Earlier quoted context omitted.
The USG controls .com, .net, and .org. The government of Libya controls .ly. DNSSEC puts cryptographic key material under the influence of the DNS. "No it doesn't" isn't a rebuttal to that.
But Thomas ... I still don't understand the attack that you say can be made against DNSSEC-signed domains. Here's what I see, if I have a .COM domain: 1. I sign my domains and generate a DS record. 2. I upload the DS record to my registrar who passes the DS record up to the .COM registry. Now, when someone does DNSSEC validation on my DNS records, they wind up doing this process: 1. Going through the DNS process to g…
This is not, of course, the only problem with DNSSEC. It's also an archaic 1990s cryptosystem built around 1024-bit PKCS1v15 RSA, which by default makes every DNS record in the system public, trivially dramatically amplifies DNS traffic, and does all this without actually securing DNS lookups from browsers, which still run the old insecure DNS protocol to talk to DNSSEC-enabled caches.
It's a silly system, has been since the USG paid TIS to design it in the 1990s, is nearing two decades delayed, and isn't going to happen. Look at what Chris Palmer from Google has to say about it. Whatever the opposite of "betting on it" is, that's what Chromium is doing with DNSSEC. We should get to work designing a modern alternative.