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Cap: Lightweight, modern open-source CAPTCHA alternative using proof-of-work

capjs.js.org

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Re: Cap: Lightweight, modern open-source CAPTCHA alternative using proof-of-work

#111

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> how much more CO2 this is going to produce extremely minimal emissions, you're only solving a small cryptographic challenge after all.

Not at scale, however. Like another comment said, this is going to turn out like cryptocurrencies. (I really couldn't care less about the climate debate, but waste is waste.)

even at a huge scale the emissions are still extremely small.

Re: Cap: Lightweight, modern open-source CAPTCHA alternative using proof-of-work

#112
post #67

Earlier quoted context omitted.

For which part? Every time a new submission is created on HN, you have a curl script that posts a comment on it shilling your product. (According to the /newest tab there seems to be one submission every few minutes.) What's harder for you to automate: the comment always posts successfully after 500ms, or you get a Cloudflare Turnstile captcha every time?

PoW is for a completely different threat model than CAPTCHA. If you're trying to decide which is better, you're doing it wrong.

The title of the submission, the project README, and the project homepage repeats:

> CAPTCHA alternative

Re: Cap: Lightweight, modern open-source CAPTCHA alternative using proof-of-work

#113

Did no-one click through to the technical white paper? https://www.researchgate.net/publication/374638786_Proof-of-... "Proof-of-Work CAPTCHA with password cracking functionality" The "work" is "to use the distributed power of webusers’ computers" to "obtain suspects’ passwords in order to access encrypted evidence" and "support law enforcement activities". Funny how that isn't mentioned anywhere in the linked site.

> Normally, it is undesirable for users’ passwords to be cracked. However, in the case of law enforcement, we often need to obtain suspects’ passwords in order to access encrypted evidence. The obvious solution is to build powerful (and expensive) dictionary cryptanalysis computers. A less obvious approach is to use the distributed power of web users’ computers, as has been done in the Seti@Home ( https://setiathome.…

btw no, cap does not contribute to any "fed botnet". you can build the WASM binaries yourself and compare the hashes. added a clarification about that to the docs.

Re: Cap: Lightweight, modern open-source CAPTCHA alternative using proof-of-work

#114
post #11

can someone ELI5 how these proof-of-work captchas work under the hood to detect whether i'm a bot or not?

They don't detect if you're a bot or not; it just makes it more expensive, the idea being that doing $action 10,000 (or more) times becomes much more costly for the attacker, preferably to the point where doing $action (posting spam, creating accounts, etc.) is no longer profitable. It's probably more useful to see it as a ratelimiter than a bot detection mechanism.

Until, of course, the attackers reprogram their FPGAs and can solve challenges 10,000 times faster than a legitimate user. And since you can't request a user to have their phone toast itself at 100% load for 10 seconds, the attackers can solve it in micro/milliseconds for a sip of power.

Actually, this just uses SHA-256 hashing, which already has specialized CPU instructions (that browser WASM can't use) and ASICs.

I can't see how this isn't DOA?

Re: Cap: Lightweight, modern open-source CAPTCHA alternative using proof-of-work

#115

Did no-one click through to the technical white paper? https://www.researchgate.net/publication/374638786_Proof-of-... "Proof-of-Work CAPTCHA with password cracking functionality" The "work" is "to use the distributed power of webusers’ computers" to "obtain suspects’ passwords in order to access encrypted evidence" and "support law enforcement activities". Funny how that isn't mentioned anywhere in the linked site.

> Normally, it is undesirable for users’ passwords to be cracked. However, in the case of law enforcement, we often need to obtain suspects’ passwords in order to access encrypted evidence. The obvious solution is to build powerful (and expensive) dictionary cryptanalysis computers. A less obvious approach is to use the distributed power of web users’ computers, as has been done in the Seti@Home ( https://setiathome.…

2030: to enter the site you must allow us to mine few ethereal on your pc...

Re: Cap: Lightweight, modern open-source CAPTCHA alternative using proof-of-work

#116

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Cap does not send any of the calculated hashes ANYWHERE, the white paper just details a bit how proof-of-work works and I thought that it would be interesting to share.

added a note saying that to the docs, should hopefully clarify stuff a bit!

In case you weren't aware, a blue hat is typically associated with law enforcement in the US. On its own it'd be no problem, but the logo, the paper, and the comment above correctly pointing out concerns/lack of acknowledgement on your site (until now) really comes off as suspicious.

FWIW, I do believe you just made a few unintentional awkward choices instead of being malicious... But a product associated with something like this is a hard sell.

Re: Cap: Lightweight, modern open-source CAPTCHA alternative using proof-of-work

#117
post #39

How does this compare to Anubis, another similar PoW based CAPTCHA? Paired with this, and if there is a way to block out DDOS https traffic then we might be able to stop dependence on Cloudflare altogether.

I'd be so happy if the Internet moved away from Cloudflare for Captcha. I got on their "bad list" at one point (for who knows why), and no matter how many times I checked the "I am a human" box their Captcha wouldn't let me through for a few days. I was unable to login to the portal of a product that we pay for. It was such a frustrating experience.

In my case the harsh firewall settings made by my company on our laptops were showing a red flag on captchas WAFs etc

Re: Cap: Lightweight, modern open-source CAPTCHA alternative using proof-of-work

#118
post #35

I was wondering if more sites will start to drift to a system where they require you to be logged in to an account attached to a SIM card in some ways. I feel like accounts that require phone verification are already similar in that they require a some cost to access. It obviously wouldn't stop a large corporation from buying up thousands of numbers if they needed it for a specific purpose, but it would be prohibitiv…

Such site is better provide some unique service no one else can. There is no way I am sharing my phone number with random sites unless I absolutely have to, I get enough spam & scam already, and tracking potential is enormous.

You might not, but most people don't care anymore, and they will give their personal data. And then you will have no choice, as you will be the outlier who is just an old man yelling at clouds.

Re: Cap: Lightweight, modern open-source CAPTCHA alternative using proof-of-work

#119

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There are two binaries commited to the repo (cap_wasm_bg.wasm) but from what I can tell, it doesn't seem to be making any network calls or what have you. They still should get rid of them and add a Rust build step for their browser/node packages.

you can compare the hashes of the wasm lmao the build script is very much public

It's not a good practice to commit binary blobs in a repository. And I don't think it would be difficult to add a prepublish step to your npm packages so that you can remove them. The end user shouldn't need to run the build script and compare hashes whenever the source code changes.

Very surprised to get pushback on what I thought was an industry standard lmao

Re: Cap: Lightweight, modern open-source CAPTCHA alternative using proof-of-work

#120

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Normally, it is undesirable for users’ passwords to be cracked. However, in the case of law enforcement, we often need to obtain suspects’ passwords in order to access encrypted evidence. The obvious solution is to build powerful (and expensive) dictionary cryptanalysis computers. A less obvious approach is to use the distributed power of web users’ computers, as has been done in the Seti@Home ( https://setiathome.…

2030: to enter the site you must allow us to mine few ethereal on your pc...

You better not show me any ads if you want my system to make some crypto for you then.

We’ll, who am I kidding

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