to be the entire reason for the existence of the 737 MAX.

Re: Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

#134

Post by jussij »

CamperBob2 wrote: post #48
oldjokes wrote: post #44

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Anything short of admitting "we fundamentally screwed up, and are rethinking the poor decision to pair this engine with this airframe" as well as "we are reviewing all our design processes and how the FAA oversees every step of the process" is unacceptable. MCAS is just the horrific bloody bandage that is peeling away, it's not actually the problem here. This probably won't happen of course, all they seem to want to…

Anything short of admitting "we fundamentally screwed up, and are rethinking the poor decision to pair this engine with this airframe" Can you cite the basis for this often-expressed sentiment? There's absolutely no reason why a properly-designed and -vetted MCAS system wouldn't have been a perfectly acceptable solution to any handling irregularities caused by the engine configuration. The idea was fine. The fault wa…

> There's absolutely no reason why a properly-designed and -vetted MCAS system wouldn't have been a perfectly acceptable solution

Surely that was exactly the MCAS that was installed in both of the planes that crashed.

But the fact it failed so badly suggest it might in fact be a rather difficult system to get right.

Re: Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

#135

Post by BurningFrog »

ficklepickle wrote: post #52

This whole plane sounds like any ugly hack. They slapped very different engines on an existing airframe. Then, when it inevitability exhibited undesirable behaviour, they tried to paper over the cracks. Then they hid this information from their customers, regulatory agencies and the pilots. It makes me wonder if there are other issues with the Max that the public doesn't know about yet. I hope a thorough review of Bo…

It's an ugly hack because the design tries to stay within what The Regulator considers the same airplane type.

This in turn is because getting a new airplane type to market would cost some (I assume, facts are welcome!) unholy amount of money and time to get approved.

If you consider that decision "greed" or "a rational response to perverse regulatory incentives" is I suppose a personality test as good as any :)

Re: Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

#136

Post by chris_wot »

rjzzleep wrote: post #131
GoToRO wrote: post #118

Earlier quoted context omitted.

engineers overseeing this work There the thing: nobody wants to pay engineers on par with managers. Maybe one can not manage something he/she can not understand.

Given all the environments I've worked in, including midsize construction projects I'm willing to bet my hand on the fact that some engineers or third party planning bureaus actually did spot these flaws and reported them and then were turned down and ignored, but not before having been told that it's not their decision/problem. That's always the moment when I'm happy to have documented the decisions.

It’s what happened at NASA...

Re: Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

#137

Post by JudgeWapner »

throw7 wrote: post #36

"As part of the fix, Boeing has reworked MCAS to more closely resemble the first version." Be very wary if pilot training is not part of the "fix" to getting the Max back up in the air. If MCAS is being "rolled back" then certain situations such as "The Max wasn’t handling well when nearing stalls at low speeds." come back.

my prediction: no matter what they do, nobody is ever going to fly as pax on 737-max and fedEx, UPS, and (lol) Amazon are going to get really sweet deals on brand new fleets of freighters.

Re: Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

#138

Post by jquery »

nopzor wrote: post #106
ilaksh wrote: post #98

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I agree. I think the FAA failed in it's mission also.

it’s reputation has been destroyed in the international aviation community. which is extremely sad because it was really hard won. classic story of gutting a gov organization, and regulatory capture. i know some really good people at faa and the situ makes their blood boil. mine too.

I haven't seen commentary from international pilots who are worried about flying Boeing planes.

Even with the two MAX planes that went down, fatal crashes are enormously rare (for Airbus/Boeing/CRJs/ERJs). This one is only getting so much attention because it was that extraordinarily rare "design defect" rather than a maintenance issue or pilot issue.

Re: Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

#139

Post by spking »

salawat wrote: post #110
kejaed wrote: post #27

I really see this as a failure of the Systems Engineering process. With so many people unaware of the impacts of the changes, it’s up to the systems types to have the big picture view and make sure these sorts of things are taken into account. Especially if as the article says a failure of the AOA sensor on the system would be Hazardous (looks like it was Catastrophic when paired with MCAS in retrospect), that would…

>Especially if as the article says a failure of the AOA sensor on the system would be Hazardous (looks like it was Catastrophic From my understanding, this was an intentional decision, as the only way they could certify the airframe without simulator training being required was to feed the MCAS with only 1 sensor. The only way they could do that is keeping the system overall rated as hazardous, as the Catastrophic ra…

Thanks for the tip on the AUS 60 Minutes expose. For anyone else interested: https://youtu.be/aO7_indbfME

Re: Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

#140

Post by joe_the_user »

kejaed wrote: post #27

I really see this as a failure of the Systems Engineering process. With so many people unaware of the impacts of the changes, it’s up to the systems types to have the big picture view and make sure these sorts of things are taken into account. Especially if as the article says a failure of the AOA sensor on the system would be Hazardous (looks like it was Catastrophic when paired with MCAS in retrospect), that would…

I don't know if one could say a failure of the Systems Engineering process. One could also say it is a situation where management, regulatory and market constraints became so unwieldy that there was simply no way Systems Engineering could possibly satisfy the requirements. Sure, it's a failure to push back again this but that seems a bit different.
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