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Facebook Messenger begins testing end-to-end encryption using Signal Protocol

whispersystems.org

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Re: Facebook Messenger begins testing end-to-end encryption using Signal Protocol

#131

Post by tptacek »

eganist wrote: post #128
tptacek wrote: post #125

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Cyph's solution for this, last I saw it, is a Rube Goldberg machine of rolling HPKP pins used in attempt to keep the application from reloading itself from its own servers. It's incredibly complicated. And no matter how much asm.js you use, it's still crypto running in a browser instance. There are other very significant problems with browser crypto --- problems that even affect Chrome Applications.

You and I+Cure53+others will probably always disagree on this topic since you've always been the primary catalyst for dissent on this, but it's not at all complicated nor deserving of the analogy to a Rube Goldberg machine. It's been well vetted enough. It might be a hack, but it's a sufficiently effective hack. We can agree to disagree :) You coming to either Black Hat or DEF CON? Let me at least connect the two of…

I can't tell if you're talking about browser crypto (in which case my perspective is shared by a large number of crypto engineers) or Cyph's weird caching scheme, in which case a couple people from Cure53 are the only ones who have ever tried to evaluate it.

Re: Facebook Messenger begins testing end-to-end encryption using Signal Protocol

#132

Post by roflc0ptic »

danesparza wrote: post #84

So ... no comment on the choice of picture in the blog post? I hadn't heard of Jules Bonnot, but found the wikipedia article illuminating: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jules_Bonnot This seems like it's a subtle endorsement for using Open Whisper Systems for criminal activities. Is it just me, or does that seem like the wrong image to gravitate towards?

Moxie Marlinspike, public face of Open Whisper Systems, identifies with anarchism. They include political radicals in most of their images of the application. It's not promoting criminality, except insofar as opposing state repression is criminal. Opposing state repression is the raison d'etre of OWS. I can't speak for them, but I suspect the fact that they're using software to do it is a secondary consideration.

Re: Facebook Messenger begins testing end-to-end encryption using Signal Protocol

#133

Post by bertil »

alva wrote: post #3

From what is written, I understand this to mean that users can select this feature for specific conversations. That not all messages are subject to this encryption. I am not usually one for paranoia, but is anyone else becoming more suspicious about Facebooks motivations and involvement with gov? This feature is a massive boost for intelligence services dealing with unsophisticated actors. This reduces the haystack s…

> I am not usually one for paranoia, but is anyone else becoming more suspicious about Facebooks motivations and involvement with gov?

I worked for Facebook; I am friends with the people who developed this: I would like to reassure you strongly (well, as much as an Internet stranger can) on their motives. They are the good guys, and this was develop with people being spied on by abusive governments in mind — because those people use Messenger and would like to do it for those conversations too. Don’t trust me, but reach out to them if you are curious: few people appreciate their work, so they are generally happy to talk (about published work; unannounced products are very much off limits).

Facebook does collaborate with governments when the messages are not encrypted and the crimes are clear, and the court issued warrants. I seriously doubt any of those are political dissidents. Facebook engineers receive very generous poaching offers all the time, and they would have minimal economic damage from leaving the company over something like this. The shit-show from engineers leaving over that would massive (and many engineers are true believers).

I wasn’t in the company six months ago when that project was decided, but from my experience of the internal culture, I know that there was a debate on whether this feature could cover crimes that Facebook would object to — and the need for protecting the good guys obviously had the upper hand.

> Why doesn't FB just apply encryption on all messages? > Surely they have the resources avail.

Scaling. I know nothing about this, but I have no doubt that this is the main reason. Any tiny amount of extra memory, computation, etc. times a billion becomes massive. Facebook struggles building enough capacity for all its services: the data center expansions you hear about are done a break-neck pace, to meet service expansion deadlines. The engineers working on this are heroes internally, and the units they use are unheard of outside of astronomy. More specifically, they probably want to test some scaling aspects, but it might be unethical to use the usual approach of A/B testing.

Re: Facebook Messenger begins testing end-to-end encryption using Signal Protocol

#134

Post by tptacek »

eganist wrote: post #103
matheweis wrote: post #88

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Even if they have been able to successfully get in-browser code signing working, how can they possibly gaurantee no leakage of data? I mean, there are so many inroads, from mitm to rogue browser plugins... It seems (near) impossible to secure them all.

Rogue browser plugins can be discounted as that's tantamount to a compromised device in the context of a downloaded E2EE app. MITM, well it's E2EE with trust-on-first-use for the crypto logic and implements the works when it comes to web security protocols, such as HPKP. There's enough mitigation there. TOFU in this context would mean once you visit once, the logic that's pinned in the browser then performs signature…

This is a weird response. The comment you replied to suggested (very accurately) that there are lots of different ways that browsers leak information, and gave the example of rogue plugins. You (accurately) dismiss rogue plugins, and then go on to write as if that were the only, or even the most important, vector for leaks. But, obviously, no.

Can you cite some other ways browsers leak information besides browser plugins? It's you who are making the extraordinary claim, that Cyph has come up with a way to make browser crypto reliably secure. I think the onus should be on you to demonstrate how carefully you've thought this out.

