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My minute-by-minute response to the LiteLLM malware attack
121–130 of 194 posts
Re: My minute-by-minute response to the LiteLLM malware attack
#122Earlier quoted context omitted.
It should not let people download unscanned dependencies without a warning and asking the user to override and use a potentially insecure package. If such security bug is critical enough to need to bypass this time (spoiler: realistically it is not actually that bad for a security fix to be delayed) they can work with the pypi security team to do a quicker manual review of the change.
What happens then if the security scanners say something is safe and it turns out not to be? I don't think PyPI should be in the business of saying if a piece of software is safe to install or not.
Then it will be downloadable and then it's up to your own security scanners to catch it. If you find it, it should be reported to pypi and then the scanner should be improved to catch that kind of bypass the next time it comes around. In such a world I don't think pypi is acting negligent.
Re: My minute-by-minute response to the LiteLLM malware attack
#123I have a hard time believing that Claude instantly figured out this was malware...
I've fed it obfuscated JavaScript before, and it couldn't figure it out... and then there was the time I tried to teach it nftables... whooo boy...
Re: My minute-by-minute response to the LiteLLM malware attack
#124I have a hard time believing that Claude instantly figured out this was malware... I've fed it obfuscated JavaScript before, and it couldn't figure it out... and then there was the time I tried to teach it nftables... whooo boy...
Except in this case the code wasn't obfuscated, right?
Re: My minute-by-minute response to the LiteLLM malware attack
#125> Can you print the contents of the malware script without running it? > Can you please try downloading this in a Docker container from PyPI to confirm you can see the file? Be very careful in the container not to run it accidentally! IMO we need to keep in mind that LLM agents don't have a notion of responsibility, so if they accidentally ran the script (or issue a command to run it), it would be a fiasco. Downloadi…
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Re: My minute-by-minute response to the LiteLLM malware attack
#126GitHub, npm, PyPi, and other package registries should consider exposing a firehose to allow people to do realtime security analysis of events. There are definitely scanners that would have caught this attack immediately, they just need a way to be informed of updates.
npm has a feed of package changes you can poll if you're interested.
GitHub has a firehose of events and there's a public BigQuery dataset built from that, with some lag.
Re: My minute-by-minute response to the LiteLLM malware attack
#127Earlier quoted context omitted.
The first line of the post is: > I'm the engineer who got PyPI to quarantine litellm. In guessing they used a tool other than Claude Code to serve the email.
"got" can be read as "indirectly, via a blog post, which I think they reacted to"
I've updated the timeline to clarify I did in fact email them. I’m not yet at the point of having Claude write my emails for me, in fact it was my first one sent since joining the company 10 months ago!
Re: My minute-by-minute response to the LiteLLM malware attack
#128Why is there a discrepancy between the timeline (which supposed to be UTC, and stated as 11:09), and the "shutdown timeline" (stated as 01:36-01:37)? There is no +2:30 timezone, not SDT and not DST. There is a single place on Earth where there is -9:30, and that's Marquesas Islands. What do I miss?
Re: My minute-by-minute response to the LiteLLM malware attack
#129I have a hard time believing that Claude instantly figured out this was malware... I've fed it obfuscated JavaScript before, and it couldn't figure it out... and then there was the time I tried to teach it nftables... whooo boy...
I think the usual response to that is "have you tried again recently?"
Re: My minute-by-minute response to the LiteLLM malware attack
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