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After 3 Years, I Failed. Here's All My Startup's Code

dylanhuang.com

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Re: After 3 Years, I Failed. Here's All My Startup's Code

#121
post #66

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Maybe my understanding of "big company" salaries are skewed but I imagine there's a profitable middle ground between big company salary and hypergrowth? As long as one isn't taking VC money at least On the flip side, I can't say I'm super sure what "hypergrowth" means, it's a rate of growth but I guess what really Matters is some expected valuation/market cap kinda thing

pretty hard beating riskless 500k+ TC without having equity in a hypergrowth company.

I wonder how the probability of securing such a job - with huge layoffs lately and increased competition - compares to the probability of business success. There's unemployed engineers grinding at system design and algorithms 10 hours a day for at least half a year to get an interview. If I'm going to spend hundreds of person hours on something, I think I'd rather start a company to be honest. Additionally, internationally those levels of pay are incredibly rare.

Re: After 3 Years, I Failed. Here's All My Startup's Code

#122

> While we gained some traction with some startups, we ultimately weren't able to build a hyper-growth business. […] We then decided to pivot into a vertical B2B SaaS AI product […, but] we haven't been able to find enough traction to make us believe that we were on the right track to build a huge business. American startup culture is so weird. Not everything needs to be a hyper-scaler, not everything needs to be hug…

I don't understand this criticism. Most businesses aren't hyperscale. Some businesses are hyperscale because that's what people want to invest in.

Re: After 3 Years, I Failed. Here's All My Startup's Code

#123
post #30

Earlier quoted context omitted.

People say that but as someone trying to actually do that, it is freaking hard to commit to 3-5 years of virtually no salary to maybe get to the same outcome you would have had with a funded business. You need to sell a lot of 10$/month licenses for it to even viable to a 2-3 people startup in a developed country. There is also the cost of opportunity to consider in that.

I don't understand why people even think about selling $10/mo licenses. Just go sell $2-4k/mo SaaS to a medium sized traditional industry that has ancient, crummy software with a target customer employee size of 50 - 1,000 people. Customer problem discovery is easier, you get reputation network effects within the vertical, you gain trust because you learn the industry lingo, you can actually solve peoples' problems b…

>Just go sell $2-4k/mo SaaS to a medium sized traditional industry that has ancient, crummy software with a target customer employee size of 50 - 1,000 people.

As if that is easy.

Re: After 3 Years, I Failed. Here's All My Startup's Code

#124

> While we gained some traction with some startups, we ultimately weren't able to build a hyper-growth business. […] We then decided to pivot into a vertical B2B SaaS AI product […, but] we haven't been able to find enough traction to make us believe that we were on the right track to build a huge business. American startup culture is so weird. Not everything needs to be a hyper-scaler, not everything needs to be hug…

American startup culture is so weird

On the one hand, sure. On the other hand this relentless focus on "hyper-scale" or bust is what has pushed the US startup scene to where it is and probably why it is so far ahead of the rest of the world.

If you told most European startup founders that in 5 years you'll have plateaued at 15-20 employees, a steady income flow, and you'll be paying yourself $200-250k a year, they'd think of that has a big success. In the US they may very well think of that as failure, especially if they are VC funded. I remember hearing a SV VC straight up say that if you consider selling your company for $50 million a win, the you don't have the right mindset and he doesn't want to do business with you.

If you never take big swings and big risks and are happy with small wins and stable growth you'll never win the big prize. And while this might be healthier for you as an individual, it's bad for the Economy.

Re: After 3 Years, I Failed. Here's All My Startup's Code

#125
post #124

> While we gained some traction with some startups, we ultimately weren't able to build a hyper-growth business. […] We then decided to pivot into a vertical B2B SaaS AI product […, but] we haven't been able to find enough traction to make us believe that we were on the right track to build a huge business. American startup culture is so weird. Not everything needs to be a hyper-scaler, not everything needs to be hug…

American startup culture is so weird On the one hand, sure. On the other hand this relentless focus on "hyper-scale" or bust is what has pushed the US startup scene to where it is and probably why it is so far ahead of the rest of the world. If you told most European startup founders that in 5 years you'll have plateaued at 15-20 employees, a steady income flow, and you'll be paying yourself $200-250k a year, they'd…

Yes, but SV VC are not known for being wise people you look to for life advice. It's a bit like asking for forest safety advice from drunk hunters.

Re: After 3 Years, I Failed. Here's All My Startup's Code

#126

> While we gained some traction with some startups, we ultimately weren't able to build a hyper-growth business. […] We then decided to pivot into a vertical B2B SaaS AI product […, but] we haven't been able to find enough traction to make us believe that we were on the right track to build a huge business. American startup culture is so weird. Not everything needs to be a hyper-scaler, not everything needs to be hug…

My impression is that many profitable small businesses (small teams, long-term goals, which can be considered even boring) don't make it to the front page of HN because they don't aim (unrealistically) high. I find it fascinating how this culture embraces a "move fast, break things" mentality, which seems to apply (only) to the tech industry, where someone with multiple failed businesses is often labeled a "serial entrepreneur" (selling unsustainable company I don't consider a success). It's amusing to think about what it would be like if someone failed in multiple sports and referred to themselves as a "serial sportsman."

Re: After 3 Years, I Failed. Here's All My Startup's Code

#127

> While we gained some traction with some startups, we ultimately weren't able to build a hyper-growth business. […] We then decided to pivot into a vertical B2B SaaS AI product […, but] we haven't been able to find enough traction to make us believe that we were on the right track to build a huge business. American startup culture is so weird. Not everything needs to be a hyper-scaler, not everything needs to be hug…

The problem is that once you take the VC coin, you are pushed towards hyper-scale. If you don't take the VC coin it's a much harder and longer path to self-sustainability, unless you have some way to fund yourself e.g. consulting. 37 Signals is the model here, but they are super-exceptional (they created Rails, after all).

