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This hacker might seem shady, but throwing him in jail is bad for everyone

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Re: This hacker might seem shady, but throwing him in jail is bad for everyone

#121
post #113

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Whether it's the server's or the client's fault doesn't matter that much from a legal perspective. Intent plays a big role: if you knew that ending a URL with "\" causes `rm -rf /*` to be run, and intentionally run that on a server, you could likely be prosecuted and convicted if it were proven that you did it intentionally. If it were done accidentally by a client, they would (likely, and hopefully) not be convicted…

No, Weev did not "exploit" anything. He _requested_ information from a server. If the server owner had so desired, they could have made the data private by adding a password. They chose not to. In the end, the decision to offer Weev the data was made _by the server_ . And if you're going to bring up the UserAgent spoofing, let me remind you that most browsers have done something like that for > 15 years.

He did not exploit a software flaw or a platform flaw, however he exploited an information disclosure / access separation EXPOSURE. Exploiting just means "taking advantage of something."

He did exploit the fact that AT&T did not make the endpoint in question accessible only if the logged-in user matched the actual user ID (or just made it entirely inaccessible).

Re: This hacker might seem shady, but throwing him in jail is bad for everyone

#122
post #64
post #62

Earlier quoted context omitted.

A bit nitpicky on one portion over an otherwise good analogy. If they library is funded by a city, the list of employees and their salaries are public knowledge. I use to work for a small town library in high school. I could see all of my high school teacher/staff information along with co-workers and any other town staff salaries in the town record (publicly displayed in the library itself). Of course, what you may…

OH MY GOD ARE YOU SERIOUS.

I have heard that America's bizarre obsession with keeping your salary secret is not shared by rest of the world. I haven't checked myself, though.

I'm deeply suspicious of the "tradition" either way since working at a place where it was actually a policy violation to tell a coworker what your salary was. Because then they would know if they were getting stiffed, and they might ask a raise.

Re: This hacker might seem shady, but throwing him in jail is bad for everyone

#123
post #109
post #69

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is currently downmodded because people don't like the implication. And they shouldn't, because it quickly forces someone into either a) agreeing with the law or b) saying that SQL injections must be, ipso facto, legal. Including ones like: 1 AND ("1" = SUBSTRING(select social_security_number from employees where employee_name = 'Angela Smith', 1, 1)) You can use variations on this to... a) Ask our librarian for…

You: Can you provide me with Angela Smith's email address? Librarian: Sure, here you go. Later, Librarian's manager: You weren't supposed to give out that information! Librarian: Oops. I had the wrong access rules. Librarian's manager: Let's call the cops on that guy. It's his fault that you gave him the information he wasn't supposed to have.

Later, when I crack your bank password,

    Me: Can you provide me with all of guelo's money?
    Bank: Sure, here you go.
Also, when I approach your house,

    Me: I have these lock picks. Will you let me in?
    Lock: Sure thing, boss!

Re: This hacker might seem shady, but throwing him in jail is bad for everyone

#124

Earlier quoted context omitted.

By "unpopular speech", do you mean the AT&T bit, or the harassment bit? If the latter, I disagree. A free and fair society can certainly draw a line between "unpopular speech" and "criminal harassment." If I were to threaten to murder you, you wouldn't expect the police to say "Eh, nothing we can do, he's got a right to free speech. Call us back after he shoots you, you'll have a case then."

If I were to threaten to murder you, you wouldn't expect the police to say "Eh, nothing we can do, he's got a right to free speech. Call us back after he shoots you, you'll have a case then." This is the problem with thought experiments regarding crime: they always make the facts 100% certain, when in real life, the facts are never 100% certain. If we were to rephrase your thought experiment, it would be: "Some guy s…

"Not quite as clear-cut as you think, is it?"

Weev did literally threaten to murder Kathy Sierra, and he then bragged about doing so on multiple public websites. So, yes, it is quite clear-cut.

(And, please, at least think for a minute before you try to rebut by saying that he didn't mean it, so it shouldn't count.)

Re: This hacker might seem shady, but throwing him in jail is bad for everyone

#125
post #109

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You: Can you provide me with Angela Smith's email address? Librarian: Sure, here you go. Later, Librarian's manager: You weren't supposed to give out that information! Librarian: Oops. I had the wrong access rules. Librarian's manager: Let's call the cops on that guy. It's his fault that you gave him the information he wasn't supposed to have.

Later, when I crack your bank password, Me: Can you provide me with all of guelo's money? Bank: Sure, here you go. Also, when I approach your house, Me: I have these lock picks. Will you let me in? Lock: Sure thing, boss!

Well in a private by default world, browsing the internet just became one hell of a lot scarier. Any page you visit could become a felony.

