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CrowdStrike ex-employees: 'Quality control was not part of our process'

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Re: CrowdStrike ex-employees: 'Quality control was not part of our process'

#121
post #100
post #20

Most interesting quote in the article: “It was hard to get people to do sufficient testing sometimes,” said Preston Sego, who worked at CrowdStrike from 2019 to 2023. His job was to review the tests completed by user experience developers that alerted engineers to bugs before proposed coding changes were released to customers. Sego said he was fired in February 2023 as an “insider threat” after he criticized the comp…

> Imagine criticizing a policy and then getting labeled "insider threat". Especially because that’s incredibly dumb. A true insider threat would play nice while you find all your confidential data leaking.

I mean, that's just insanely true. I think this is maybe the most dystopian company I've ever heard of so far.

Re: CrowdStrike ex-employees: 'Quality control was not part of our process'

#122
post #43
post #36

Found out that the CrowdStrike Mac agent (Falcon) sends all your secrets from environment variables to their cloud hosted SIEM. In plain text. Anyone with access to your CS SIEM can search for GitHub, aws, etc creds. Anything your devs, ops and sec teams use on their Macs. Only the Mac version does this. There is no way to disable this behaviour or a way to redact things. Another really odd design decision. They prob…

Is this really a criticism? Because this has been the case forever with all security and SIEM tools. It’s one of the reasons why the SIEM is the most locked down pieces of software in the business. Realistically, secrets alone shouldn’t allow an attacker access - they should need access to infrastructure or a certificates in machines as well. But unfortunately that’s not the case for many SaaS vendors.

"Oh, but our system is so secure, you don't need other layers."

Re: CrowdStrike ex-employees: 'Quality control was not part of our process'

#124
post #20

Most interesting quote in the article: “It was hard to get people to do sufficient testing sometimes,” said Preston Sego, who worked at CrowdStrike from 2019 to 2023. His job was to review the tests completed by user experience developers that alerted engineers to bugs before proposed coding changes were released to customers. Sego said he was fired in February 2023 as an “insider threat” after he criticized the comp…

I'd like to clarify: that my job was also to educate, modernize, and improve developer velocity through tooling and framework updates / changes (impacting every team in my department (UX / frontend engineering)). Reviewing tests is part of PR review. --- and before anyone asks, this is my statement on CrowdStrike calling everyone disgruntled: "I'm not disgruntled. But as a shareholder (and probably more primarily, so…

I mourn the fact that your ex co-workers are still working for a shitty company.

Re: CrowdStrike ex-employees: 'Quality control was not part of our process'

#125
post #36

Found out that the CrowdStrike Mac agent (Falcon) sends all your secrets from environment variables to their cloud hosted SIEM. In plain text. Anyone with access to your CS SIEM can search for GitHub, aws, etc creds. Anything your devs, ops and sec teams use on their Macs. Only the Mac version does this. There is no way to disable this behaviour or a way to redact things. Another really odd design decision. They prob…

Secrets in clear text in environment variables is never a good idea though.

Re: CrowdStrike ex-employees: 'Quality control was not part of our process'

#126
post #83

Critical software infrastructure should be regulated the way critical physical infrastructure is. We don't trust the people who make buildings and bridges to "do the right thing" - we mandate it with regulations and inspections. (When your software not working strands millions of people around the globe, it's critical) And this was just a regular old "accident"; imagine the future, when a war has threat actors trying…

Did you notice that the piece of software in question was apparently installed mostly in companies where regulations and inspections already override sysadmins' common sense? Are you sure the answer is simply more of the same?

I've worked in these enterprise organizations for a long time. They don't run on common sense, or even what one might consider "business sense". Their existing incentives create bizarre behavior.

For example, you might think "if a big security exploit happens, the stock price might tank". So if they value the stock price, they'll focus on security, right?. In reality what they do is focus on burying the evidence of security exploits. Because if nobody finds out, the stock price won't tank. Much easier than doing the work of actually securing things. And apparently it's often legal.

And when it's not a bizarre incentive, often people just ignore risks, or even low-level failures, until it's too late. Four-way intersections can pile up accidents for years until a school bus full of kids gets T-boned by a dump truck. We can't expect people to do the right thing even if they notice a problem. Something has to force the right thing.

The only thing I have ever seen force an executive to do the right thing is a law that says they will be held liable if they don't. That's still not a guarantee it will actually happen correctly, course. But they will put pressure on their underlings to at least try to make it happen.

On top of that, I would have standards that they are required to follow, the way building codes specify the standard tolerances, sizes, engineering diagrams, etc that need to be followed and inspected before someone is allowed into the building. This would enforce the quality control (and someone impartial to check it) that was lacking recently.

This will have similar results as building codes - increased bureaucracy, cost, complexity, time... but also, more safety. I think for critical things, we really do need it. Industrial controls, like those used for water, power (nuclear...), gas, etc, need it. Tanker and container ships, trains/subways, airlines, elevators, fire suppressants, military/defense, etc. The few, but very, very important, systems.

If somebody else has better ideas, believe me, I am happy to hear them....

Re: CrowdStrike ex-employees: 'Quality control was not part of our process'

#127
post #87
post #79

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Ok, suppose you're right. Why are they only doing it for macs then?

It may depend a bit on your organization but I bet most folks using an EDR solution can tell you that Macs are probably very low on the list when it comes to malware. You can guess which OS you will spend time on every day ...

So because macs are not the targets of malware ... we're locking them down tighter than any other system?

Re: CrowdStrike ex-employees: 'Quality control was not part of our process'

#128

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Personal: Nothing - Windows Defender is built into Windows. Business: Nothing - Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection is built into the higher Microsoft 365 license tiers. It amazes me people chose to pay money to have all their PCs bluescreen.

if you had used 'some' before 'people' i could agree but some industries have to use a siem or they can be fined, so, i mean if there's a list of siems that are definitely not going to ever crash by messing around in the kernel lets get a list going

Microsoft Sentinel seems like a pretty unlikely candidate for SIEM to crash every machine it’s receiving data from.

Re: CrowdStrike ex-employees: 'Quality control was not part of our process'

#129
post #102
post #80

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Conspiracy theory time. Because Apple is the only OS company that has reliably proven that it won't decrypt hard drives at government request.

It depends on the country it is in, it rejects the US government's request. But it fully complies with any request from the Chinese government

The venn diagram of users who don't want the government to access their data and crowdstrike customers is two circles in different galaxies.

Re: CrowdStrike ex-employees: 'Quality control was not part of our process'

#130
post #71
post #57

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Because this has been the case forever with all security and SIEM tools. Why? There is no need to send your environment variables.

Otherwise malware can hide in environment variables

They do not need to take the data off the computer to do that
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