Live data from Hacker News

One-Click RCE in Asus's Preinstalled Driver Software

mrbruh.com

121–130 of 253 posts

Re: One-Click RCE in Asus's Preinstalled Driver Software

#121
post #52

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If the vulnerability can't be fixed within the week, maybe the company should be SOL. This will incentivize companies to build their software better, as they'll know that any vulnerability that is hard to fix will mean consequences. Maybe the mitigation is for the company to take its service down while it works on the problem. Again, a good incentive to avoid that in the first place. Also an incentive to not waste an…

And when its an OS company and the test suites take a week to run (really) ? Dev time + test time + upload to cdn , is often longer than a week.

You know, airlines also had a ton of excuses for not making air travel so safe, it's expensive, takes a while, do you know how long these things take, etc.

Still, they did it, because we decided safety is important to us.

Re: One-Click RCE in Asus's Preinstalled Driver Software

#122
post #97

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You're making an assumption that doesn't match reality - vulnerability discovery doesn't work like some efficient market. Yes, intelligence agencies and sophisticated criminal groups might find 0-days, but they typically target selectively, not deploying exploits universally. The real threat comes from the vast number of opportunistic attackers who lack the skills to discover vulnerabilities themselves but are perfec…

Let’s imagine you found how to steal funds from a bank, best is to let them know that you are concerned (as a customer) for the safety of your own funds. If they do nothing after a reasonable amount of time, escalate to regulators or change bank. Then once they release information that some processes are changed: “thanks to XXX working at YYY for helping us during it”. You win, they win, clients win, everybody wins.…

A middle ground: announce that Discord is insecure and you’ve found a zero-day. Perhaps a trusted 3rd party exists that can attest publicly (Mitre?) after you show a demo.

Then customers are aware, Discord is pressured to act/shamed, and then you proceed with your private disclosure with a window.

Re: One-Click RCE in Asus's Preinstalled Driver Software

#123
post #48

Earlier quoted context omitted.

what if the vulnerability cannot be easily fixed within the week, even if the company stops all work and focus completely on the problem? If the reason for responsible disclosure is to ensure that no members of the public is harmed as a result of said disclosure, should it not be a conversation between the security researcher and the company? The security researcher should have an approx. idea of how or what to do to…

> what if the vulnerability cannot be easily fixed within the week, even if the company stops all work and focus completely on the problem? A week is an example and not a definitive value dictated by law, statute, or regulation. When you report the vulnerability you give the developer a timeline of your plans, and if they can't make the deadline they can come back to you and request more time.

This back and forth is not possible if the researcher is anonymous. And it places all power in the hands of the developer. If the developer says, "I need a year" but the researcher doesn't give them a year, then the developer sues? Or files a criminal complaint? Why is all the risk on the researcher?

So a gunshy researcher stays anonymous to keep their risk lower. They craft a disclosure with a crypto signature. They wait for the developer to post a public announcement about the disclosure that doesn't expose a ton of detail but does include the signature hash and general guidance about what to do until a fix is released.

The researcher then posts their own anonymous public announcement with however much detail they choose. They might wait 24 hours or 7 days or 7 months. They might make multiple announcements with increasing levels of detail. Each announcement includes the original hash.

Anybody can now make an announcement at any time about the vulnerability. If an announcement is signed by the same key as the original and contains more detail than given by the developer, the public can argue back and forth about who is being more or less responsible.

Now the researcher can negotiate with the developer anonymously and publicly. The researcher can claim a bounty if they ever feel safe enough to publicly prove they are the author of the original report.

Developers who routinely demonstrate responsible disclosure can earn the trust of researchers. Individual researchers get to decide how much they trust and how patient they are willing to be. The public gets to critique after the fact whether they sympathize more with the developer or the researcher. Perhaps a jury can decide which was liable for the level of disclosure they each pursued.

Re: One-Click RCE in Asus's Preinstalled Driver Software

#124

Responsible Disclosures and their consequences have been a disaster for the human race. Companies need to feel a lot more pain a lot more often in order for them to take the security of their customers a lot more serious. If you just give them month to fix an issue and spoon-feed them the solution it's just another ticket in their Backlog. But if every other security issue becomes enough news online that their CEOs a…

Business idea. Maybe this already exists. A disclosure aggregator/middle man which: - protects the privacy of folks submitting - vets security vulns. Everything they disclose is exploitable. - publishes disclosures publicly at a fixed cadence. - allows companies to pay to subscribe to an "early feed" of disclosures which impact them. This money is used to reward those submitting disclosures, pay the bills, and take s…

It does indeed already exist in many sectors as trade publications and journalism.

Re: One-Click RCE in Asus's Preinstalled Driver Software

#125

A few of the drivers they install (or want to install) are also on Microsoft's vulnerable actively exploited driver blacklist. So that's fun, they have no intention of fixing it because they do not support "third party software". I'm also pretty sure their installer doesn't work without unencrypted HTTP traffic being let through. Plus they keep offering bloatware as "updates" to you. On top of it all, the software th…

Hardware manufacturers consistently ship out the worst softwares in existence. It's just a cost center to them. They've already sold the thing, it doesn't matter anymore.

My laptop has a fan and keyboard LED application that requires kernel access and takes over a minute to display a window on screen. Not to mention being Windows only.

