Live data from Hacker News

PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations

github.com

121–130 of 358 posts

Re: PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations

#121
post #75

There are multiple levels of protection one might want. I.e. when you are being selected for random questioning entering US as a non-US citizen, you'd benefit from steganography-like approach: you give a password, and relatively bland, non-personal stuff shows up, giving appearance of full access to a system. If you only care about your privacy, the next one is to have a destroy-everything script (and it's not that h…

>usually, passphrases are only used to decrypt the actual encryption keys, so overwriting those keys should be super fast I'm not sure if it's really that simple with modern flash storage. There might be no guarantee that attempting to overwrite some data will actually affect the particular memory cells where it is stored. You would probably have to trigger a secure erase to reset all memory cells and hope that it is…

This would happen inside the TCM no?

Re: PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations

#122
post #75

There are multiple levels of protection one might want. I.e. when you are being selected for random questioning entering US as a non-US citizen, you'd benefit from steganography-like approach: you give a password, and relatively bland, non-personal stuff shows up, giving appearance of full access to a system. If you only care about your privacy, the next one is to have a destroy-everything script (and it's not that h…

>usually, passphrases are only used to decrypt the actual encryption keys, so overwriting those keys should be super fast I'm not sure if it's really that simple with modern flash storage. There might be no guarantee that attempting to overwrite some data will actually affect the particular memory cells where it is stored. You would probably have to trigger a secure erase to reset all memory cells and hope that it is…

This is something TPMs are good for I guess.

Re: PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations

#123
post #59

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That'd be neat. With Touch ID, it would be very intuitive to configure the middle finger as the trigger to run a duress script.

Always configure a non-obvious part of your thumb (or left thumb) as Touch-ID. Then when under duress, use your normal thumb to make it fail.

You can push the lock button many time (when pulling you phone from the pocket for example) and it will require lock the phone and require to use your passcode

Re: PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations

#124
post #75

There are multiple levels of protection one might want. I.e. when you are being selected for random questioning entering US as a non-US citizen, you'd benefit from steganography-like approach: you give a password, and relatively bland, non-personal stuff shows up, giving appearance of full access to a system. If you only care about your privacy, the next one is to have a destroy-everything script (and it's not that h…

> I.e. when you are being selected for random questioning entering US as a non-US citizen, you'd benefit from steganography-like approach: you give a password, and relatively bland, non-personal stuff shows up, giving appearance of full access to a system. Is there a practical way to implement this today with Linux? I know VeraCrypt supports hidden operating systems, but I think only Windows?

It's possible to have a truly "hidden container" with LUKS/cryptsetup, but it's not exactly a "supported" setup. Here's some information: https://blog.linuxbrujo.net/posts/plausible-deniability-with...

Re: PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations

#125

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It would need to be baked into the OS. With FaceID, I guess I could use eyes crossed, as a queue.

I do not understand why any security concerned person would use biometric identification for anything, ever.

Because there is a difference between identification and authentication and unfortunately the Touch/Face ID mixed then

Re: PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations

#126
post #73

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think on Android you can set up multiple users.

I'd love that feature (android 9+) if it allowed me to install some of the gazillion apps (e.g. every bloody fast food place that only has deals via their app) but restricts them from accessing my real user contacts, emails, msgs, gps/location, etc. Blackberry phones had this feature and it was pretty bulletproof.

I believe users cannot access each others' data. So yes you can use it this way. I'm pretty sure it existed at Android 9. Are you running stock Android or some Samsung bull?

Re: PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations

#127
post #48
post #17

The company that was pitching my employer retina scanners on data center doors 20 years ago had an idea like this. Left eye gets you in, right eye gets you in and alerts security.

This is also very typical for regular alarm systems with a keypad. A PIN disarms the alarms system, the same PIN + 1 disarms the alarm system and notifies security.

in ncis there was a security system where the pin had to be entered twice, only once would alert security.

Re: PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations

#128
post #75

There are multiple levels of protection one might want. I.e. when you are being selected for random questioning entering US as a non-US citizen, you'd benefit from steganography-like approach: you give a password, and relatively bland, non-personal stuff shows up, giving appearance of full access to a system. If you only care about your privacy, the next one is to have a destroy-everything script (and it's not that h…

Even US Citizens are subject to search at the border without warrant or probable cause.

Recently I had a CBP officer at SFO ask to search photo gallery when returning from vacation.

Re: PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations

#129
post #63

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If that's what's mandated, you may have little choice.

Somebody mandates using biometric identification instead of a PIN?!?

Biometric passports: https://www.dhs.gov/e-passports

Face ID: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT208109

Fingerprint Readers: https://www.samsung.com/us/support/answer/ANS00082563/

These are extant, and either part of or required within numerous presently-used systems.

Re: PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations

#130
post #79

Training is very important in duress systems. I once worked in a place with a keypad duress code on the security system. If you prefixed your security PIN with NN-, it was the duress version of the code and would trigger a silent alarm. This was setup long-ago, and not communicated. One night, the keypad was acting glitchy. Partially out of frustration (countdown is running), and partially to test, I ended up acciden…

An interesting way to use this PAM-Duress system would be to write a program that (a) begins recording your microphone and webcam video immediately upon login (b) Aggressively try the hell out of every passwordless Wi-Fi network it can detect, then use headless chrome to aggressively smack every button to get past the stupid login pages (c) Stream that video and audio to a server that saves it.

Use Emergency SOS on your iPhone

https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT208076

Post reply on HN