Earlier quoted context omitted.
How much of this is outdated practice? Shouldn't TCP/TLS be doing checksum and origin signing already? In the days of FTP, checksum and gpg were vital. With http/TCP, you need more GPG due to TCP handling retries checksum etc, but still both due to MitM. But with https, how does it still matter? It's doing both verifications and signature checks for you.
TLS prevents a different kind of attack, the MitM one which you describe. GPG signing covers this threat model but much more, the threats include: * The server runs vulnerable software and is compromised by script-kiddies. They, then, upload arbitrary packages on the server * The cloud provider is compromised and attackers take over the server from the admin cloud provider account. * Attacker use a vulnerability (fro…
And change the instructions to point to a different GPG key (or none at all).
I think the only situation it possibly helps in is if you are using untrusted mirrors. But then a simple checksum does that too. No need for GPG.