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Telnyx package compromised on PyPI

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Re: Telnyx package compromised on PyPI

#111

Post by TheTaytay »

vrighter wrote: post #110
mil22 wrote: post #23

For those using uv , you can at least partially protect yourself against such attacks by adding this to your pyproject.toml : [tool.uv] exclude-newer = "7 days" or this to your ~/.config/uv/uv.toml : exclude-newer = "7 days" This will prevent uv picking up any package version released within the last 7 days, hopefully allowing enough time for the community to detect any malware and yank the package version before you…

if everyone waited a week, then everyb would still be installing it it the same time for the first time. This is not a solution.

A lot of automated scanners run during that week.

Re: Telnyx package compromised on PyPI

#112

Post by TheTaytay »

dist-epoch wrote: post #101
ashishb wrote: post #100

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Rather than being hopeful why not start running 'uv' inside sandbox? Why does your python package (cli/Web server/library) need full access to your full disk at the time of execution?

You're doing all of your software development inside containers, all the time? That is very inconvenient.

Devcontainers are looking pretty gold right now…

Re: Telnyx package compromised on PyPI

#115

Post by cestivan »

ashishb wrote: post #100
mil22 wrote: post #23

For those using uv , you can at least partially protect yourself against such attacks by adding this to your pyproject.toml : [tool.uv] exclude-newer = "7 days" or this to your ~/.config/uv/uv.toml : exclude-newer = "7 days" This will prevent uv picking up any package version released within the last 7 days, hopefully allowing enough time for the community to detect any malware and yank the package version before you…

Rather than being hopeful why not start running 'uv' inside sandbox? Why does your python package (cli/Web server/library) need full access to your full disk at the time of execution?

[dead]

Re: Telnyx package compromised on PyPI

#117

Post by LtWorf »

dist-epoch wrote: post #101
ashishb wrote: post #100

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Rather than being hopeful why not start running 'uv' inside sandbox? Why does your python package (cli/Web server/library) need full access to your full disk at the time of execution?

You're doing all of your software development inside containers, all the time? That is very inconvenient.

Why? Just open your entire editor/whatever inside a limited namespace and that's it no?

Re: Telnyx package compromised on PyPI

#118

Post by LtWorf »

woodruffw wrote: post #83
6thbit wrote: post #69

So both this and litellm went straight to PyPI without going to GitHub first. Is there any way to setup PyPI to only publish packages that come from a certain pattern of tag that exists in GH? Would such a measure help at all here?

Yes: if you use a Trusted Publisher with PyPI, you can constrain it to an environment. Then, on GitHub, you can configure that environment with a tag or branch protection rule that only allows the environment to be activated if the ref matches. You can also configure required approvers on the environment, to prevent anyone except your account (and potentially other maintainers you’d like) from activating the environm…

If they have compromised the token wouldn't that mean the developer is compromised and such access can be used to just put "curl whatever" into the build and publish that payload on pypi?

Re: Telnyx package compromised on PyPI

#119

Post by LtWorf »

deathanatos wrote: post #62

> The Telnyx platform, APIs, and infrastructure were not compromised. This incident was limited to the PyPI distribution channel for the Python SDK. Am I being too nitpicky to say that that is part of your infrastructure? Doesn't 2FA stop this attack in its tracks? PyPI supports 2FA, no?

No. I was one of the "lucky" ones forced to use 2FA from the beginning.

I also wrote the twine manpage (in debian) because at the time there was even no way of knowing how to publish at all.

Basically you enable 2FA on your account, go on the website, generate a token, store it in a .txt file and use that for the rest of your life without having to use 2FA ever again.

I had originally thought you'd need your 2FA every upload but that's not how it works.

Then they have the trusted publisher thing (which doesn't and won't work with codeberg) where they just upload whatever comes from github's runners. Of course if the developer's token.txt got compromised, there's a chance also his private ssh key to push on github got compromised and the attackers can push something that will end up on pypi anyway.

Remember that trusted publishing replaces GPG signatures, so the one thing that required unlocking the private key with a passphrase is no longer used.

python.org has also stopped signing their releases with GPG in favour to sigstore, which is another 3rd party signing scheme somewhat similar to trusted publisher.

edit: They deny this but my suspicion is that eventually tokens won't be supported and trusted publishing will be the only way to publish on pypi, locking projects out of using codeberg and whatever other non-major forge they might wish to use.

Re: Telnyx package compromised on PyPI

#120

Post by AnssiH »

ivanvanderbyl wrote: post #20

Has anyone here used Telnyx? I tried to build a product against their API last year and 3 weeks after signing up they banned my account and made it impossible to get an answer as to why or re-enable it.

I tried, but they used some 3rd party KYC platform whose country selection dropdown seemed to have every country except Finland (even Åland, a region of Finland, was there).

Support wasn't helpful.

Went with Twilio instead.

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