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Unauthenticated remote code execution in OpenCode

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Re: Unauthenticated remote code execution in OpenCode

#111

Post by Rygian »

thdxr wrote: post #4

hey maintainer here we've done a poor job handling these security reports, usage has grown rapidly and we're overwhelmed with issues we're meeting with some people this week to advise us on how to handle this better, get a bug bounty program funded and have some audits done

Don't waste your time and money on funding bug bounties or "getting audits done". Your staff will add another big security flaw just the next day, back to square one.

Spend that money in reorganizing your management and training your staff so that everyone in your company is onboard with https://owasp.org/Top10/2025/A06_2025-Insecure_Design/ .

Re: Unauthenticated remote code execution in OpenCode

#112

Post by BoredPositron »

thdxr wrote: post #14
Imustaskforhelp wrote: post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

My original message was more positive but after more looking into context, I am a bit more pessimistic. Now I must admit though that I am little concerned by the fact that the vulnerability reporters tried multiple times to contact you but till no avail. This is not a good look at all and I hope you can fix it asap as you mention I respect dax from the days of SST framework but this is genuinely such a bad look espec…

the email they found was from a different repo and not monitored. this is ultimately our fault for not having a proper SECURITY.md on our main repository the issue that was reported was fixed as soon as we heard about it - going through the process of learning about the CVE process, etc now and setting everything up correctly. we get 100s of issues reported to us daily across various mediums and we're figuring out ho…

Fixed? You just change it to be off by default giving the security burden to your users. It's not fixed it's buried with minimal mitigation and you give no indication to your users that it will make your machine vulnerable if activated. Shady.

Re: Unauthenticated remote code execution in OpenCode

#113

Post by CyberShadow »

jerrythegerbil wrote: post #62

I run mine on the public internet and it’s fine, because I put it behind auth, because it’s a tool to remotely execute code with no auth and also has a fully featured webshell. To be clear, this is a vulnerability. Just the same as exposing unauthenticated telnet is a vulnerability. User education is always good, but at some point in the process of continuing to build user-friendly footguns we need to start blaming t…

Can you share what made this behavior obvious to you? E.g. when I first saw Open Code, it looked like yet another implementation of Claude Code, Codex-CLI, Gemini-CLI, Project Goose, etc. - all these are TUI apps for agentic coding. However, from these, only Open Code automatically started an unauthenticated web server when I simply started the TUI, so this came as a surprise to me.

Re: Unauthenticated remote code execution in OpenCode

#114

Post by dxuh »

I liked aider initially, but I keep running into problems, as the project seems largely unmaintained. I wanted to install OpenCode yesterday, but this somewhat turns me off. Are there any good model-agnostic alternatives? I am somewhat shocked there is not a lot of good open source CLI LLM code assistants going around.

Re: Unauthenticated remote code execution in OpenCode

#115

Post by estsauver »

_zoltan_ wrote: post #109
kaliszad wrote: post #52

Many people seem to be running OpenCode and similar tools on their laptop with basically no privilege separation, sandboxing, fine-grained permissions settings in the tool itself. This tendency is reflected also by how many plugins are designed, where the default assumption is the tool is running unrestricted on the computer next to some kind of IDE as many authentication callbacks go to some port on localhost and th…

Claude asks you for permissions every time it wants to run something.

Until you run --dangerously-skip-permissions

Re: Unauthenticated remote code execution in OpenCode

#116

Post by GoblinSlayer »

Rygian wrote: post #110
rtaylorgarlock wrote: post #7

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Respect for openness. Good work and good luck.

I don't understand what is being encouraged here. Something is seriously wrong when we say "hey, respect!" to a company who develops an unauthenticated RCE feature that should glaringly shine [0] during any internal security analysis, on software that they are licensing in exchange for money [1], and then fumble and drop the ball on security reports when someone does their due diligence for them. If this company want…

Honestly RCE here is in the browser. Why the browser executes any code in sight and this code can do anything?

Re: Unauthenticated remote code execution in OpenCode

#117

Post by mirashii »

ollien wrote: post #92
mirashii wrote: post #90

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Neovim’s server defaults to named pipes or domain sockets, which do not have this issue. The documentation states that the TCP option is insecure. VS Code’s ssh daemon is authenticated.

> Neovim’s server defaults to named pipes or domain sockets, which do not have this issue. The documentation states that the TCP option is insecure. Good note on pipes / domain sockets, but it doesn't appear there's a "default", and the example in the docs even uses TCP, despite the warning below it. https://neovim.io/doc/user/api.html#rpc-connecting (EDIT: I guess outside of headless mode it uses a named pipe?) > VS…

> but it doesn't appear there's a "default"

From the page you linked: Nvim creates a default RPC socket at startup, given by v:servername.

You can follow the links on v:servername to read more about the startup process and figure out what that is, but tl;dr, it's a named pipe unless you override it.

Re: Unauthenticated remote code execution in OpenCode

#118

Post by Rygian »

GoblinSlayer wrote: post #116
Rygian wrote: post #110

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't understand what is being encouraged here. Something is seriously wrong when we say "hey, respect!" to a company who develops an unauthenticated RCE feature that should glaringly shine [0] during any internal security analysis, on software that they are licensing in exchange for money [1], and then fumble and drop the ball on security reports when someone does their due diligence for them. If this company want…

Honestly RCE here is in the browser. Why the browser executes any code in sight and this code can do anything?

It's called "the world wide web" and it works on the principle that a webpage served by computer A can contain links that point to other pages served by computer B.

Whether that principle should have been sustained in the special case of "B = localhost" is a valid question. I think the consensus from the past 40 years has been "yes", probably based on the amount of unknown failure possibilities if the default was reversed to "no".

Re: Unauthenticated remote code execution in OpenCode

#119

Post by GoblinSlayer »

Rygian wrote: post #118
GoblinSlayer wrote: post #116

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Honestly RCE here is in the browser. Why the browser executes any code in sight and this code can do anything?

It's called "the world wide web" and it works on the principle that a webpage served by computer A can contain links that point to other pages served by computer B. Whether that principle should have been sustained in the special case of "B = localhost" is a valid question. I think the consensus from the past 40 years has been "yes", probably based on the amount of unknown failure possibilities if the default was rev…

owasp A01 addresses this: Violation of the principle of least privilege, commonly known as deny by default, where access should only be granted for particular capabilities, roles, or users, but is available to anyone.

Indeed, deny by default policy results in unknown failure possibilities, it's inherent to safety.

Re: Unauthenticated remote code execution in OpenCode

#120

Post by KolenCh »

thdxr wrote: post #14
Imustaskforhelp wrote: post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

My original message was more positive but after more looking into context, I am a bit more pessimistic. Now I must admit though that I am little concerned by the fact that the vulnerability reporters tried multiple times to contact you but till no avail. This is not a good look at all and I hope you can fix it asap as you mention I respect dax from the days of SST framework but this is genuinely such a bad look espec…

the email they found was from a different repo and not monitored. this is ultimately our fault for not having a proper SECURITY.md on our main repository the issue that was reported was fixed as soon as we heard about it - going through the process of learning about the CVE process, etc now and setting everything up correctly. we get 100s of issues reported to us daily across various mediums and we're figuring out ho…

I learnt this the hard way: if anyone is sending multiple emails, with seemingly very important titles and messages, and they get no reply at all, the receiver likely haven’t received your email rather than completely ghosting you. Everyone should know this, and at least try a different channel of communication before further actions, especially from those disclosing vulnerability.
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