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NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption

nist.gov

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Re: NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption

#121

Post by 0xDEAFBEAD »

chowells wrote: post #117
0xDEAFBEAD wrote: post #90

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Curious why this is being downvoted.

Almost certainly because of the inappropriately aggressive tone for what would otherwise be a nice clean clarification. I just said "split" and "combine", making it possible to believe I literally meant "put half the bits in each". That's so bad of an idea that I was sure no one would think I meant that. But I can see how I wasn't clear enough. An additional clarification is good info. But the way it was posted is so…

>That's so bad of an idea that I was sure no one would think I meant that.

Not everyone who reads these HN threads is a cryptographer. It didn't raise serious red flags for me when you mentioned that. I figured it should be OK as long as you make the size of the key twice as large. Is that wrong?

Re: NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption

#122

Post by kerkeslager »

MidnightRider39 wrote: post #119
kerkeslager wrote: post #113

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's a fallacy that multiple companies and governments need to be working on one thing at a time. We absolutely should be patching current vulnerabilities and implementing quantum-safe cryptography. There's no conflict between these goals.

The reality is that resources are constrained and there is definitely conflict between different goals - if you invest in one thing you can’t invest as much in another. For me it looks like the investment in QC is way bigger than its real life impact - which is 0. Sure it can be a niche field for some more esoteric research - but it shouldn’t be the no1 topic for security researchers. But I get that QC brings in the…

The reality is that resources needed to pursue research are measured in hundreds of thousands and national security budgets are measured in billions in many countries, so your "constrained" claim is pretty much nonsense. That's not even talking about US national security budgets, which are another order of magnitude larger. The US intelligence budget in 2022 was $65.7 billion[1], and there's ample political will to fund whatever intelligence agencies such as the NSA request.

A generous CS PhD salary vs NSA 2013 estimated budget:

           300,000
    10,800,000,000
We can argue over exact allocation amounts but if you're really claiming the NSA can't spare even one researcher salary to research QC security I'm calling bullshit.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_intelligence_bud...

Re: NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption

#123

Post by basfo »

whimsicalism wrote: post #30
nartho wrote: post #26

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I Wonder why ? It doesn't to me. Maybe I'm just bad at recognizing LLMs patterns

the question/conclusion phrasing at the end is a suspicious red flag to me, quick click on their comment history is confirmation

English is not my first language. Sometimes, especially when I try to write a complex and long idea, I use LLMs to correct my errors, syntax, etc. In those cases, even if the idea remains the same, the text ends up looking LLM generated, since the correction applies its own "robotic style." This is even more noticeable if you ask chatgpt to translate it from another language.

(I'm not the author of the post, just mentioning it since it will probably become harder to detect such cases.)

Re: NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption

#124

Post by chowells »

0xDEAFBEAD wrote: post #121
chowells wrote: post #117

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Almost certainly because of the inappropriately aggressive tone for what would otherwise be a nice clean clarification. I just said "split" and "combine", making it possible to believe I literally meant "put half the bits in each". That's so bad of an idea that I was sure no one would think I meant that. But I can see how I wasn't clear enough. An additional clarification is good info. But the way it was posted is so…

>That's so bad of an idea that I was sure no one would think I meant that. Not everyone who reads these HN threads is a cryptographer. It didn't raise serious red flags for me when you mentioned that. I figured it should be OK as long as you make the size of the key twice as large. Is that wrong?

The problem is that no commonly-used symmetric cipher has been studied nearly as heavily with larger keys. 128 bits for a symmetric cipher is enough for all practical purposes barring a cryptographic break, and it gives the best performance. Their constructions aren't so trivial that you can just extend the existing study to larger key sizes mechanically. Using larger key sizes basically means using new ciphers. Unstudied ciphers.

It's much more conservative on your novelty budget to use a well-studied 128-bit cipher along with a well-studied key derivation function. In cryptography, you really should be as conservative as possible with your novelty budget.

Re: NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption

#125

Post by natch »

tptacek wrote: post #118
mistercheph wrote: post #110

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> they could do that with or without the contest Then why does the contest give you any more confidence that the selection isn't backdoored?

It's not the contest so much as the reputation of the winning team and the reputations of all the teams who did cryptanalytic work. Wait, I guess that means it is the contest. Well, there's your answer. People on threads like these are pretending NIST was a shadowy force making secret determinations, but the whole thing happens in the open, and NIST is essentially just proctoring. A lot of this kind of thing is just…

>the reputation of the winning team and the reputations of all the teams who did cryptanalytic work

>NIST is essentially just proctoring

Well, there we go. These items are actually good information (to be verified of course). Way better information than questions that seem to miss the concern. Thank you.

Re: NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption

#126

Post by 0xDEAFBEAD »

chowells wrote: post #124
0xDEAFBEAD wrote: post #121

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>That's so bad of an idea that I was sure no one would think I meant that. Not everyone who reads these HN threads is a cryptographer. It didn't raise serious red flags for me when you mentioned that. I figured it should be OK as long as you make the size of the key twice as large. Is that wrong?

The problem is that no commonly-used symmetric cipher has been studied nearly as heavily with larger keys. 128 bits for a symmetric cipher is enough for all practical purposes barring a cryptographic break, and it gives the best performance. Their constructions aren't so trivial that you can just extend the existing study to larger key sizes mechanically. Using larger key sizes basically means using new ciphers. Unst…

Thanks!
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