Trevor Perrin and I have been working on a dynamic certificate pinning proposal called TACK to help mitigate these types of attacks: http://tack.io In the current state of the world, we're all dependent on CA signatures for each connection we make to a website. TACK is a layer of indirection away from CA certificates, such that we'd only be dependent on CA signatures the very first time we contacted a website. It doe…
New NSA Leak Shows MITM Attacks Against Major Internet Services
111–120 of 149 posts
Re: New NSA Leak Shows MITM Attacks Against Major Internet Services
#112Earlier quoted context omitted.
We have some large websites on board to deploy it, and Trevor has been working with browser vendors to get it integrated. The latter has been pretty slow going, but there is interest.
This isn't a promise or official or anything, but I'm fairly sure that Silent Circle will be interested in deploying TACK. I can put it on the table, if you want, but anything that increases security will be welcome. Also, how does TACK relate to certificate pinning? The introduction has a few differences (e.g. tack expiration), but the two techniques seem pretty similar, am I missing something?
https://lists.riseup.net/www/arc/tack
Regarding certificate pinning: TACK is a different "style" of pinning, it lets you pin to a self-managed signing key instead of certificate keys. So it gives you more control and security than CA pinning, if you're willing to assume more key management responsibilities (storing a TACK private key, and using it to sign new TLS keys).
I think there's room for both approaches: I'd like to see CA pinning be made easy enough that most sites could deploy a fairly safe, simple pin to popular CAs, while high-security sites make use of TACK pins.
But we'll see how things go.
Re: New NSA Leak Shows MITM Attacks Against Major Internet Services
#113Earlier quoted context omitted.
Moxie, have you had any success with getting TACK into OpenSSL builds with the various distributions? It's not a big deal to rebuild nginx/apache but I would think that getting TACK to ship default with OpenSSL would go a long way in getting more adoption.
We have support for a"ServerInfo" file checked into OpenSSL. This is a file with PEM blobs that can specify TACK and similar data (e.g. Certificate Transparency) that an OpenSSL server will return to clients if requested. This is a generic mechanism for TLS Extensions instead of TACK-specific, but it's what we need. It will hopefully appear in OpenSSL 1.0.2. We'll be submitting Apache patches for it shortly. Daniel J…
Re: New NSA Leak Shows MITM Attacks Against Major Internet Services
#114Earlier quoted context omitted.
We have support for a"ServerInfo" file checked into OpenSSL. This is a file with PEM blobs that can specify TACK and similar data (e.g. Certificate Transparency) that an OpenSSL server will return to clients if requested. This is a generic mechanism for TLS Extensions instead of TACK-specific, but it's what we need. It will hopefully appear in OpenSSL 1.0.2. We'll be submitting Apache patches for it shortly. Daniel J…
Any chance this is backported to 0.9.8 series? I still see a ton of installs using 0.9.x
Re: New NSA Leak Shows MITM Attacks Against Major Internet Services
#115Earlier quoted context omitted.
This isn't a promise or official or anything, but I'm fairly sure that Silent Circle will be interested in deploying TACK. I can put it on the table, if you want, but anything that increases security will be welcome. Also, how does TACK relate to certificate pinning? The introduction has a few differences (e.g. tack expiration), but the two techniques seem pretty similar, am I missing something?
That would be great, we have a mailing list interested people should monitor, we'll definitely let people know once things get far enough for sites to start testing the waters. https://lists.riseup.net/www/arc/tack Regarding certificate pinning: TACK is a different "style" of pinning, it lets you pin to a self-managed signing key instead of certificate keys. So it gives you more control and security than CA pinning,…
I will read the spec for more information (e.g. what prevents the MITM from becoming my CA?) but it sounds very interesting, thanks again.
Re: New NSA Leak Shows MITM Attacks Against Major Internet Services
#116It is irresponsible on behalf of the rest of the world to allow this behavior to continue. Maybe after US businesses have experienced enormous economic damages they will change their way.
Re: New NSA Leak Shows MITM Attacks Against Major Internet Services
#117Cut the cables. The USA should be kicked off the internet. They've proven they can't be trusted. It is irresponsible on behalf of the rest of the world to allow this behavior to continue. Maybe after US businesses have experienced enormous economic damages they will change their way.
Re: New NSA Leak Shows MITM Attacks Against Major Internet Services
#118> Another screenshot [2] implies is that the 2011 DigiNotar hack was either the work of the NSA, or exploited by the NSA.
I doubt that those 2 documents are original slides or screenshots from NSA material. They both are written with the familiar rounded font that Globo uses for all its text [3]
[1] http://www.scribd.com/doc/166819124
[2] http://imgur.com/a/g3UGP#1
[3] http://www.fonts.com/font/urw/vag-rundschrift?siteId=2c670c8...)
Re: New NSA Leak Shows MITM Attacks Against Major Internet Services
#119Cut the cables. The USA should be kicked off the internet. They've proven they can't be trusted. It is irresponsible on behalf of the rest of the world to allow this behavior to continue. Maybe after US businesses have experienced enormous economic damages they will change their way.
If the USA were kicked off the internet, US businesses would be far from the only ones that would experience enormous economic damages.
Re: New NSA Leak Shows MITM Attacks Against Major Internet Services
#120Earlier quoted context omitted.
That would be great, we have a mailing list interested people should monitor, we'll definitely let people know once things get far enough for sites to start testing the waters. https://lists.riseup.net/www/arc/tack Regarding certificate pinning: TACK is a different "style" of pinning, it lets you pin to a self-managed signing key instead of certificate keys. So it gives you more control and security than CA pinning,…
Thanks, I will sign up to the list now. So, if I understand it correctly, TACK allows you to become your own CA. I will read the spec for more information (e.g. what prevents the MITM from becoming my CA?) but it sounds very interesting, thanks again.
The "pin activation" algorithm is intended to make it difficult for a MITM to foist bad pins on clients, and to limit the lifetime of such pins.