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How we rooted Copilot

research.eye.security

121–130 of 147 posts

Re: How we rooted Copilot

#121

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Okay, so I give the team that put this together credit. Hopefully the parent company sees based on this that it's worth letting teams invest more in quality and security work, over features.

We should give all the credit to the Product Manager because he told the engineers to make it secure.

Lets send a thank you letter to Bill Gates

Re: How we rooted Copilot

#122

Earlier quoted context omitted.

funny how it sounds kind of the opposite of how people might work. Get enough 'no's from someone and they might finally cave in. get enough 'yes'es and they might get sick of doing everything you ask.

Sales people are specifically trained to manipulate people by asking them questions that they will say ‘yes’ to because once people start to say yes, they tend to continue to say it.

Only when certain pressure is applied. If you're paying attention when someone's doing this to you, you can feel (and disregard) the tendency to keep saying "yes".

Re: How we rooted Copilot

#123
post #8

OK, I think I understand what this is about: the vulnerability that they reported (and Microsoft fixed) is that there was a trick you could use to run your own code with root privileges inside the container - when the system was designed to have you only execute code as a non-root user. It turned out not to really matter, because the container itself was still secured - you couldn't make network requests from it and…

I have to give Microsoft props here. Most companies don't bother to lock things down well enough, but they were thorough.

I bet the container was in an isolated VM too.

Re: How we rooted Copilot

#124
post #81

It's crazy to me that someone can write a post called "How We Rooted Copilot" when in reality they got root in an ephemeral python sandbox container that was locked down so much that they couldn't do anything. I read "rooted copilot" and I think they got root on a vm that is core to copilot itself. A much more accurate title would be "How We Rooted the Copilot Python Sandbox"

“how we escalated privileges from a regular user to a root user in a completely locked sandbox” pretty much sums it up. it’s a nothing burger, which actually goes to show just how effective sandboxing is for defense in depth.

Also shows you how shit an LLM is for defence, as it actively helps you look for exploits.

LLM is like an insane quadruple agent and you dont know whose side it is on (if any at all)

Re: How we rooted Copilot

#125
post #6

Earlier LLMs used to be a goldmine for company secrets (when it learned documents that shouldn't be on public internet). Most of it seem to be scrubbed now.

In my humble experience company secrets are mostly useless for other companies.

Except when they aren't. Defence in depth and zero trust and short expiry makes them way less useful for sure.

Startups are probably most vulnerable as they are likely to use more "pet" techniques for infra, like SSH open to any IP to make changes.

Re: How we rooted Copilot

#126

So am I just missing something or could you create a network connection to the "outside" world (clearly by finding your way around the local network? Start fuzzing the router endpoint, Etc. Or is Microsoft able to provide these containers where their customers can get root access to them without them having any risk of exfiltration or exploitation?

The post mentions egress (outgoing) traffic being blocked. I assume the machine or VM hosting the container had iptables rules in place to enforce it.

Re: How we rooted Copilot

#127

Earlier quoted context omitted.

“how we escalated privileges from a regular user to a root user in a completely locked sandbox” pretty much sums it up. it’s a nothing burger, which actually goes to show just how effective sandboxing is for defense in depth.

Also shows you how shit an LLM is for defence, as it actively helps you look for exploits. LLM is like an insane quadruple agent and you dont know whose side it is on (if any at all)

chaotic neutral

Re: How we rooted Copilot

#129

Earlier quoted context omitted.

At most of the companies I've worked, low-grade managers love to hoard secrets. It makes them feel powerful. Someone gets promoted from Lower Level Manager Grade 4 to Lower Level Manager Grade 5 and they feel all "Oooh! Look at the new things I know!" My mother-in-law is like this with knowing what various relatives are doing. Being the gatekeeper of knowledge gives her imagined power. I guess it's just part of the h…

Why limit it to low-grade managers? I know sysadmins and programmers who behave exactly they same way. They could give you permission or a script to do the thing you need to do but they'd rather have you come to them and ask them to do it. Gives them a sense of purpose, I guess.

i feel for sysadmins it's more a case of: we gave developers permissions and they made a mess of the system because they just copy / paste whatever drivel they saw from SO / an LLM, so unfortunately we have to limit your permissions.

Re: How we rooted Copilot

#130

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I have to give Microsoft props here. Most companies don't bother to lock things down well enough, but they were thorough.

I bet the container was in an isolated VM too.

Every infra I ever worked in used this pattern to a degree. Many proxmox vm's in a kubernetes cluster.
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