“Our primary goal is to un-fork the Tor Browser”

Post by gtk40 » Mon, Aug 08, 2016, 2:48 PM UTC

daveguy wrote: post #96

eitland wrote: post #65

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> They need to start acting like the situation is getting dire. We might start by start offering free mandatory history lessons everytime anyone uncritically evangelizes for Chrome or create anything that "works best in IE^h^hChrome". Or continue to remind those poor souls that their browser still doesn't support real extensions after all these years ;-)

> their browser still doesn't support real extensions after all these years I'm confused. What is a "real extension"? Given the rich extension library for chrome I'm not sure of the difference. Rather than remind the poor souls, it may be time to acknowledge and accept the fact that "real extensions" aren't an actual benefit of Firefox over Chrome? If it is a reference to IE. I think the only reason IE has market sha…

Also, many of my favorite tabs have no equivalent in Chrome that I can find. One of these is "Tree Style Tab" which is important to my workflow.

IE is not the default on the current version of Windows, though it is on older and still supported versions.

Post by micaksica » Mon, Aug 08, 2016, 5:46 PM UTC

jrochkind1 wrote: post #97

micaksica wrote: post #40

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I agree with this. "Tor Browser Mode" should become the default "Private browsing mode" on Firefox. It seems to me that a lot of uneducated users seem to have the idea that Incognito/Private mode does, somehow, give them more anonymity in a way other than locally. The extra streaming traffic would probably cripple Tor exit nodes in the short run if Mozilla didn't run worldwide fast exits on their own, but it'd be a s…

> if Mozilla didn't run worldwide fast exits on their own If a huge portion of tor traffic is going through exit nodes owned by one organization and presumably deployed on a uniform consistent infrastructure, this becomes a prime target for hackers, state-sponsored or otherwise.

Tor itself is already a prime target for hackers. There are plenty of malicious exit nodes as is; as for nation-states, the cost of entry into polluting the Tor network with your own circuits to probabilistically deanonymize users is low enough as is that you'd be stupid not to do it. By the same logic, torservers.net shouldn't exist, or ipredator's massive exit.

Tor has a fair amount of relay bandwidth; Mozilla running exit nodes adds strength to where the bigger bottleneck is. There isn't a lot of personal risk in running middles or guards to the common techie; an exit node with abusive traffic can get your house raided in the United States [1] and Germany makes you responsible for traffic on your IP [2].

They have the legal and personnel resources to be able to deal with abuse complaints from bad actors, and should, for the sake of the network they support.

[1] http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/seattle-police-raid-home-privacy-ac...

[2] http://www.young-germany.de/topic/live/your-digital-rights-i...

Re: “Our primary goal is to un-fork the Tor Browser”

Re: “Our primary goal is to un-fork the Tor Browser”