Hacker News Board Hacker News, browsed like a classic message board
Live data from Hacker News

Torvalds clarifies Linux's Windows 8 Secure Boot position

zdnet.com

Post reply on HN
Print view View original

111–120 of 147 posts

Re: Torvalds clarifies Linux's Windows 8 Secure Boot position

#111

Post by humanspecies »

cooldeal wrote: post #41
speeder wrote: post #7

I always thought that the secure boot is a very, very, very bad idea. In fact the whole UEFI in general I think it is a clusterfuck of mishmashed random ideas, some good, many bad. What I intend to do personally, is attempt to don't use secure boot. And this all might explain the e-mail I got from Lenovo 10 minutes ago... I asked them for a non-Windows machine. They replied saying that they from now on only manufactu…

>In fact the whole UEFI in general I think it is a clusterfuck of mishmashed random ideas, some good, many bad. Care to explain why or how, instead of just throwing a general statement around?

If you need an explanation as to why a encrypted only closed platform shouldn't exist, you're already off the mark.

Re: Torvalds clarifies Linux's Windows 8 Secure Boot position

#112

Post by disgruntledphd2 »

recoiledsnake wrote: post #89
tomjen3 wrote: post #78

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Well it wouldn't have been a fud storm if Microsoft hadn't insistet on it being turned on by default. But if I were to remove a MS key, am I right in assuming that that would prevent anybody from running windows on that machine (at least without installing the key or turning it of)?

If it's turned off by default, it might as well be useless to protect the hundreds of millions of non-technical users who are more prone to get malware. >But if I were to remove a MS key, am I right in assuming that that would prevent anybody from running windows on that machine (at least without installing the key or turning it of)? Windows 8 boots fine without Secure Boot enabled or even supported. However, if you…

The only real reason that I (as a Linux user) can see is for the amusement value, as well as the opportunity to watch others fail to boot Windows on this machine and the opportunity to engage in an extended philosophical discussion regarding this event.

Mind you, I might be a niche case.

Re: Torvalds clarifies Linux's Windows 8 Secure Boot position

#113

Post by emidln »

cooldeal wrote: post #53
mimiflynn wrote: post #29

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think the issue is: to buy a Lenovo machine is to buy Windows. There is no other option but to have to pay for Windows with your machine. One can't just buy a laptop with nothing on it. This can be seen as unfair to the customer in many countries and therefore, illegal.

Can I buy a Toyota car without the Michelin tires they bundle and get a discount? I want to install my custom tires and have no need for the tires they bundle.

I did something similar to this with my Volkswagen. I wanted different tires, wheels, and a different stereo from what was on the car they in the lot. I ended up paying about $500 more, but received exactly what I wanted.

Re: Torvalds clarifies Linux's Windows 8 Secure Boot position

#114

Post by emidln »

mjg59 wrote: post #103
belorn wrote: post #8

> What they've told us privately is that as long as no-one comes along with a plausible exploit for Windows based on using a secure boot enabled Linux system, they don't care what we do. I guess we need to hide all those forensic distributions that can modify and access data on a windows machine. To name a few: backtrack, CAINE, and DEFT. If technology can modify and access data, it can also be used in an exploit. So…

Sure, it modifies Windows. But if it modifies the Windows bootloader, Windows refuses to boot. If it modifies the Windows kernel, the bootloader refuses to load the kernel. If it modifies any Windows drivers, the drivers won't load. So you modify userspace, but under Windows 8 the (signed) malware checker is started before any other userspace.

So you exploit the kernel (or some driver), do whatever evil shit you want, then lie to the signed malware checker. You now have an APT that ignores this whole notion of secure boot.

Come to think of it, this is every modern rootkit. You try to remove it and it reinstalls itself.

There's not intrinsic reason why you have to modify the kernel that sits on disc. Now there are lots of other checks and features you can add (that already exist) to make it harder to get access to the kernel, to make sure that unknown objects are purged or flagged on reboot, etc.

The thing is, this secure boot doesn't seem to significantly make your machine more secure than current TPM-based methods involving sealing a hard disk decryption key that is only unlocked based on checksums of firmware, nvram, bootloader, kernel, etc.

