End game (being charitable to them here) is they can now start encrypting iCloud photos, and iCloud backups for that matter, with a key that they do not have any way to access, while getting the FBI off their backs on this one hot button issue.
That by itself makes it look ok.
Until you consider… there are a couple counterarguments.
One, Apple has not actually enabled such private encryption with the keys out of reach to Apple for iCloud backups.
Two, that child protection in other countries will sometimes be defined in such repugnant terms that it will compromise Apple fully to scan for the hashes provided by “child protection” organizations in those countries.
“Child protection” is in quotes not because I think countries will get away with shoehorning, say, terrorist
content hashes in as purported child pornography hashes. It’s in quotes because the concept of child protection can be so wildly bizarrely corrupted in some countries for religious or ideological reasons. Who decides what is off limits for children, from having gay parents, to having friends of the opposite sex, to having an unislamic head covering? Well, each random government, of course, with Apple as the enabler, and individual and human rights be damned.
So while the most charitably viewed end game may be good, they seem to be papering over the real impacts this could have.