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Shai-Hulud Themed Malware Found in the PyTorch Lightning AI Training Library

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Re: Shai-Hulud Themed Malware Found in the PyTorch Lightning AI Training Library

#121

Post by [deleted] »

JohnMakin wrote: post #33
wlkr wrote: post #32

This might just be the frequency illusion at play, but there seem to have been a number of high-profile supply chain attacks of late in major packages. There are several articles on the first few pages of HN right now with different cases. Looking back ten years to `left-pad`, are there more successful attacks now than ever? I would suspect so, and surely the value of a successful attack has also increased, so are we…

People are ramming tons of code into places without ever looking at it, it would follow that supply chain attacks would increase thusly.

[deleted]

Re: Shai-Hulud Themed Malware Found in the PyTorch Lightning AI Training Library

#122

Post by contingencies »

jackdoe wrote: post #22

I cant wait to have no dependencies. An extreme example is now when I make interactive educational apps for my daughter, I just make Opus use plain js and html; from double pendulums to fluid simulations, works one shot. Before I had hundreds of dependencies. Luckily with MIT licensed code I can just tell Opus to extract exactly the pieces I need and embed them, and tweaked for my usecase. So far works great for hobb…

Love it :) Excellent quippy summary of the zeitgeist. Added to https://github.com/globalcitizen/taoup

Re: Shai-Hulud Themed Malware Found in the PyTorch Lightning AI Training Library

#123

Post by RandyOrion »

One thing that makes me wonder is that there are 4 security issues raised and all of them were automatically commented and closed by some bot called `pl-ghost` [1][2][3][4]. In the end, only this one [4] properly handled, and all bot comments are deleted. You can see the bot comments in another report [5], which is more informative than the OP one.

[1] https://github.com/Lightning-AI/pytorch-lightning/issues/216...

[2] https://github.com/Lightning-AI/pytorch-lightning/issues/216...

[3] https://github.com/Lightning-AI/pytorch-lightning/issues/216...

[4] https://github.com/Lightning-AI/pytorch-lightning/issues/216...

[5] https://socket.dev/blog/lightning-pypi-package-compromised

Re: Shai-Hulud Themed Malware Found in the PyTorch Lightning AI Training Library

#124

Post by zarzavat »

wlkr wrote: post #32

This might just be the frequency illusion at play, but there seem to have been a number of high-profile supply chain attacks of late in major packages. There are several articles on the first few pages of HN right now with different cases. Looking back ten years to `left-pad`, are there more successful attacks now than ever? I would suspect so, and surely the value of a successful attack has also increased, so are we…

FWIW left-pad was not an attack, it was a bug in NPM. It should not be possible to unpublish package versions that are depended on by other published packages. On the other hand, it should be possible to unpublish certain package versions that are new and not depended on.

NPM should have returned error codes when the author of left-pad attempted to remove all his data with the intention of leaving the service.

To quote Wikipedia:

> After Koçulu expressed his disappointment with npm, Inc.'s decision and stated that he no longer wished to be part of the platform, Schlueter [author of NPM] provided him with a command that would delete all 273 modules that he had registered.

Re: Shai-Hulud Themed Malware Found in the PyTorch Lightning AI Training Library

#125

Post by andrekandre »

SupLockDef wrote: post #73
fnoef wrote: post #55

Looks like coding is in a downward spiral towards complete chaos

When I was a kid, we've been told to be cautious with third party dependencies, that code can do anything and it's a risk to evaluate. With the new generation of yolo NPM scripters, they simply don't evaluate the risks. They will even fight back telling you that it's the way of doing things. In reality, it's the warning we learnt back then, that's the result of be mindlessly importing third dependencies without think…

  > that's the result of be mindlessly importing third dependencies without thinking
tbf, most tech-related corporate environments don't want you to think, just do (kpi, mbo, okr et al) and this is one of the results

Re: Shai-Hulud Themed Malware Found in the PyTorch Lightning AI Training Library

#126

Post by zarzavat »

throwatdem12311 wrote: post #103
nrengan wrote: post #61

Most of my pip installs come from Claude Code suggesting them now and me just hitting enter. Model was trained months ago, so it has no clue what got compromised this week. We built the worst possible filter for "is this package safe right now".