Re: Torvalds clarifies Linux's Windows 8 Secure Boot position

#115

Post by mjg59 »

emidln wrote: post #114
mjg59 wrote: post #103

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Sure, it modifies Windows. But if it modifies the Windows bootloader, Windows refuses to boot. If it modifies the Windows kernel, the bootloader refuses to load the kernel. If it modifies any Windows drivers, the drivers won't load. So you modify userspace, but under Windows 8 the (signed) malware checker is started before any other userspace.

So you exploit the kernel (or some driver), do whatever evil shit you want, then lie to the signed malware checker. You now have an APT that ignores this whole notion of secure boot. Come to think of it, this is every modern rootkit. You try to remove it and it reinstalls itself. There's not intrinsic reason why you have to modify the kernel that sits on disc. Now there are lots of other checks and features you can a…

No, there's no intrinsic reason why you have to modify the on-disk kernel. It just makes detection more difficult, because there's never a point where the OS is running without having been compromised. That makes detection much harder.

You're right that this is no more secure than using a TPM. But most consumer-grade hardware has no TPM, and hardware vendors aren't going to add one just for Microsoft.

Re: Torvalds clarifies Linux's Windows 8 Secure Boot position

#116

Post by anonymfus »

trotsky wrote: post #84

Having read through the entire thread instead of just the expletives, in my opinion it's a rare case of Linux and Greg being totally wrongheaded on the issue. The problem crops up because redhat submitted a pull request to enhance the existing in kernel live inclusion of additional trusted x.509 certificates. Note that this is 100% upstream and live. The pull was to add the ability to extract these x.509 certificates…

But Linus opposes third party modules, especially proprietary. He use only Intel hardware and has personal hate against NVidia. He want to force everybody to contribute to kernel. "Stable API Nonsense".

Re: Torvalds clarifies Linux's Windows 8 Secure Boot position

#117

Post by coldpie »

trotsky wrote: post #84

Having read through the entire thread instead of just the expletives, in my opinion it's a rare case of Linux and Greg being totally wrongheaded on the issue. The problem crops up because redhat submitted a pull request to enhance the existing in kernel live inclusion of additional trusted x.509 certificates. Note that this is 100% upstream and live. The pull was to add the ability to extract these x.509 certificates…

Alternatively, Microsoft could sign x.509 certs. Why are they placing certificate data into Windows binaries in the first place?

The Linux kernel is simply not the place to parse Windows binaries. It's not Linus's fault the de facto standard is a Windows binary, it's just another harmful side-effect of the Windows monopoly.

Really SecureBoot should just die on the vine. But the monopolist wants to force it on their customers, so here it is.

Re: Torvalds clarifies Linux's Windows 8 Secure Boot position

#118

Post by csense »

trotsky wrote: post #84

Having read through the entire thread instead of just the expletives, in my opinion it's a rare case of Linux and Greg being totally wrongheaded on the issue. The problem crops up because redhat submitted a pull request to enhance the existing in kernel live inclusion of additional trusted x.509 certificates. Note that this is 100% upstream and live. The pull was to add the ability to extract these x.509 certificates…

> Every distro should parse the PEs and add every key of every 3rd part module they wish to allow to run and embed these in their signed kernels, issuing a new kernel every time a driver revs.

Why do they have to embed the ID of whitelisted modules in the signed kernel? Why not have a kernel that will load any module the root user tells it to load, then have userland insmod utility verify the signatures using a configuration file like /etc/accepted_module_signers.conf?

Re: Torvalds clarifies Linux's Windows 8 Secure Boot position

#119

Post by csense »

phowat wrote: post #97
nolok wrote: post #93

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Responding from a French point of view, so that might not match Brazil (but does match Germany): you can not tie a material product with an immaterial one, if you do not also sell the material product as a stand alone. You cannot sell a car with an insurance if you don't sell the car alone. You cannot sell a phone with a plan if you don't sell the phone alone (see: iPhone 1 release in Europe). You cannot sell a compu…

Interesting, I know that in Brazil the same law applies even if both products are immaterial. For example, it was common for nightclubs here to give you an option of charging less (or nothing at all) for the entrance into the nightclub if you spent a certain amount of money in drinks or whatever else they sold inside. This was also prohibited by the same law since it was tying two separate "products". Wikipedia artic…

Drinks seem like a material product to me, they're a consumable physical liquid.

The right to enter the nightclub is an immaterial good, along with software or cellphone service.

Actually this is a really well-thought-out law.

Post reply on HN