121–130 of 181 posts
It seems like some folks are missing the motivation for DNSSec and suggesting TLS instead. If your threat model includes global adversaries, you have can't rely on TLS because governments can trivially compromise TLS providers and TLS exposes users to the lowest common denominator TLS. The lowest common denominator TLS (ACME DNS-1) and the mitigation to the TLS provider problem (CAA records) are both based on DNS. So…
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The most devastating and primary attack I am worried about is someone obtaining a TLS certificate for my domain via services like Let's Encrypt. Thus, I really care about LE getting the right IP, I don't care about random users' DNS getting hijacked because their browser will reject the missing/invalid certificate.
Subscribe to CT logs for your domain, and you will know if this ever happens, from LE or from any oher authority. Such attack is a very big deal, if this happens this will only happen once, whichever hole is used will be closed. And if this does not happen, you can be rest assured your TLS is safe. Meanwhile if DNSSEC's vision is ever fully realized, you will lose that control entirely. There is no CT there, and even…
This is a false dichotomy. DNSSEC secures DNS records, it doesn't prevent logging certificate issuance.
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> Forging a ‘fake CT log’ isn’t possible, either Why do you think this isn't possible?
Aside from what mjg59 said, it's clear you don't quite understand how CT works. Logs are stood up and then go through a fairly rigorous acceptance process by Google (and Apple) before finally being used. 'Used' in that a CA can then submit pre-certs to it and include the resulting SCTs in signed certificates, making them functional on Chrome/Apple platforms. Even the CA using the log generally takes some communicatio…
(Not that I'm a DNSSEC user myself, my feet aren't bulletproof)
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Aside from what mjg59 said, it's clear you don't quite understand how CT works. Logs are stood up and then go through a fairly rigorous acceptance process by Google (and Apple) before finally being used. 'Used' in that a CA can then submit pre-certs to it and include the resulting SCTs in signed certificates, making them functional on Chrome/Apple platforms. Even the CA using the log generally takes some communicatio…
If you are able to compromise a CA and generate a bogus certificate, why couldn't you also compromise a certificate transparency log provider and generate a bogus signed merkle hash? (Not that I'm a DNSSEC user myself, my feet aren't bulletproof)
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All the CAs are required to log. You don't have to trust any of them. The premise of CT isn't that every device is watching the logs in real time, such that your set-top box is somehow using it.
How can you prove that all CAs log every certificate they produce?
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When criticizing DNSSEC, you can’t assume that the system for TLS certificates – i.e. CAs – is perfect. They both have their weak points and drawbacks. Both BGP and certificate issuance have bootstrapping problems, which are handled today by imperfect TOFU-like solutions. DNSSEC is, IMHO, perfectly positioned to solve both of those problems. I.e. use certificates all you like, but verify them by looking up the TLSA r…
People say this all the time, but of course the WebPKI has Certificate Transparency, requiring every issuer to register every certificate issued in a globally monitored tamper-proof log, and DNSSEC doesn't. Moreover, the WebPKI got CT because the browser root programs were able to force the CAs to join it. They have no such influence over DNS registrars, many of which are de jure controlled by world governments and w…
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The important stuff is not just websites I host, but also websites I visit. And in all the scenarios you mention, I (and everyone else) would know that it happened very clearly, as it is basically denial of service attack. Even if this is a takeover event with almost-instantaneous replacement with the phishing page, the website owner would detect this and if the website is at least a bit popular, the news would defin…
Web PKI CAs aren't psychic, they just use DNS. So your claim ends up being that you believe DNS answers from the DNS can be tampered with by parties who control those answers (which includes the TLD registrar, this part checks out), but, somehow every Web PKI CA would know if this happened and disregard the results. Not only is your claim obviously not true in principle, we know it's not true in practice, disrupted D…
Supplementary question: Why do so many sites these days opt for tiny font-sizes in some shade of pale-grey on white?
DNSSEC is easily the worst upgrade, multiplying complexity and brittleness, with the least amount of net benefit (without even adding encryption), that could have been solved in much simpler ways, that the Internet has ever attempted -- and that's including IPv6 (which is now quite workable). Speaking as someone who most people consider a DNS expert and actually did help develop and deploy something substantially add…
At this point it feels like DNS should be given to Cloudflare or Google and let them design it from scratch. I'm only half joking.