Earlier quoted context omitted.
Fair enough. I more meant that after an attacker has achieved RCE, no amount of encryption or other practices can protect sensitive info in your database.
Encryption can't save you, but other practices can. Specifically: if you're working with a lot of very sensitive information, you structure your application such that there are multiple layers separating that data from the outside world. In the case of Equifax, that might mean implementing the "credit score check" as an internal service exposed through the public web servers (or whatever).
* Credential vaults that allow only-once retrieval on application startup and only keep credentials in memory
* anomaly detectors for request patterns (suspicious payload formats, processing time, CPU/memory usage, etc),
* Honeypot records in sensitive data stores (records you know should never be accessed, if they are you've been breached)
If you're storing information this sensitive you need to be paranoid, because an attacker has a $4B incentive ($30/identity on the black market * 143 million records) to crack your systems.