Earlier quoted context omitted.
I didn't mean to imply that you'd just store the hash the client comes up with. That's idiotic, of course. Not everyone uses SSL, even though they should, and it's not always secure, and even with the use of SSL, it seems that there would be a potential length attack that could be employed to effectively guess a user's password length. So in all cases, IMO, it makes more sense to be receiving a fixed-length thing tha…
Here is the attack scenario: Alice is trying to login to server Bob, but her WiFi access point Eve is running a protocol-mismatch attack: Alice communicates to Eve by HTTP, which Eve records and then transmits to Bob by HTTPS. We'll assume that Eve does not inject her own scripts but just eavesdrops on the conversation. Your problem: clientHash is "password-like" and Eve can use it to log in. One solution: use the HT…
So sitting here trying to think about a way to solve that problem, what I come up with is essentially PKI. But if the attacker has the ability to inject code, they can always break this entirely by stealing my private key.
This feels to me like URLs are fundamentally broken, in that a user might try to go to http://mybank.com. Is there any secure way to get their browser to redirect to https://mybank.com? It seems like there might be something that could be done with dnssec, but that feels brittle too. Gross.