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The Reemergent 1977 H1N1 Strain and the Gain-of-Function Debate (2015)

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Re: The Reemergent 1977 H1N1 Strain and the Gain-of-Function Debate (2015)

#121

Post by watertom »

EGreg wrote: post #86
nradov wrote: post #71

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It matters. Zoonotic viruses that jump to humans naturally tend to be less well adapted to human biology, and thus less contagious. That potentially gives us more time to respond before they evolve really dangerous human adapted variants. Whereas GoF research using human tissue or transgenic animals can produce viruses that are perfectly adapted to humans right out of the gate.

That’s true. I don’t remember any other viruses being this contagious for a long time. Avian flu, swine flu, not nearly as contagious as Delta and spreading asymptomatically. Ebola - not as contagious. Perhaps AIDS was the closest.

AIDS, (HIV) spent a long time in human the population before it became a serious problem.

Re: The Reemergent 1977 H1N1 Strain and the Gain-of-Function Debate (2015)

#122

Post by germinalphrase »

ameminator wrote: post #88
germinalphrase wrote: post #74

Earlier quoted context omitted.

“I would like to point out that most of the research, at the same Winnipeg lab discussed above, seems to have been shared with/taken by the Chinese military“ The linked article does not support your assertion that “most” research was shared/taken.

You're right. It only provides evidence that a top member of the Chinese military was working with the lab (specifically with Ebola variants), that this was only discovered after he had access to the lab and that the RCMP are not releasing details on their investigation on the extent that "intellectual property" has been passed on. So, you're right, maybe I should have left it at "infiltrated by the Chinese military"…

That would be more accurate (and damning enough), yes.

Re: The Reemergent 1977 H1N1 Strain and the Gain-of-Function Debate (2015)

#123

Post by philjohn »

mensetmanusman wrote: post #84
halfmatthalfcat wrote: post #68

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Because if we had a competent strategy for dealing with the virus, you wouldn't have been locked in your house for months. This is entirely a failure of government. The origin is for all intents and purposes irrelevant. "Why" ultimately doesn't matter because viruses can just spontaneously evolve in carrier animals, in a lab or by whatever other means causes a mutation where it is now infectious to us. People searchi…

A competent strategy for an aerosol virus that also remains hosted in domestic pets requires many years of preplanning and N95 stockpiling.

Which is why pandemic preparadness plans are a thing - as are teams that run regular drills, and stockpile the necessary PPE.

In both the US and the UK those plans were either ignored, or the teams disbanded.

Re: The Reemergent 1977 H1N1 Strain and the Gain-of-Function Debate (2015)

#124

Post by cxpeople »

bildung wrote: post #96
rayiner wrote: post #78

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> All of this focus on the point of origin is misplaced. We know that there will be new viruses. What matters is how we respond to them. In this case the US response was completely botched. It’s worth talking about better versus worse covid response, but that’s missing the forest for the trees. Most of the G7 didn’t do that much better: from Germany to Italy, and including the US, they’re all in the 1,200 to 2,200 de…

Response type absolutely matters. Sweden has 10x the death rate of Norway, for example. Norway, Finland, Denmark, even Cuba, a poor country with 3x the population density of the US is significantly below 700. Australia stands at 45, not 700, BTW.

Sweden has the same numbers as Germany. Sweden and Germany are very similar with respect to culture, clustering of people in cities, percentage of people with a migration background. Norway and Sweden are not.

Turns out that Sweden and Germany have similar results:

https://ianmsc.substack.com/p/why-does-no-one-ever-talk-abou...

Re: The Reemergent 1977 H1N1 Strain and the Gain-of-Function Debate (2015)

#125

Post by frogpelt »

m0llusk wrote: post #57

The article notes that a lab leak or gain of function research or both are suspected because research with cultivated influenza strains was common at that time. In contrast, attempts by researchers at Wuhan to consistently cultivate coronavirus were unsuccessful. That is why they decided to work with chimeras instead of pursuing gain of function research. All of this focus on the point of origin is misplaced. We know…

I think we can focus on both our response to widespread viruses and also making sure we aren’t shooting ourselves in the face by releasing novel viruses into the wild.