Re: This hacker might seem shady, but throwing him in jail is bad for everyone

#126
post #46

So does anyone know why exactly they weren't able to get Weev on criminal harassment? I wouldn't expect the gummint to fail to bring the charge unless they thought there was no hope of victory, but it seems like such a gimme.

I'm not sure there is any relevant law. At the federal level it appears to require "obscenity" which is very hard to prove for anything short of child pornography.

IIRC, he photoshopped pictures of Kathy Sierra's kids into porn and posted them online, and emailed her graphic threats to rape her with a chainsaw, . It doesn't seem like you'd have a hard time convincing a jury of "obscenity".

Re: This hacker might seem shady, but throwing him in jail is bad for everyone

#127

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If I were to threaten to murder you, you wouldn't expect the police to say "Eh, nothing we can do, he's got a right to free speech. Call us back after he shoots you, you'll have a case then." This is the problem with thought experiments regarding crime: they always make the facts 100% certain, when in real life, the facts are never 100% certain. If we were to rephrase your thought experiment, it would be: "Some guy s…

"Not quite as clear-cut as you think, is it?" Weev did literally threaten to murder Kathy Sierra, and he then bragged about doing so on multiple public websites. So, yes, it is quite clear-cut. (And, please, at least think for a minute before you try to rebut by saying that he didn't mean it, so it shouldn't count.)

Were you at the keyboard when he was typing this message?

Re: This hacker might seem shady, but throwing him in jail is bad for everyone

#128
post #109
post #69

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is currently downmodded because people don't like the implication. And they shouldn't, because it quickly forces someone into either a) agreeing with the law or b) saying that SQL injections must be, ipso facto, legal. Including ones like: 1 AND ("1" = SUBSTRING(select social_security_number from employees where employee_name = 'Angela Smith', 1, 1)) You can use variations on this to... a) Ask our librarian for…

You: Can you provide me with Angela Smith's email address? Librarian: Sure, here you go. Later, Librarian's manager: You weren't supposed to give out that information! Librarian: Oops. I had the wrong access rules. Librarian's manager: Let's call the cops on that guy. It's his fault that you gave him the information he wasn't supposed to have.

As is often the case, and is often ignored, the key is intent.

There is a difference between:

    You: Can you give me the email address of user 50?
    Librarian: Sure, here you go

    Librarian: Oh balls, I wasn't supposed to hand that over, that could have been anyone!
And

    You: Can you give me the email address of user 50?
    Librarian: Sure, here you go
    You: Hmm

    You-irc: Hey guise! The librarian is giving out everyones email addresses, this is totally breaking privacy laws right? 
    You-irc: lols, I'm going to get all of them! This could be used for a massive phishing operation
    You-irc: or even make their stock price drop, we could short it

    You: Hey librarian, can you give me the email address of user 51?
    Librarian: Sure, here you go
    You: Hey librarian, can you give me the email address of user 52?
    Librarian: Sure, here you go
    You: Hey librarian, can you give me the email address of user 53?
    Librarian: Sure, here you go
    ...
    You: Hey librarian, can you give me the email address of user 1023821?
    Librarian: Sure, here you go

He didn't grab one or two, then send the information to AT&T to get them to fix it. He deliberately collected a significant amount of data he knew was personal information and gave it to someone else. That alone would be enough. If he just wanted to verify that the attack worked, get the code of someone else who gives you permission, show that they can be easily generated and you're done. You don't need more than a few to prove the point.

The service was clearly not intended to be a directory of email addresses for people to use. It was clearly there to return the email address to the user of the iPad with that ICC-IDC code (which, unlike my example, aren't obviously guessable)

I'm not going to say anything about the sentence, but I do think he was guilty.

Re: This hacker might seem shady, but throwing him in jail is bad for everyone

#129
post #35

Everyone throws out analogies about walking into unlocked houses and such. Those are fairly poor analogies, so let me offer one which I think is far better at conveying what really happens. Imagine you walked into a public library and struck up a conversation with the librarian: You: Can you tell me general information about this library? Librarian: Certainly, this library was built in 1990, has a million books on it…

I like the librarian comparison. Perhaps a receptionist would also work for this, they can give out some information about people working there (office phone number, etc) but not salaries.

> When is the onus on the web server owner to configure their security properly? When is a "200 OK" response actually not okay? This is the "mind reader" aspect the article mentions

This is why the laws usually care about the intent. It's a combination of the action and the reason that's important (which is why there's a difference between murder and manslaughter).

There are no hard and fast rules, and there simply cannot be.

Weev clearly knew that AT&T shouldn't be handing over the information. He wasn't there saying "Wait, this isn't a normal service?".