Then having got there, a VC-funded competitor will just roll over you as they'll have better connections and funding.

Re: After 3 Years, I Failed. Here's All My Startup's Code

#128

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It just doesn't make any sense when you can go to work for a big company and get that kind of outcome without all the risk.

It does if you aren't a big company person. I suspect the majority of entrepreneurs aren't doing it for the money, they are doing it because they don't fit the traditional corporate mould. The people the media loves to focus on are the outliers. Schumpeter had some interesting insights on this: https://reactionwheel.net/2019/01/schumpeter-on-strategy.htm...

Also, for some of us, building your own company is much less risky than working for a company.

No matter how comfortable or secure you feel in your job, sudden layoffs can and do happen. Also, what if you develop an illness that makes you unable to work?

Having your company means you can make money while you sleep, you answer to the market (which on average is somewhat "rational") rather than to a (possibly capricious) boss, you get to grapple with a wide range of interesting challenges that take you out of your comfort zone and lead to personal growth, and so on.

As long as you are able to build a company that provides income at least comparable to what you would make at a job, I think the benefits are numerous. It is not for everyone though.

Re: After 3 Years, I Failed. Here's All My Startup's Code

#129
post #124

> While we gained some traction with some startups, we ultimately weren't able to build a hyper-growth business. […] We then decided to pivot into a vertical B2B SaaS AI product […, but] we haven't been able to find enough traction to make us believe that we were on the right track to build a huge business. American startup culture is so weird. Not everything needs to be a hyper-scaler, not everything needs to be hug…

American startup culture is so weird On the one hand, sure. On the other hand this relentless focus on "hyper-scale" or bust is what has pushed the US startup scene to where it is and probably why it is so far ahead of the rest of the world. If you told most European startup founders that in 5 years you'll have plateaued at 15-20 employees, a steady income flow, and you'll be paying yourself $200-250k a year, they'd…

Swinging big or not, the odds of (by definition of startup) "failure" are high. Therefore, you might as well swing big. A swing small experiment that doesn't connect is still a "failure".

Put another way, there is an endless supply of noise (read: competition for attention). If you're not swinging big enough to cut through that clutter odds are good you're just adding to the clutter. That's going to be an endless struggle.

Less risk is actually more risk.

Re: After 3 Years, I Failed. Here's All My Startup's Code

#130
post #30
post #25

> While we gained some traction with some startups, we ultimately weren't able to build a hyper-growth business. >"We then decided to pivot into a vertical B2B SaaS AI product because we felt we could use the breakthroughs in Gen AI to solve previously unsolvable problems, but after going through user interviews and the sales cycle for many different ideas, we haven't been able to find enough traction to make us beli…

People say that but as someone trying to actually do that, it is freaking hard to commit to 3-5 years of virtually no salary to maybe get to the same outcome you would have had with a funded business. You need to sell a lot of 10$/month licenses for it to even viable to a 2-3 people startup in a developed country. There is also the cost of opportunity to consider in that.

> it is freaking hard to commit to 3-5 years of virtually no salary to maybe get to the same outcome you would have had with a funded business.

I agree and I disagree.

It is hard to bootstrap a product. It's even harder to bootstrap a product that folks want to buy. It's even harder to do that when the prevailing wisdom on this (and other tech sites) is to go the VC-funded route.

The VC funded route -- for the vast, vast, vast majority of software businesses ends up being the exact same as the bootstrapped route -- except that you lose one avenue when you find out your business isn't "hyper-growth" or isn't going to be a huge as you claimed in your pitchdeck to the VCs. You lose the ability to pare back and to be what is described as a "lifestyle business". On failure, the business gets sold or stripped for parts, unless the founder can somehow get the VCs to agree to let them 'buy it back' or write-off their investment and give it back.

Bootstrapping means taking that risk on yourself; but it also means control over your options, and that is one fundamental strength to bootstrapping you don't get with VC funded startups.

Absolutely, it's no salary or the aptly named ramen profitability for a long time if your marketing is not aligned with the folks that will buy your software, or if your software really is just selling a solution to a problem no one actually cares about.

The 'hard part' isn't the engineering. It isn't the technology. The hard part is the marketing -- the connecting the hopefully expensive problem you solve to the right folks who want to buy that solution.

To your second part, I wholly agree that selling $10/month licenses is not a viable way forward if you want to be anything more than a solopreneuer.

But to do that, you need to hone your positioning so that you get in front of the folks with money who need to solve the problem your solution solves.

In your case, it looks like you run a web-auditing tool (according to your bio) called caido.io; and it looks like you're targetting basically everyone who needs to audit a website.

In the thought that "there are more fish in the ocean so why not fish there", that is a seemingly sound idea.

But you don't really want to spend your time trying to fish in the ocean if you have a barrel you could fish in and get the same result... dinner. (I did not come up with this metaphor, that was Jonathan Stark -- who writes a lot about positioning in this context).

The question you have to ask yourself is, are you positioning your product so that the CISOs or the large cyber-security firms would want to buy it? And if you did, do you think they'd trust your product at a mere $25 per month?

Anyway, the point to all this is that the problem is learning how to position the thing you build and get it in front of the right folks, and that's a marketing problem, not a technology problem, and that's something that we as engineers have ignored for far too long collectively.

I wish you the best of luck with your product -- we need more small software businesses in this world!

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