Stop blaming the LLM for your laziness and lack of due diligence.

Indeed, I also use LLMs to suggest dependencies but:

- I ask the LLM for multiple options

- I tell it what I need and what I don't need

- I then look at the packages it has suggested. Sometimes LLMs suggest unmaintained packages with 5 downloads a month just because it came at the top of a web search.

- if it's not a very well known project, I look at the code, I have received vibecoded dependency suggestions before that don't even function

LLMs are useful resources for "getting the pulse of the ecosystem", but just pressing enter is crazy.

Re: Shai-Hulud Themed Malware Found in the PyTorch Lightning AI Training Library

#127

Post by godelski »

jefftk wrote: post #113
wlkr wrote: post #32

This might just be the frequency illusion at play, but there seem to have been a number of high-profile supply chain attacks of late in major packages. There are several articles on the first few pages of HN right now with different cases. Looking back ten years to `left-pad`, are there more successful attacks now than ever? I would suspect so, and surely the value of a successful attack has also increased, so are we…

>This might just be the frequency illusion at play, but there seem to have been a number of high-profile supply chain attacks of late in major packages. It's real. As of the beginning of April we'd had 7 in the past 12 months vs 9 in the two decades before that: https://www.jefftk.com/p/more-and-more-extensive-supply-chai...

I think the real question is "are we just hearing about it more now or has the actual rate of attack increased?"

Re: Shai-Hulud Themed Malware Found in the PyTorch Lightning AI Training Library

#128

Post by throwatdem12311 »

zarzavat wrote: post #126
throwatdem12311 wrote: post #103

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Stop blaming the LLM for your laziness and lack of due diligence.

Indeed, I also use LLMs to suggest dependencies but: - I ask the LLM for multiple options - I tell it what I need and what I don't need - I then look at the packages it has suggested. Sometimes LLMs suggest unmaintained packages with 5 downloads a month just because it came at the top of a web search. - if it's not a very well known project, I look at the code, I have received vibecoded dependency suggestions before…

exactly

Re: Shai-Hulud Themed Malware Found in the PyTorch Lightning AI Training Library

#129

Post by bbor »

avaer wrote: post #85
mkeeter wrote: post #3

A repository search shows 2.2K repos with the text "A Mini Shai-Hulud has Appeared", all created within the past day: https://github.com/search?q=A%20Mini%20Shai-Hulud%20has%20Ap...

Why can't GitHub get on the case and just block any repo where the README matches the regex? I thought they'd have learned their lesson the last time it happened. This malware isn't even trying. Then again it's Microsoft so they're not even trying either.

1. This happened less than 24 hours ago.

2. This is just one of the four techniques the worm uses to phone home.

Re: Shai-Hulud Themed Malware Found in the PyTorch Lightning AI Training Library

#130

Post by bbor »

CodeAndCuffs wrote: post #15
foo12bar wrote: post #11

Earlier quoted context omitted.

FTFA > The attack steals credentials, authentication tokens, environment variables, and cloud secrets, while also attempting to poison GitHub repositories.

That doesn't really explain why there is a bunch of GitHub repos created as well. If I remember correctly from Shai-Hulud 2, the attacker extricated creds by posting them in public github repos with minor easily reversible encryption. I believe it was double b64 last time. I'm assuming the logic there is that every security researcher and company is going to pull and scan those creds for their stuff and their clients…

With HN ettiquette in mind, I must make an exception: this is a case where skimming the first parts of the article would help a lot!

The public repo path is just one of four parallel paths, with the goal of getting around any barriers:

  The exfiltration component shares its design with the "Mini Shai-Hulud" mechanism from their last campaign, using four parallel channels so stolen data gets out even if individual paths are blocked.
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