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The U.S. cracked a $3.4B crypto heist and Bitcoin’s anonymity

wsj.com

121–130 of 243 posts

Re: The U.S. cracked a $3.4B crypto heist and Bitcoin’s anonymity

#121
post #15

The US invested so much effort into this because they were worried that their own agents were involved with the theft. This was all part of their effort to clean up the massive corruption post-Silk Road seizure.

On what basis do you make this statement?

fun thread: https://twitter.com/tayvano_/status/1641927617216655360?s=20

(corruption part starts at https://twitter.com/tayvano_/status/1641927647440830465?s=20)

Re: The U.S. cracked a $3.4B crypto heist and Bitcoin’s anonymity

#122

Earlier quoted context omitted.

they didn’t listen then and they don’t listen now. waste of effort.

I think you are projecting your beliefs onto them. Mixers, privacy chains, and ZK privacy schemes have all been implemented because everyone in crypto acknowledges the lack of privacy. The WSJ on the other hand…

> Mixers, privacy chains, and ZK privacy schemes

Does any of this stuff actually help bypass KYC requirements for legal offramps in developed countries?

Re: The U.S. cracked a $3.4B crypto heist and Bitcoin’s anonymity

#123

Earlier quoted context omitted.

But used as intended (not via a KYC exchange) it is pseudonymous, right?

If you trade in and out for cash, in person with a counterparty, from a self-hosted wallet that you never use to send or receive from any other wallet that's connected to an exchange... then yes. The use case for this is mainly moving money over borders.

This makes bitcoin sounds like a complicated technical reimplementation of hawala

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hawala?wprov=sfla1

Re: The U.S. cracked a $3.4B crypto heist and Bitcoin’s anonymity

#124
post #19

Say it with me: "Bitcoin is not, and never was, anonymous."

But used as intended (not via a KYC exchange) it is pseudonymous, right?

Since the ledger is public, it can be analyzed for patterns from the individual transactions. The more transactions there are involving a certain party, the more likely an outside observer will be able to piece together identities for that party's overall network. KYC exchanges accelerate that process.

Crypto projects like Monero (XMR) do not have this flaw, as deducing the identities of parties from the public ledger is computationally prohibitive.

Re: The U.S. cracked a $3.4B crypto heist and Bitcoin’s anonymity

#125
post #79

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The worst part IMO? That the suitcase of cash didn’t work.

> The worst part IMO? That the suitcase of cash didn’t work. As a parent of young men, I'm glad it didn't work. IMHO it would have been bad for the character development of both parties.

At the point he's heisted several billion dollars of bitcoin (or anything really), I think it's a bit late to be worrying about that.

Re: The U.S. cracked a $3.4B crypto heist and Bitcoin’s anonymity

#126
post #83

Earlier quoted context omitted.

But AFAIK, you can launder cryptos, right? [0] [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptocurrency_tumbler#

You can, but this is the kind of thing which is very easy to get wrong in ways which are significant legal risks on their own. For example, if you were some random cryptobro buying personal quantities of drugs in 2015 there’s some risk but the FBI probably isn’t going to spend time on something that small. If you do anything which reveals funds going to or from a tumbler, however, the risk isn’t just KYC but also que…

>Lying to them is a federal crime, too, so even if you nothing other than tumble coins for ideological reasons you’d want to be very careful about what you say – and think about how hard it could be to prove you didn’t know the other parties in a transaction.

This is true. However, I'd present a few caveats:

1. Even though it's a felony to lie to Federal (and some state/local) law enforcement in the US, you can just not speak to them. In fact, you should mostly not talk to the police under any circumstances. There are many reasons for this. Too many for me to list here. However, this attorney and a former police officer[0] (48 minute video, but well worth it. Share it with your friends and family too!) provide all those reasons.

2. Law enforcement aren't superhuman. They're just as dumb (or smart, but the really smart ones end up in corner offices rather than police stations like police and more common criminals) as the next guy. Their big advantage, especially in a circumstance like this, is that they only have to get it right (i.e., find some evidence) once. The alleged perpetrator of a crime needs to get it right (in covering their tracks, destroying evidence, etc.) every single time to make sure they aren't identified and caught.