Re: The Reemergent 1977 H1N1 Strain and the Gain-of-Function Debate (2015)

#126

Post by onlyrealcuzzo »

varelse wrote: post #119
rossdavidh wrote: post #101

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Whatever one thinks the optimal response to a pandemic should be, the fact that several nations of western Europe (e.g. France) with much different policies, have per capita mortality the same or higher, suggests that the policies used were not a major determinant of the outcome. If you plot per capita mortality for France and Sweden, they are almost identical, swapping places five times so far. Currently Sweden is s…

Why not focus instead on countries that did get this under control then? Some of them are even western.

You mean island countries?

South Korea is essentially an Island, since it has been completely shut off from NK for decades.

Re: The Reemergent 1977 H1N1 Strain and the Gain-of-Function Debate (2015)

#127

Post by rich_sasha »

rossdavidh wrote: post #101
m0llusk wrote: post #57

The article notes that a lab leak or gain of function research or both are suspected because research with cultivated influenza strains was common at that time. In contrast, attempts by researchers at Wuhan to consistently cultivate coronavirus were unsuccessful. That is why they decided to work with chimeras instead of pursuing gain of function research. All of this focus on the point of origin is misplaced. We know…

Whatever one thinks the optimal response to a pandemic should be, the fact that several nations of western Europe (e.g. France) with much different policies, have per capita mortality the same or higher, suggests that the policies used were not a major determinant of the outcome. If you plot per capita mortality for France and Sweden, they are almost identical, swapping places five times so far. Currently Sweden is s…

It’s a good point, but it is also more complex. For example the severity of policy response tends to be proportional to local severity of the disease.

You can imagine a situation where all countries have a different, fixed propensity to Covid, and adjust their policy until they hit some universal level of containment. You’ll then see a world with very different policies but identical outcomes.

I think it is hard to disentangle those two in general.

Re: The Reemergent 1977 H1N1 Strain and the Gain-of-Function Debate (2015)

#128

Post by tim333 »

ModernMech wrote: post #116
tim333 wrote: post #95

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If it was a lab leak it very much does matter and can be dealt with by stopping such stuff.

The point being made is that even if you stop all pandemics with a lab leak origin, pandemics will still happen. So at the end of the day if you prove covid was lab leak and put in safeguards that will, with 100% certainty stop pandemics with a lab leak origin, you’re nonetheless going to encourage yet pandemics because they are a fact of nature. Therefore it’s more important to respond pandemics rather than prevent…

Yeah but you should do both. Regulate labs and prepare for pandemics.

Re: The Reemergent 1977 H1N1 Strain and the Gain-of-Function Debate (2015)

#129

Post by hourislate »

m0llusk wrote: post #57

The article notes that a lab leak or gain of function research or both are suspected because research with cultivated influenza strains was common at that time. In contrast, attempts by researchers at Wuhan to consistently cultivate coronavirus were unsuccessful. That is why they decided to work with chimeras instead of pursuing gain of function research. All of this focus on the point of origin is misplaced. We know…

>What matters is how we respond to them. In this case the US response was completely botched. This is in part because the team that had been in place to deal with emerging virus threats was disbanded and also in part because the CDC was forced to focus on making the president look good instead of dealing with the virus.

Your confrontational attitude and make believe reasons, dismisses you from any and all future discussions on this matter. You have demonstrated that your are unfit to comment. Please refrain from posting.

Re: The Reemergent 1977 H1N1 Strain and the Gain-of-Function Debate (2015)

#130

Post by thedrbrian »

varelse wrote: post #119
rossdavidh wrote: post #101

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Whatever one thinks the optimal response to a pandemic should be, the fact that several nations of western Europe (e.g. France) with much different policies, have per capita mortality the same or higher, suggests that the policies used were not a major determinant of the outcome. If you plot per capita mortality for France and Sweden, they are almost identical, swapping places five times so far. Currently Sweden is s…

Why not focus instead on countries that did get this under control then? Some of them are even western.

Because it's going to be very hard to move France or Germany into the Pacific. Hell just moving them a few hundred miles into the Atlantic will be difficult .
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