Words can barely describe just how aggravating that thing was. One of the best things I've ever done is reverse engineer that piece of crap and create a Linux free software replacement. Mine works instantly, I just feed it a configuration file. I intend to do this for every piece of hardware I buy from now on.

Re: One-Click RCE in Asus's Preinstalled Driver Software

#126
post #122
post #97

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Let’s imagine you found how to steal funds from a bank, best is to let them know that you are concerned (as a customer) for the safety of your own funds. If they do nothing after a reasonable amount of time, escalate to regulators or change bank. Then once they release information that some processes are changed: “thanks to XXX working at YYY for helping us during it”. You win, they win, clients win, everybody wins.…

A middle ground: announce that Discord is insecure and you’ve found a zero-day. Perhaps a trusted 3rd party exists that can attest publicly (Mitre?) after you show a demo. Then customers are aware, Discord is pressured to act/shamed, and then you proceed with your private disclosure with a window.

Yep. People keep pushing this false dichotomy that it's either company-directed 'responsible disclosure', or it's "release full working POC and complete writeup publicly, immediately", and there's no middle ground.

Yes, limited disclosure will make people start hunting for the vuln, but it's still more than enough time for me to revoke an API key, lock down an internet-facing service, turn off my Alexa (no, I don't/won't own one), uninstall the app, etc. And it's better than me not knowing, and someone is intruding into my system in the meantime.

Re: One-Click RCE in Asus's Preinstalled Driver Software

#127
post #30

Earlier quoted context omitted.

no bug bounty, onto black market of exploit it goes. that or full public disclosure.

I wonder how worried they would get if more people actually started selling exploits on the black market, instead of reporting and not getting a bug bounty. If you don’t offer a bug bounty program in the first place, my gut feeling is that they probably wouldn’t care in that case either. Either way, this is a super good reason to not do business with such a company.

if the fire it lit under them, after their software leads to widespread hack - they will care.

that's the point - to put pressure on them to CARE.

Re: One-Click RCE in Asus's Preinstalled Driver Software

#128
post #110
post #36

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I make software. If you discover a vulnerability, why would you put my tens of thousands of users at risk, instead of emailing me and have the vulnerability fixed in an hour before disclosing? I get that companies sit on vulnerabilities, but isn't fair warning... fair?

I think one point being made is that (in this example) you would've been much less careless about shipping the vulnerability, if you knew you'd be held accountable for it. With current practice, you can be as sloppy and reckless as you want, and when you create vulnerabilities because of that, you somehow almost push the "responsibility" onto the person who discovers it, and you aren't discouraged from recklessness.…

> you would've been much less careless about shipping the vulnerability, if you knew you'd be held accountable for it

I have a problem with this framing. Sure, some vulnerabilities are the result of recklessness, and there’s clearly a problem to be solved when it comes to companies shipping obviously shoddy code.

But many vulnerabilities happen despite great care being taken to ship quality code. It is unfortunately the nature of the beast. A sufficiently complex system will result in vulnerabilities even a careful person could not have predicted.

To me, the issue is that software now runs the world, despite these inherent limitations of human developers and the process of software development. It’s deployed in ever more critical situations, despite the industry not having well defined and enforceable standards like you’d find in some engineering disciplines.

What you’re describing is a scenario that would force developers to just stop making software, on top of putting significantly more people at risk.

I still believe the industry has a problem that needs to be solved, and it needs a broad culture shift in the dev community, but disagree that shining a bright light on every hole such that it causes massive harm to “make devs accountable” is a good or even reasonable solution.

Re: One-Click RCE in Asus's Preinstalled Driver Software

#129
post #36

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"Responsible" disclosure is paradoxically named because actually it is completely irresponsible. The vast majority of corporations handle disclosures badly in that they do not fix in time (i.e. a week), do not attribute properly, do not inform their users and do not learn from their mistakes. Irresponsibly delayed limited disclosure reinforces those behaviors. The actually responsible thing to do is to disclose immed…

I make software. If you discover a vulnerability, why would you put my tens of thousands of users at risk, instead of emailing me and have the vulnerability fixed in an hour before disclosing? I get that companies sit on vulnerabilities, but isn't fair warning... fair?

Strange wording. You are the one that put tens of thousands of your users at risk. Not the one who discovers the problem.

Re: One-Click RCE in Asus's Preinstalled Driver Software

#130

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Increasing the chance of a bad actor actually doing something with a vulnerability seems bad, actually. You're effectively shifting responsibility to consumers, who are probably not going to see a CVE for one of the dozens of softwares they use every day.

> You're effectively shifting responsibility to consumers, who are probably not going to see a CVE for one of the dozens of softwares they use every day. Which is again, a problem created by the companies themselves. The way this should work is that the researcher discloses to the company, and the company reaches out to and informs their customers immediately . Then they fix it. But instead companies refuse to tell t…

> The way this should work is that the researcher discloses to the company, and the company reaches out to and informs their customers immediately. Then they fix it.

If that was common practice, bad actors would make sure to be a registered customer of all interesting targets, so that they get informed early about vulnerabilities before there is a fix. And it would create a black market for that information.

When someone gets the information “Asus BIOS has an RCE vulnerability related to driver installation”, they’ll be able to figure out the details quickly with high probability, like OP did.

Post reply on HN