> The librarian is smart enough to not hand out things like access to the staff lounge, a list of employees and their salaries, or even things like an arbitrary library member's borrowing history.

If the librarian didn't know to restrict access to salary information, lets say the managers thought that if you knew the SSN that was enough of an ID to get access, and you repeat the example, it becomes a bit more clear how intent is important.

    You: Can I have the salary of IanCal?
    Recep: Sure, it's £X

    You: Hmm, hey Dave, I think there's a security issue here, mind if I know your salary?
    Dave: Sure, it's £Y
    You: Can I have the salary of Dave?
    Recep: Sure, it's £Y

    You: Best go tell the managers.
That would be looked on very differently than:

    You: Can I have the salary of IanCal?
    Recep: Sure, it's £X

    You: Hmm, hey Dave, I think there's a security issue here, can you generate SSN numbers?
    Dave: Yeah I think so
    You: Can I have the salary of SSN#1
    Recep: Sure, it's £Y
    ...
    You: Can I have the salary of SSN#147934
    Recep: Sure, it's £Y
    You: Hahahahaha, let's give all the info to a news site, bet you'd make money shorting the stock!
The core of it is the same, you've requested information for someone else that you shouldn't really have. Even if you remove the consent of Dave in the example, it's still different than the second example. And that was what was important.

Re: This hacker might seem shady, but throwing him in jail is bad for everyone

#130
post #69

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is currently downmodded because people don't like the implication. And they shouldn't, because it quickly forces someone into either a) agreeing with the law or b) saying that SQL injections must be, ipso facto, legal. Including ones like: 1 AND ("1" = SUBSTRING(select social_security_number from employees where employee_name = 'Angela Smith', 1, 1)) You can use variations on this to... a) Ask our librarian for…

>This is currently downmodded because people don't like the implication. And they shouldn't, because it quickly forces someone into either a) agreeing with the law or b) saying that SQL injections must be, ipso facto, legal. Not if you make a distinction between using a service and breaking a service. Analogize with entering vs. breaking and entering. In many cases it is valid to punish someone for bypassing security…

Tackling that out of order, because it seems clearer.

> Analogize with entering vs. breaking and entering.

From Free Dictionary [1]:

    breaking and entering v., n. entering a residence or other enclosed property through the slightest amount of force (**even pushing open a door**), without authorization.
Emphasis mine. If pushing a door counts, so does changing the user agent header or auto-incrementing IDs. The key here is "without authorization". As that analogizes with the Weev situation and our librarian, much of the debate I see here on HN seems to hinge on whether that means authorization in some technical sense or in the sense meant by that breaking and entering definition. I submit that it means the latter, in part because that reflects how we see authorization in other contexts (like doors we're not supposed to enter) and in part because I don't think the first view holds up to scrutiny on its own terms.

Let me explain what I mean by that. Consider two situations:

1. A server responds to requests for email addresses without checking whether the user is authorized to receive that information.

2. A server responds to all requests without checking whether they contain injected SQL.

In pure technology terms, these aren't really any different. In either case, the server is simply failing to check that the request has certain properties (came from the right user/does not contain context escapes). But of course case 2 is particularly nefarious, because passing SQL directly to the database is clearly not the intent of that interface, and that it's not the intent is obvious to the SQL injector. So the intent of the software is what matters. But then it's what matters in case 1 too. The lack of technical enforcement of this intent is not the issue.

Which leads me to some clarity about this:

> Not if you make a distinction between using a service and breaking a service.

I believe this use/break distinction exists, but the distinction isn't something that's determined by the code or the vaguer "design of the code"; it's determined by the purpose of the service. The service as it would be described functionally, not technically. The service was not meant to be used by Weev and his scraper any more than our librarian's database was meant to be used by SQL injection, or any more than your unencrypted traffic was meant to be intercepted by my packet sniffer (you did nothing to not authorize me to see it!). To drive that home, the library's hapless database admin who foolishly decides to update the list of books using her own SQL injection bug is not hacking, because she is authorized to fiddle with the database, even though, in your terms, it's bypassing the design of the code.

In other words, authorization is not the same as the technical artifacts involved in authorization. More generally, I don't think being bad at making software justifies people accessing it when they know it's not meant for them.

As the law is actually applied here, I am somewhat sympathetic to Weev, on the grounds that I don't think it was a serious crime (imagine if it were bank account information!), but that's a quantitative issue, not a qualitative one. I can also see that there are many cases where it isn't obvious whether something is meant for you to access or not (like a door that seems to lead into a public place but which turns out to be a private space), and I can imagine there being issues there. But this isn't one of them.

[1] http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/breaking+and+e...

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