Earlier quoted context omitted.
One question, with the two-stage approach, isn’t that a security risk? App 1 gets measured and can’t change, but it needs to identify app 2 in a way that still allows it to be updatable, invalidating the whole security chain. I’m probably not understanding something, so I’d love an explanation (preferably one that non-cryptographers understand)
> One question, with the two-stage approach, isn’t that a security risk? App 1 gets measured and can’t change, but it needs to identify app 2 in a way that still allows it to be updatable, invalidating the whole security chain. It doesn't invalidate it if it works as the application developer intended. The essential idea is that the first mutable boot stage contains a trust policy which somehow verifies the second st…
That would make it less secure ("only" as secure as the private key), which is the trade-off the developer made in exchange for an upgradable app, correct?