Earlier quoted context omitted.
Allowing XP to exist forever is not a good thing for security either. There are security architectures in place within Windows 10 for example that do significantly improve security. At some point companies need to cough up the money and upgrade their technology.
Is there some philosophical principle under which you believe that companies must "cough up money" for services that they have already ostensibly paid for? That sounds remarkably like extortion. If Windows XP is proven to be untenably insecure, anyone who bought it should receive a refund.
Lessons from last week’s cyberattack
131–140 of 304 posts
Re: Lessons from last week’s cyberattack
#132The quote bombshell here, and what hasnt yet gotten much attention since sysadmins the world over are busy dealing with fallout, is that the NSA and therefore the US government is directly responsible for the current global cyber-carnage. We developed the capability, we chose to keep it unpatched, we tried to keep it secret, we lost control of it. This has similarities in type, if not in horror, to the development an…
MS issued a patch ahead of the usage of the lost exploit by a wide enough margin that I'm loathe to blame the government for the mere existence. The problem lies in our defensive infrastructure and our ability to roll out patches responding to incidents. It also lies in our security infrastructure: that cryptoworms are a danger speaks to a fundamental lapse in permission and process management systems.
Re: Lessons from last week’s cyberattack
#133How did MS know to patch a month before the exploits leaked? Did they get advanced notice as a courtesy from NSA, or someone else, that the exploits leaked?
Re: Lessons from last week’s cyberattack
#134 I see three areas where this event provides an
opportunity for Microsoft and the industry to improve.
Fixed version: I see three areas where this event provides an
opportunity for Microsoft, the industry, and
government to improve.
To be fair, he does go on to point out how this is partly the fault of poorly conceived government policies, namely the NSA's foolish practice of stockpiling exploits. But Microsoft and the industry should keep the heat on the government about this at every opportunity, because the horrifically bad and analogous idea of having government master keys is still being pushed forward.Re: Lessons from last week’s cyberattack
#135One of the reasons why such attack was possible is poor security in Windows. Port 445 that was used in an attack is opened by a kernel driver (at least that is what netstat says on WinXP) that runs in ring 0. This driver is enabled by default even if the user doesn't need SMB server and it cannot be easily disabled. Most of services in Windows are run under two privileged user accounts (LocalService or NetworkService…
Are you saying all of the major operating systems have poor security because they use "vulnerable" languages?
Re: Lessons from last week’s cyberattack
#136No one in the UK seems to be tying this attack to the Conservative Party's desire for backdoors everywhere, which is a shame because it's a nice example for the public of how the government have got this very wrong.
Re: Lessons from last week’s cyberattack
#137Earlier quoted context omitted.
No system is perfect. Remember Heartbleed? Microsoft released a patch to correct this particular issue in March, however the IT infrastructure in companies is slow, the whole process is convoluted, yada yada. The point is: the NSA caused this particular problem. Steps should be taken be everyone to ensure something like this doesn't happen ever again.
The NSA did not cause this particular problem. The NSA may have identified the vulnerability, however there is certainly an argument that their other responsibilities outweigh any responsibility that they might have to act as a free security investigation team and report a security vulnerability to an outside corporation. If Russian government intelligence agency security researchers found that bug first would you sa…
Yeah, a shitty one. Free? No they're funded by tax payer dollars. I do think we need to argue about priority of responsibilities. Was this exploit used to spy on allies?
Re: Lessons from last week’s cyberattack
#138Earlier quoted context omitted.
> If I booted a RedHat (5.2 came out in 2009ish) or FreeBSD machine from 2009 without patches, and put it on the internet, I'm pretty sure it'd be hosed just as bad (shellshock, heartbleed, ?). the difference is, everyone would tell me I'm an idiot for putting a machine online from 2009. As a tongue in cheek (but totally true) correction, FreeBSD from 2009 would NOT be vulnerable to the shellshock vulnerability unles…
True, but FreeBSD can't guarantee perpetual security for releases. It also doesn't provide warranties, like the majority of software out there. FWIW, I do hold FreeBSD in high regard. It's just that expecting perfection security-wise from complex systems is a fools errand.
I think that may have been the OP's point. Bash is more complex than sh has to be hence because FreeBSD choose the simpler option they avoid the inherent security implications of complex systems.
(I use bash myself and don't use FreeBSD.)
Re: Lessons from last week’s cyberattack
#139Earlier quoted context omitted.
Citation please?
The NSA hoarding / leaking aspect of this vulnerability has been reported by most major news outlets. Even the mainstream ones. Albeit most haven't expanded on that point to the level that Microsoft did here.