So, unless you're prepared to cover your tracks (in this case, it was bitcoin transactions) over and over forever, you run the risk of being caught -- eventually.

I'll say it again, because it's an important point: If you're in the US (not just a citizen, anyone present within its borders), DON'T TALK TO THE POLICE!

I'm sure things are different elsewhere (perhaps someone could expound on that?), but in the US, just STFU.

[0] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d-7o9xYp7eE

Re: The U.S. cracked a $3.4B crypto heist and Bitcoin’s anonymity

#127
post #83

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You can, but this is the kind of thing which is very easy to get wrong in ways which are significant legal risks on their own. For example, if you were some random cryptobro buying personal quantities of drugs in 2015 there’s some risk but the FBI probably isn’t going to spend time on something that small. If you do anything which reveals funds going to or from a tumbler, however, the risk isn’t just KYC but also que…

> …and think about how hard it could be to prove you didn’t know the other parties in a transaction. They have to prove you committed a crime, all you need to do is have a lawyer present during questioning.

>They have to prove you committed a crime, all you need to do is have a lawyer present during questioning.

That's a good idea, but any decent lawyer will tell you to keep your mouth shut. Especially when being questioned. Let the lawyer do the talking[0].

[0] That assumes you have a good lawyer. Which may or may not be a valid assumption.

Re: The U.S. cracked a $3.4B crypto heist and Bitcoin’s anonymity

#128
post #83

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You can, but this is the kind of thing which is very easy to get wrong in ways which are significant legal risks on their own. For example, if you were some random cryptobro buying personal quantities of drugs in 2015 there’s some risk but the FBI probably isn’t going to spend time on something that small. If you do anything which reveals funds going to or from a tumbler, however, the risk isn’t just KYC but also que…

The topic is "laundering BTC into dollars". You're referring to the risk of getting chased down for the "bad deeds" of others after funds are co-mingled. You're not explaining that it's prohibitively risky or not possible. Further, I'm only aware of tumbling blacklisting [0], where the exchange gets blacklisted for co-mingling known dirty funds. AFAIK, there are still sizable tumbling vectors. [0] https://www.cnbc.co…

My point was simply that your options with Bitcoin for converting it into real currency or goods are either easily tracked (mainstream exchange following KYC laws) or push you into riskier activities. As with most things, the odds of getting caught aren’t certain but one somewhat unique risk to most cryptocurrencies is that you have to estimate the risk of retroactive punishment since the ledger is irrevocably public.

Re: The U.S. cracked a $3.4B crypto heist and Bitcoin’s anonymity

#129
post #83

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You can, but this is the kind of thing which is very easy to get wrong in ways which are significant legal risks on their own. For example, if you were some random cryptobro buying personal quantities of drugs in 2015 there’s some risk but the FBI probably isn’t going to spend time on something that small. If you do anything which reveals funds going to or from a tumbler, however, the risk isn’t just KYC but also que…

> …and think about how hard it could be to prove you didn’t know the other parties in a transaction. They have to prove you committed a crime, all you need to do is have a lawyer present during questioning.

That’s already stressful and expensive but consider also that you’re probably only having that conversation if they already have evidence for at least one crime (disclosure and/or taxes). That is likely going to be grounds for a search warrant to examine everything else, and even if that’s ultimately fruitless it’d be an ordeal and could lead to professional consequences as well as things like losing your devices to a forensic lab.

Re: The U.S. cracked a $3.4B crypto heist and Bitcoin’s anonymity

#130
post #76

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Only if you and everyone you ever deal with have perfect security. As soon as one person’s identity is leaked, that opens the possibility of a real-world ID being linked to a wallet. This story from about a year ago also showed how that worked with investigators tracing it link by link: https://www.wired.com/story/tracers-in-the-dark-welcome-to-v...

Future proof security. I think that people discount that aspect of it. If your identity is cracked at any point in the future, perhaps using methods yet to be invented, all your transactions will still be there on the blockchain. I once heard someone refer to the blockchain as prosecution futures, and that is about right.

Exactly - and that’s especially true if laws or other things change. For example, suppose that you made a donation to the political party which lost a key election to an authoritarian – are you sleeping easy at night wondering whether they have a data mining team?
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