I'll make you a deal: if you name all the ones I know about, I'll tell you so. :)

Re: Facebook Messenger begins testing end-to-end encryption using Signal Protocol

#135

Post by josho »

arximboldi wrote: post #107
Techbrunch wrote: post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Reasons from @alexstamos (CSO @ Facebook): - FBM is multi-device, and we'd like to see E2E usability improve to support this. For now, pick one device and keys never leave it - Secret conversations don't currently support popular features like searching message history, switching devices, voice/video, etc - Hundreds of millions use Messenger from a web browser. No secure way to verify code or store keys without routi…

Hundreds of millions use Messenger from a web browser. No secure way to verify code or store keys without routing through mobile. I wouldn't use the web version if they had not disabled Jabber access... and then I could use OTR. This trend makes me very sad... IM networks are getting more centralized as ever. I don't feel thankful for this kind of development. End-to-end encryption should not be a feature of the serv…

> digital prisons

Did you just coin that? It appropriately captures what is going on, but without having the positive connotation that comes from a 'walled garden'. I love the phrase.

As an example outside of messaging, I have a fitbit and 'digital prison' so aptly describes what happens with my personal health data. I can't get my heart rate data out of their prison, because the fitbit warden doesn't see it fit to grant me the privilege to access my raw data.

Re: Facebook Messenger begins testing end-to-end encryption using Signal Protocol

#136

Post by lorenzhs »

microcolonel wrote: post #58
Techbrunch wrote: post #44

Reasons from not enabling it by default by @alexstamos (CSO @ Facebook): - FBM is multi-device, and we'd like to see E2E usability improve to support this. For now, pick one device and keys never leave it - Secret conversations don't currently support popular features like searching message history, switching devices, voice/video, etc - Hundreds of millions use Messenger from a web browser. No secure way to verify co…

Given that I don't have a smartphone, and use messenger.com; yeah, I wouldn't want it to require a mobile.

Downvotes for not owning a smartphone? I think we can agree that not requiring a mobile phone to use a messenger is a nice feature.

Re: Facebook Messenger begins testing end-to-end encryption using Signal Protocol

#137

Post by buu700 »

tptacek wrote: post #131
eganist wrote: post #128

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You and I+Cure53+others will probably always disagree on this topic since you've always been the primary catalyst for dissent on this, but it's not at all complicated nor deserving of the analogy to a Rube Goldberg machine. It's been well vetted enough. It might be a hack, but it's a sufficiently effective hack. We can agree to disagree :) You coming to either Black Hat or DEF CON? Let me at least connect the two of…

I can't tell if you're talking about browser crypto (in which case my perspective is shared by a large number of crypto engineers) or Cyph's weird caching scheme, in which case a couple people from Cure53 are the only ones who have ever tried to evaluate it.

I think he was only (or mostly) talking about the latter, which I would agree isn't very complicated at all (it's just deleting and regenerating keys/certs on an interval).

As to the former, are you referring to specific known side channel attacks against asm.js/wasm, or just the usual XSS risk?

Re: Facebook Messenger begins testing end-to-end encryption using Signal Protocol

#138

Post by tptacek »

buu700 wrote: post #137
tptacek wrote: post #131

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I can't tell if you're talking about browser crypto (in which case my perspective is shared by a large number of crypto engineers) or Cyph's weird caching scheme, in which case a couple people from Cure53 are the only ones who have ever tried to evaluate it.

I think he was only (or mostly) talking about the latter, which I would agree isn't very complicated at all (it's just deleting and regenerating keys/certs on an interval). As to the former, are you referring to specific known side channel attacks against asm.js/wasm, or just the usual XSS risk?

One would hope that the founder of the company trying to bring that weird secure caching attempt to market would believe that it wasn't very complicated. :)

Of course, if you've filed for patents on this, as was suggested upthread, that somewhat cuts against that argument, doesn't it?

Re: Facebook Messenger begins testing end-to-end encryption using Signal Protocol

#139

Post by lorenzhs »

oluwie wrote: post #108
sigmar wrote: post #14

This article doesn't mention it, but Facebook Messenger will be using the Signal protocol: https://whispersystems.org/blog/facebook-messenger/ also, here is the white paper (from the above post): https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/2016/07/secret_conv...

I'm pretty sure (actually positively sure) the article mentions this.

I think the mods merged two threads here, and the other article didn't mention it

Re: Facebook Messenger begins testing end-to-end encryption using Signal Protocol

#140

Post by libeclipse »

alva wrote: post #3

From what is written, I understand this to mean that users can select this feature for specific conversations. That not all messages are subject to this encryption. I am not usually one for paranoia, but is anyone else becoming more suspicious about Facebooks motivations and involvement with gov? This feature is a massive boost for intelligence services dealing with unsophisticated actors. This reduces the haystack s…

Brute-forcing is infeasible. The meta-data is certainly visible however, so intelligence agencies could glean a lot of information about certain users from other sources. You're right that "private conversations" does throw up a red flag.
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